scholarly journals ROLUL SERVICIILOR DE INTELLIGENCE ÎN POLITICA EXTERNĂ AMERICANĂ.

2021 ◽  
Vol 79 (2) ◽  
pp. 136-147
Author(s):  
Daniel-Mihai DUȚU ◽  
Teodor BADIU

Această lucrare prezintă rolul serviciilor de intelligence în politica externă americană, utilizând ca studiu de caz conflictul din Afganistan din perioada 1979-1989. Astfel, lucrarea are în vedere acțiunile (și inacțiunile) serviciilor de intelligence americane, scoțând în evidență limitările serviciilor în acea perioadă. Pentru acestea, este important de prezentat atât contextul declanșării invaziei din Afganistan, cât și cele două perspective (americană și sovietică) asupra acestui conflict. Am considerat necesară și o analiză a perspectivei sovietice asupra conflictului și, mai ales, asupra intervenției americane în Afganistan, pentru a prezenta cât mai obiectiv contextul și desfășurarea evenimentelor. Folosind documente relevante, dar și poziții și mărturii ale unor oficiali care au lucrat în CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), în perioada conflictului din Afganistan, lucrarea arată modul în care deciziile de politică externă au fost luate de către administrațiile de la Washington, care s-au succedat în perioada 1979-1989, dar și modul în care serviciile de intelligence americane au influențat procesul decizional și, în mod evident, evoluția conflictului.

2018 ◽  
pp. 97-130
Author(s):  
Denzenlkham Ulambayar

Since the 1990s, when previously classified and top secret Russian archival documents on the Korean War became open and accessible, it has become clear for post-communist countries that Kim Il Sung, Stalin and Mao Zedong were the primary organizers of the war. It is now equally certain that tensions arising from Soviet and American struggle generated the origins of the Korean War, namely the Soviet Union’s occupation of the northern half of the Korean peninsula and the United States’ occupation of the southern half to the 38th parallel after 1945 as well as the emerging bipolar world order of international relations and Cold War. Newly available Russian archival documents produced much in the way of new energies and opportunities for international study and research into the Korean War.2 However, within this research few documents connected to Mongolia have so far been found, and little specific research has yet been done regarding why and how Mongolia participated in the Korean War. At the same time, it is becoming today more evident that both Soviet guidance and U.S. information reports (evaluated and unevaluated) regarding Mongolia were far different from the situation and developments of that period. New examples of this tendency are documents declassified in the early 2000s and released publicly from the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in December 2016 which contain inaccurate information. The original, uncorrupted sources about why, how and to what degree the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) became a participant in the Korean War are in fact in documents held within the Mongolian Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. These archives contain multiple documents in relation to North Korea. Prior to the 1990s Mongolian scholars Dr. B. Lkhamsuren,3 Dr. B. Ligden,4 Dr. Sh. Sandag,5 junior scholar J. Sukhee,6 and A. A. Osipov7 mention briefly in their writings the history of relations between the MPR and the DPRK during the Korean War. Since the 1990s the Korean War has also briefly been touched upon in the writings of B. Lkhamsuren,8 D. Ulambayar (the author of this paper),9 Ts. Batbayar,10 J. Battur,11 K. Demberel,12 Balảzs Szalontai,13 Sergey Radchenko14 and Li Narangoa.15 There have also been significant collections of documents about the two countries and a collection of memoirs published in 200716 and 2008.17 The author intends within this paper to discuss particularly about why, how and to what degree Mongolia participated in the Korean War, the rumors and realities of the war and its consequences for the MPR’s membership in the United Nations. The MPR was the second socialist country following the Soviet Union (the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics) to recognize the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and establish diplomatic ties. That was part of the initial stage of socialist system formation comprising the Soviet Union, nations in Eastern Europe, the MPR, the PRC (People’s Republic of China) and the DPRK. Accordingly between the MPR and the DPRK fraternal friendship and a framework of cooperation based on the principles of proletarian and socialist internationalism had been developed.18 In light of and as part of this framework, The Korean War has left its deep traces in the history of the MPR’s external diplomatic environment and state sovereignty


2021 ◽  
pp. 096834452110179
Author(s):  
Raphaël Ramos

This article deals with the influence of Gen. George C. Marshall on the foundation of the US intelligence community after the Second World War. It argues that his uneven achievements demonstrate how the ceaseless wrangling within the Truman administration undermined the crafting of a coherent intelligence policy. Despite his bureaucratic skills and prominent positions, Marshall struggled to achieve his ends on matters like signals intelligence, covert action, or relations between the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. Yet he crafted an enduring vision of how intelligence should supplement US national security policy that remained potent throughout the Cold War and beyond.


2003 ◽  
Vol 12 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 207-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Gerteis

AbstractDuring the 1950s, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) led a global covert attempt to suppress left-led labor movements in Western Europe, the Mediterranean, West Africa, Central and South America, and East Asia. American union leaders argued that to survive the Cold War, they had to demonstrate to the United States government that organized labor was not part-and-parcel with Soviet communism. The AFL’s global mission was placed in care of Jay Lovestone, a founding member of the American Communist Party in 1921 and survivor of decades of splits and internecine battles over allegiance to one faction or another in Soviet politics before turning anti-Communist and developing a secret relation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after World War II. Lovestone’s idea was that the AFL could prove its loyalty by helping to root out Communists from what he perceived to be a global labor movement dominated by the Soviet Union. He was the CIA’s favorite Communist turned anti-Communist.


1991 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
pp. 185
Author(s):  
Peter Grose ◽  
Arthur P. Darling

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 111-111

Officials of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Office for Africa, Office of Legislative Counsel, and the Freedom of Information Coordinator were contacted in an attempt to obtain information on the CIA’s involvement in Africa. These officials all declined to provide such information. Moreover, they all declined to provide a written statement of refusal to answer the ASA’s questions on the CIA’s involvement in Africa. The only material provided by the CIA was the Central Intelligence Agency Information Kit from which the photograph from page 112 is reproduced.


Author(s):  
Ilko Drenkov

Dr. Radan Sarafov (1908-1968) lived actively but his life is still relatively unknown to the Bulgarian academic and public audience. He was a strong character with an ulti-mate and conscious commitment to democratic Bulgaria. Dr. Sarafov was chosen by IMRO (Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) to represent the idea of coop-eration with Anglo-American politics prior to the Second World War. Dr. Sarafov studied medicine in France, specialized in the Sorbonne, and was recruited by Colonel Ross for the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), remaining undisclosed after the with-drawal of the British legation in 1941. After World War II, he continued to work for foreign intelligence and expanded the spectrum of cooperation with both France and the United States. After WWII, Sarafov could not conform to the reign of the communist regime in Bulgaria. He made a connection with the Anglo-American intelligence ser-vices and was cooperating with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for more than a decade. Sarafov was caught in 1968 and convicted by the Committee for State Securi-ty (CSS) in Bulgaria. The detailed review of the past events and processes through personal drama and commitment reveals the disastrous core of the communist regime. The acknowledgment of the people who sacrificed their lives in the name of democrat-ic values is always beneficial for understanding the division and contradictions from the time of the Cold War.


1998 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-13
Author(s):  
John F. Clark

Both continuity and change capture the evolving role of the Clinton White House in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. Elements of continuity are reflected in a familiar pattern of relationships between the White House and the principal foreign policy bureaucracies, most notably the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Department of Defense (Pentagon), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and more recently the U.S. Department of Commerce. As cogently argued in Peter J. Schraeder’s analysis of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa during the Cold War era, the White House has tended to take charge of U.S. African policies only in those relatively rare situations perceived as crises by the president and his closest advisors. In other, more routine situations—the hallmark of the myriad of U.S. African relations—the main foreign policy bureaucracies have been at the forefront of policy formulation, and “bureaucratic dominance” of the policymaking process has prevailed. Much the same pattern is visible in the Clinton administration, with the exception of President Clinton’s trip to Africa in 1998. Until that time, events in Somalia in 1993 served as the only true African crisis of the administration that was capable of focusing the ongoing attention of President Clinton and his closest advisors. Given that the United States is now disengaged from most African crises, Africa has remained a “backwater” for the White House and the wider foreign policymaking establishment.


Author(s):  
Sangjoon Lee

This book explores the ways in which postwar Asian cinema was shaped by transnational collaborations and competitions between newly independent and colonial states at the height of Cold War politics. The book adopts a simultaneously global and regional approach when analyzing the region's film cultures and industries. New economic conditions in the Asian region and shared postwar experiences among the early cinema entrepreneurs were influenced by Cold War politics, US cultural diplomacy, and intensified cultural flows during the 1950s and 1960s. The book reconstructs Asian film history in light of the international relationships forged, broken, and re-established as the influence of the non-aligned movement grew across the Cold War. The book elucidates how motion picture executives, creative personnel, policy makers, and intellectuals in East and Southeast Asia aspired to industrialize their Hollywood-inspired system in order to expand the market and raise the competitiveness of their cultural products. They did this by forming the Federation of Motion Picture Producers in Asia, co-hosting the Asian Film Festival, and co-producing films. The book demonstrates that the emergence of the first intensive postwar film producers' network in Asia was, in large part, the offspring of Cold War cultural politics and the product of American hegemony. Film festivals that took place in cities as diverse as Tokyo, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Kuala Lumpur were annual showcases of cinematic talent as well as opportunities for the Central Intelligence Agency to establish and maintain cultural, political, and institutional linkages between the United States and Asia during the Cold War. This book reanimates this almost-forgotten history of cinema and the film industry in Asia.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 01-04
Author(s):  
El Hadji Mbaye

Worldwide, one in eight deaths is due to cancer. Projections based on the GLOBOCAN 2012 estimates predict a substantive increase new cancer cases per year by 2035 in developing countries if preventive measures are not widely applied. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), millions of lives could be saved each year if countries made use of existing knowledge and the best cost-effective methods to prevent and treat cancer. Therefore, the aim of this study is to estimate a provisional budget against cancer in low and middle incomes countries, according the GNI-PPP, the cancer incidence and the number of population. Economically country classification is determining with the Gross national income (GNI), per capita, Purchasing power parity (PPP), according the administrations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Cancer incidence data presented are based on the most recent data available at IARC. However, population compares estimates from the US Bureau of the Census. The provisional budget is establishing among the guidelines developed by WHO for regional and national cancer control programs according to national economic development. Provisional budget against cancer is estimated to 12,782.535 (thousands of U.S $) for a population of 5,918,919 persons in Eritrea.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 01-04
Author(s):  
El Hadji Mbaye

Worldwide, one in eight deaths is due to cancer. Projections based on the GLOBOCAN 2012 estimates predict a substantive increase new cancer cases per year by 2035 in developing countries if preventive measures are not widely applied. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), millions of lives could be saved each year if countries made use of existing knowledge and the best cost-effective methods to prevent and treat cancer. Therefore, the aim of this study is to estimate a provisional budget against cancer in low and middle incomes countries, according the GNI-PPP, the cancer incidence and the number of population. Economically country classification is determining with the Gross national income (GNI), per capita, Purchasing power parity (PPP), according the administrations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Cancer incidence data presented are based on the most recent data available at IARC. However, population compares estimates from the US Bureau of the Census. The provisional budget is establishing among the guidelines developed by WHO for regional and national cancer control programs according to national economic development. Provisional budget against cancer is estimated to 86,980.024 (thousands of U.S $) for a population of 83,301,151 persons in Congo, Democratic Republic.


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