The Obligation Dilemma

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ishtiyaque Haji
Keyword(s):  
Interpersonal Relationships ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Skeptical Conclusion

This book argues for the prima facie plausibility of the surprising and paradoxical conclusion that there are no moral obligations regardless of whether determinism is true. In the form of a dilemma, the primary argument for this skeptical conclusion presupposes that obligation requires freedom. A minimal number of credible principles entail that this is the freedom both to do, and to refrain from doing, what is obligatory. On the deterministic horn of the dilemma, since determinism eliminates freedom to do otherwise, it imperils moral obligation. On the indeterministic horn, pertinent actions are too luck-infected to qualify as obligations. Hence, there are no moral obligations. The book’s principal goal is to develop the obligation dilemma as powerfully and clearly as possible to inspire sustained philosophical work to solve it (assuming that it can be solved). In many respects, the obligation dilemma mirrors the venerable responsibility dilemma: regardless of whether determinism is true, no one is morally responsible for anything. The book shows that various prevalent moves in favor of, or in response to, the responsibility dilemma are, when suitably amended, not promising as supportive of, or retorts to, the obligation dilemma. Exposing the obligation dilemma’s implications for responsibility, and its ramifications for forgiveness (something central to salutary interpersonal relationships), underscores its urgency.

Obligation and Forgiveness

2019 ◽  
pp. 220-245
Author(s):  
Ishtiyaque Haji
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Interpersonal Relationships ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Free Actions

Obligation compatibilism is the view that moral obligation is compatible with determinism. A competitor, obligation libertarianism, says that moral obligation is incompatible with determinism, and there are free actions that are morally obligatory for some people. A way to appreciate the importance of the obligation dilemma is to reflect on whether either of these rivals can accommodate forgiveness, something deemed central to interpersonal relationships. This chapter explores this issue by examining whether forgiveness presupposes our having free will owing to its putative essential ties to moral obligation. It proposes that forgiveness is conceptually associated not with obligation but with prima facie obligation. The chapter terminates with a discussion on whether prima facie obligation, and thus forgiveness, presupposes our having free will.

scholarly journals THE OBLIGATION TO OBEY THE LAW IN THE LIGHT OF THE DEBATE BETWEEN FINNIS AND RAZ

2021 ◽  
Vol 48 (152) ◽  
pp. 725
Author(s):  
Andrea Luisa Bucchile Faggion
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Social Facts ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
The Law ◽  
John Finnis

The recent debate between John Finnis and Joseph Raz on the existence of a general prima facie moral obligation to obey positive laws is a major contribution to a classical topic in legal and political philosophy. In this paper, I argue that Raz’s normal justification thesis and Finnis’s doctrine of “determinatio,” inherited from Aquinas, complement each other, shedding light on how norms grounded in social facts can give rise to particular moral obligations independently of their content. However, I argue that this on its own does not explain the possibility of a general moral obligation to obey the law, that is, the notion that everyone has a prima facie moral obligation to obey every law that applies to them.

MORAL OBLIGATION AFTER THE DEATH OF GOD: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON CONCERNS FROM IMMANUEL KANT, G. W. F. HEGEL, AND ELIZABETH ANSCOMBE

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Tristram Engelhardt
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Important Change ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
European Continent ◽  
Presence Of God ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
The Status

AbstractOnce God is no longer recognized as the ground and the enforcer of morality, the character and force of morality undergoes a significant change, a point made by G.E.M. Anscombe in her observation that without God the significance of morality is changed, as the word criminal would be changed if there were no criminal law and criminal courts. There is no longer in principle a God's-eye perspective from which one can envisage setting moral pluralism aside. In addition, it becomes impossible to show that morality should always trump concerns of prudence, concerns for one's own non-moral interests and the interests of those to whom one is close. Immanuel Kant's attempt to maintain the unity of morality and the force of moral obligation by invoking the idea of God and the postulates of pure practical reason (i.e., God and immortality) are explored and assessed. Hegel's reconstruction of the status of moral obligation is also examined, given his attempt to eschew Kant's thing-in-itself, as well as Kant's at least possible transcendent God. Severed from any metaphysical anchor, morality gains a contingent content from socio-historical context and its enforcement from the state. Hegel's disengagement from a transcendent God marks a watershed in the place of God in philosophical reflections regarding the status of moral obligations on the European continent. Anscombe is vindicated. Absent the presence of God, there is an important change in the force of moral obligation.

Intrafamilial Organ Donation Is Often an Altruistic Act

2003 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Spital
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Organ Donation ◽  
Genetic Relationship ◽  
Recent Article ◽  
Family Members ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Logical Conclusion ◽  
Prima Facie Duty

In their recent article, Glannon and Ross remind us that family members have obligations to help each other that strangers do not have. They argue, I believe correctly, that what creates moral obligations within families is not genetic relationship but rather a sharing of intimacy. For no one are these obligations stronger than they are for parents of young children. This observation leads the authors to the logical conclusion that organ donation by a parent to her child is not optional but rather a prima facie duty. However, Glannon and Ross go a step further by suggesting that because parent-to-child organ donation is a duty, it cannot be altruistic. They assert that “altruistic acts are optional, nonobligatory…supererogatory…. Given that altruism consists in purely optional actions presupposing no duty to aid others, any parental act that counts as meeting a child's needs cannot be altruistic.” Here I think the authors go too far.

GOALS, LUCK, AND MORAL OBLIGATION

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-316
Author(s):  
R. G. Frey
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Moral Experience ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Moral Obligations

AbstractIn Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams is rather severe on what he thinks of as an ethics of obligation. He has in mind by this Kant and W. D. Ross. For many, obligation seems the very core of ethics and the moral realm, and lives more generally are seen through the prism of this notion. This, according to Williams, flattens out our lives and moral experience and fails to take into account things which are obviously important to our lives. Once we take these things into account, what do we do if they come into conflict with some of our moral obligations, as Williams, in his earlier writings on moral luck, thought to be the case. I want here to explore some of these ideas, in a way that I think harmonious with Williams's general bent though not one that I intend as in any way detailed exegesis of Williams's work.

Discretionary Moral Duties

2019 ◽  
pp. 50-72
Author(s):  
R. Jay Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
General Framework ◽  
Mutual Aid ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Duties

The topic of Chapter 3 is the idea that there are discretionary moral duties, i.e., duties that cede to the agent who stands under them wide latitude in determining the actions that count as satisfying them. The chapter offers a general framework for thinking about moral obligations, which construes such obligations in essentially relational terms. It then draws on this conception of moral obligation to understand two classes of obligations that are intuitively understood to exhibit wide agential discretion: duties of gratitude and of mutual aid. It argues that the wide agential discretion apparent in these cases makes sense against the background of an understanding of morality as a set of directed obligations that we owe to each other, as individuals. A further important theme is the standing of morality as a source of requirements that make it possible for agents to relate to each other on a basis of autonomy and equality.

Political Obligation

Philosophy ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ned Dobos
Keyword(s):  
Social Exclusion ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Sole Source ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Law ◽  
Additional Reason

There are good, prudential reasons to obey the law. The prospect of punishment, not to mention loss of reputation and social exclusion, is enough for most any citizen possessed of a suitably far-sighted self-interest to discharge his or her legal duties. But is there a moral obligation to do what the law requires, just because the law requires it? If the answer is yes and the mere illegality of an act renders its performance prima facie morally wrong, political obligation obtains. Political obligation thus refers to the moral duty of citizens to obey the laws of their state. In cases where an action or forbearance that is required by law is morally obligatory on independent grounds, political obligation simply gives the citizen an additional reason for acting accordingly. But law tends to extend beyond morality, forbidding otherwise morally innocent behavior and compelling acts and omissions that people tend to think of as morally discretionary. In such cases, the sole source of one’s moral duty to comply with the law is one’s political obligation.

“BUT IT WOULD BE WRONG”

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Darwall
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Reactive Attitudes ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Buck Passing ◽  
Reason For Action

AbstractIs the fact that an action would be wrong itself a reason not to perform it? Warranted attitude accounts of value suggest “buck-passing” about value, that being valuable is not itself a reason but “passes the buck” to the reasons for valuing something in which its value consists. Would a warranted attitude account of moral obligation and wrongness, not entail, therefore, that being morally obligatory or wrong gives no reason for action itself? I argue that this is not true. Although warranted attitude theories of normative concepts entail buck-passing with respect to reasons for the specific attitudes that are inherently involved in the concept, the concepts of moral obligation and wrong are normative not in the first instance for action, but for a distinctive set of attitudes (Strawsonian “reactive attitudes”) through which we hold ourselves and one another answerable for our actions. On this analysis, moral obligations are demands we legitimately make as representative persons, and the fact that an act would violate such a demand, and so disrespect the authority these demands presuppose, is indeed a reason not to perform the wrongful act that is additional to whatever features make the act wrong.

Normativity and Reason

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 406-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Pink
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Force Model ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Rational Justification ◽  
Recent Philosophy ◽  
Rational Demand

AbstractMoral obligation is a demand of reason—a demanding kind of rational justification. How to understand this rational demand? Much recent philosophy, as in the work of Scanlon, takes obligatoriness to be a reason-giving feature of an action. But the paper argues that moral obligatoriness should instead be understood as a mode of justificatory support—as a distinctive justificatory force of demand. The paper argues that this second model of obligation, the Force model, was central to the natural law tradition in ethics, is truer to everyday intuition about obligation, and also changes our understanding of the problem of moral rationality. A new account is given of why it might be irrational to breach moral obligations. The Force model also sheds new light on moral responsibility, our responsibility for meeting moral obligations. Moral obligation is a standard of reason; but moral responsibility is shown to involve far more than ordinary rational appraisability, precisely because moral obligation involves a distinctive justificatory force of demand—one which specifically governs how we act.

International Business, Morality, and the Common Good

1992 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Velasquez
Keyword(s):  
Multinational Corporations ◽  
International Business ◽  
Greenhouse Effect ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
International Environment ◽  
The Common ◽  
Business Morality

The author sets out a realist defense of the claim that in the absence of an international enforcement agency, multinational corporations operating in a competitive international environment cannot be said to have a moral obligation to contribute to the international common good, provided that interactions are nonrepetitive and provided effective signals of agent reliability are not possible. Examples of international common goods that meet these conditions are support of the global ozone layer and avoidance of the global greenhouse effect. Pointing out that the conclusion that multinationals have no moral obligations in these areas is deplorable, the author urges the establishment of an international enforcement agency.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document