“BUT IT WOULD BE WRONG”

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Darwall
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Reactive Attitudes ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Buck Passing ◽  
Reason For Action

AbstractIs the fact that an action would be wrong itself a reason not to perform it? Warranted attitude accounts of value suggest “buck-passing” about value, that being valuable is not itself a reason but “passes the buck” to the reasons for valuing something in which its value consists. Would a warranted attitude account of moral obligation and wrongness, not entail, therefore, that being morally obligatory or wrong gives no reason for action itself? I argue that this is not true. Although warranted attitude theories of normative concepts entail buck-passing with respect to reasons for the specific attitudes that are inherently involved in the concept, the concepts of moral obligation and wrong are normative not in the first instance for action, but for a distinctive set of attitudes (Strawsonian “reactive attitudes”) through which we hold ourselves and one another answerable for our actions. On this analysis, moral obligations are demands we legitimately make as representative persons, and the fact that an act would violate such a demand, and so disrespect the authority these demands presuppose, is indeed a reason not to perform the wrongful act that is additional to whatever features make the act wrong.

Joint Activities and Moral Obligation

2019 ◽  
pp. 177-194
Author(s):  
Holmer Steinfath
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Smooth Transition ◽  
Reactive Attitudes ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Normative Structure ◽  
Joint Activities ◽  
The Social ◽  
Moral Normativity

This chapter explores the close connection between “dyadic” moral obligations and joint activities that are essential for the social life of human beings. Against Margaret Gilbert’s well-known claim, the chapter argues that joint activities are not inherently laden with obligations and entitlements. However, it shows that there is a smooth transition from joint activities to a form of morality. In this transition, reactive attitudes like resentment play an important role. Full-blown moral normativity presupposes a group of more than two people, but the normative structure of a moral community mirrors the way in which people relate to each other in typical joint activities.

MORAL OBLIGATION AFTER THE DEATH OF GOD: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON CONCERNS FROM IMMANUEL KANT, G. W. F. HEGEL, AND ELIZABETH ANSCOMBE

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Tristram Engelhardt
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Important Change ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
European Continent ◽  
Presence Of God ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
The Status

AbstractOnce God is no longer recognized as the ground and the enforcer of morality, the character and force of morality undergoes a significant change, a point made by G.E.M. Anscombe in her observation that without God the significance of morality is changed, as the word criminal would be changed if there were no criminal law and criminal courts. There is no longer in principle a God's-eye perspective from which one can envisage setting moral pluralism aside. In addition, it becomes impossible to show that morality should always trump concerns of prudence, concerns for one's own non-moral interests and the interests of those to whom one is close. Immanuel Kant's attempt to maintain the unity of morality and the force of moral obligation by invoking the idea of God and the postulates of pure practical reason (i.e., God and immortality) are explored and assessed. Hegel's reconstruction of the status of moral obligation is also examined, given his attempt to eschew Kant's thing-in-itself, as well as Kant's at least possible transcendent God. Severed from any metaphysical anchor, morality gains a contingent content from socio-historical context and its enforcement from the state. Hegel's disengagement from a transcendent God marks a watershed in the place of God in philosophical reflections regarding the status of moral obligations on the European continent. Anscombe is vindicated. Absent the presence of God, there is an important change in the force of moral obligation.

GOALS, LUCK, AND MORAL OBLIGATION

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-316
Author(s):  
R. G. Frey
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Moral Experience ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Moral Obligations

AbstractIn Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams is rather severe on what he thinks of as an ethics of obligation. He has in mind by this Kant and W. D. Ross. For many, obligation seems the very core of ethics and the moral realm, and lives more generally are seen through the prism of this notion. This, according to Williams, flattens out our lives and moral experience and fails to take into account things which are obviously important to our lives. Once we take these things into account, what do we do if they come into conflict with some of our moral obligations, as Williams, in his earlier writings on moral luck, thought to be the case. I want here to explore some of these ideas, in a way that I think harmonious with Williams's general bent though not one that I intend as in any way detailed exegesis of Williams's work.

Discretionary Moral Duties

2019 ◽  
pp. 50-72
Author(s):  
R. Jay Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
General Framework ◽  
Mutual Aid ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Duties

The topic of Chapter 3 is the idea that there are discretionary moral duties, i.e., duties that cede to the agent who stands under them wide latitude in determining the actions that count as satisfying them. The chapter offers a general framework for thinking about moral obligations, which construes such obligations in essentially relational terms. It then draws on this conception of moral obligation to understand two classes of obligations that are intuitively understood to exhibit wide agential discretion: duties of gratitude and of mutual aid. It argues that the wide agential discretion apparent in these cases makes sense against the background of an understanding of morality as a set of directed obligations that we owe to each other, as individuals. A further important theme is the standing of morality as a source of requirements that make it possible for agents to relate to each other on a basis of autonomy and equality.

The Obligation Dilemma

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ishtiyaque Haji
Keyword(s):  
Interpersonal Relationships ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Skeptical Conclusion

This book argues for the prima facie plausibility of the surprising and paradoxical conclusion that there are no moral obligations regardless of whether determinism is true. In the form of a dilemma, the primary argument for this skeptical conclusion presupposes that obligation requires freedom. A minimal number of credible principles entail that this is the freedom both to do, and to refrain from doing, what is obligatory. On the deterministic horn of the dilemma, since determinism eliminates freedom to do otherwise, it imperils moral obligation. On the indeterministic horn, pertinent actions are too luck-infected to qualify as obligations. Hence, there are no moral obligations. The book’s principal goal is to develop the obligation dilemma as powerfully and clearly as possible to inspire sustained philosophical work to solve it (assuming that it can be solved). In many respects, the obligation dilemma mirrors the venerable responsibility dilemma: regardless of whether determinism is true, no one is morally responsible for anything. The book shows that various prevalent moves in favor of, or in response to, the responsibility dilemma are, when suitably amended, not promising as supportive of, or retorts to, the obligation dilemma. Exposing the obligation dilemma’s implications for responsibility, and its ramifications for forgiveness (something central to salutary interpersonal relationships), underscores its urgency.

Normativity and Reason

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 406-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Pink
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Force Model ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Rational Justification ◽  
Recent Philosophy ◽  
Rational Demand

AbstractMoral obligation is a demand of reason—a demanding kind of rational justification. How to understand this rational demand? Much recent philosophy, as in the work of Scanlon, takes obligatoriness to be a reason-giving feature of an action. But the paper argues that moral obligatoriness should instead be understood as a mode of justificatory support—as a distinctive justificatory force of demand. The paper argues that this second model of obligation, the Force model, was central to the natural law tradition in ethics, is truer to everyday intuition about obligation, and also changes our understanding of the problem of moral rationality. A new account is given of why it might be irrational to breach moral obligations. The Force model also sheds new light on moral responsibility, our responsibility for meeting moral obligations. Moral obligation is a standard of reason; but moral responsibility is shown to involve far more than ordinary rational appraisability, precisely because moral obligation involves a distinctive justificatory force of demand—one which specifically governs how we act.

International Business, Morality, and the Common Good

1992 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Velasquez
Keyword(s):  
Multinational Corporations ◽  
International Business ◽  
Greenhouse Effect ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
International Environment ◽  
The Common ◽  
Business Morality

The author sets out a realist defense of the claim that in the absence of an international enforcement agency, multinational corporations operating in a competitive international environment cannot be said to have a moral obligation to contribute to the international common good, provided that interactions are nonrepetitive and provided effective signals of agent reliability are not possible. Examples of international common goods that meet these conditions are support of the global ozone layer and avoidance of the global greenhouse effect. Pointing out that the conclusion that multinationals have no moral obligations in these areas is deplorable, the author urges the establishment of an international enforcement agency.

scholarly journals Don’t Join the Joyride:

2019 ◽  
pp. 5-19
Author(s):  
Kjetil Mangset Skjerve ◽  
Trygve Lavik
Keyword(s):  
Social Change ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Harm Principle ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Good Time ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Large Group ◽  
Climate Ethics ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Undesirable Outcome

The paper argues that, counter to Walter Sinnott-Armostrong and Ewen Kingston’s view, we are morally required to refrain from joyguzzling, i.e., driving a fuel-inefficient car for no other purpose than having a good time. It is undisputed that joyguzzling is an example of a situation where the uncoordinated actions of a large group of individuals lead to an undesirable outcome. Additionally, it is highly unlikely that any one individual’s actions will have a significant impact on that outcome. But there are morally relevant differences between cases that share these characteristics.  The paper clarifies the debate by introducing and discussing three different types of cases: drop-in-the-ocean cases, overkill cases and emergence cases. We argue that we may have moral obligations in drop-in-the-ocean cases, and that emissions of GHGs are not examples of overkill cases.   Then we demonstrate through counterexamples that there are moral obligations in a subgroup of emergence cases we call joyguzzling-like cases. After criticizing the soundness of Kingston and Sinnott-Armstrong’s arguments, we critically address their relevance. We argue that Sinnott-Armstrong and Kingston fail to distinguish between two concepts of moral obligation — namely, autonomous and heteronomous moral obligation; that their most important arguments do not have any relevance to heteronomous obligations; and, finally, that heteronomous moral obligations are essential for social change. Keywords: joyguzzling, individual responsibility, climate ethics, harm principle, autonomous vs. heteronomous moral obligations

scholarly journals Analysis of Factors that Influence Taxpayers Compliance in Fulfilling their Taxation Obligations: Study of Small Medium Entrepreneur (SMEs) Taxpayers Based on eCommerce in the Bandung Area

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
Ayu Fuady Sania ◽  
Ivan Yudianto
Keyword(s):  
Data Analysis ◽  
Data Collection ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Online Marketplace ◽  
Program Version

This study aims to determine what factors that can affect taxpayer compliance SMEs based e-Commercein Bandung. This research uses taxpayer awareness, moral obligation and quality of tax service asfactors. A questionnaire was used as research instruments in data collection. Respondents of weresampled in this research are e-Commerce business actor who using online marketplace. Multiple linearregression with SPSS program version 23 is used for data analysis. The results of this study concludedthat taxpayer awareness, moral obligations, and the quality of tax service simultaneously influencedsignificantly to taxpayer compliance. Then the test partially produces the taxpayer awareness and thequality of tax service have a positive and significant effect on taxpayer compliance, while the moralobligation hasn’t a positive and significant effect on taxpayer compliance.

scholarly journals The Right to Seek Asylum of ‘Climate Refugees’

Acta Humana ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-136
Author(s):  
Valéria Horváth
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Climate Change Mitigation ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Mitigation And Adaptation ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right ◽  
Change Mitigation ◽  
Climate Refugees

Although the issue of climate change mitigation and adaptation is fortunately evermore widely discussed, the problems facing ‘climate refugees’ only appears sporadically in the discussions adding to the current confusion. Taking recent and forecasted trends into account, the UN declares that states have serious moral obligations to provide humanitarian protection to all those displaced. The question which the international community and international lawyers face is whether states have more than just a moral obligation to provide protection. In this paper I will assess whether or not there are any roots in the various sources of international law – such as conventional law, customary international law, or the fundamental principles of international law – for the legal definition of ‘climate refugees’.

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