scholarly journals Necessity of Maritime Security in Gwadar Port Complex

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Faiza Farid

In the changing global scenario of international politics, the growing attention following the end of the Cold War, has been directed towards oceans. Indian Ocean and its region has gained immense attention in the past few years. Due to the presence of strategic Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) and choke points-Indian Ocean has crucial importance to drive international politics. The level of competition in the region has increased. With China’s rise as a global economic power, the hegemonic status of USis beingchallenged. In this regard, China’s String of Pearls strategy comes to light with special reference to the One Belt, One Road (BRI). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the most potent part of the Belt-Road Initiative. Thesurmounting attention owes to the geostrategic location of Gwadar. Connecting Gwadar with Xinjiang-it would provide China with an alternate route to reach the Middle Eastern and North African markets, ending its Malacca Dilemma. CPEC in this regard, requires a diverse map for maritime security which sees the interplay of four major navies in the region-US, PLA Navy, Pakistan and the Indian Navy.

Author(s):  
Jens Hanssen

This chapter provides a critical analysis of a selection of Middle Eastern and North African communist parties since the interwar period and the emergence of Marxist-Leninist movements during the Arab Cold War. It focuses on the difficulties the parties faced in the changing national and international settings. Arabs were drawn to communism in the 1930s because of Soviet leadership in global antifascism. But the parties suffered from Stalin’s support for the partition of Palestine in 1947, especially in countries neighboring Israel, and from Soviet support for Arab military regimes during the Cold War. By the mid-1960s, communists no longer had a monopoly on revolutionary ideology as Palestinian-inspired national liberation movements began to vernacularize Marxism-Leninism.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (7) ◽  
pp. 106-115
Author(s):  
D. Malysheva

The article analyzes the innovations that determine the main directions and specific characteristics of international political competition in Central Asia. Particular attention is paid to political alternatives presented by the leading partners of the Central Asian countries – Russia, China, Turkey and Iran. In the context of the rivalry unfolding in the post-Soviet Central Asian space, the multi-vector policy of the five Central Asian states opens up a “window of opportunity” for various external forces to influence political and economic processes in the region in such a way that its states become objects of multilateral contention. Russia, which has the most powerful economic and military-political resource in the CIS, has a serious potential to promote its interests in Central Asia. They are primarily aiming at maintaining political stability in the Asian part of the post-Soviet space. Russia is also initiating many integration innovations in Central Asia, developing military cooperation with the countries of the region. At the same time, in Central Asia, Russia is confronted by rival forces. In the forefront is China. This great power has significantly expanded its influence in Central Asia, especially within the framework of the One Belt, One Road initiative. Economic, political, and cultural structures operating in Central Asia under the aegis of Turkey act often as alternatives to Russian integration projects. But Turkey, like Iran, has restrictions on its activities in Central Asia. Therefore, the effectiveness of the policy of these large Middle Eastern states is lower than that of Russia and China. China, Russia, and Iran are motivated to limit US influence in Eurasia, which occasionally drives them closer. In a sense, Turkey agrees with the idea of reducing the political presence of non-regional states in Central Asia. But when the US ceases to be a priority in the foreign policy of all four states, the rivalry between them may re-emerge. This will inevitably lead to a clash of interests, an increase in competition of ideas, integration projects, political and military strategies.


Subject Prospects for One Belt, One Road in 2017. Significance The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, launched in 2013, consists of Chinese investment in land-based infrastructure linking China with Europe across Central Asia, and in shipping and port infrastructure around South-east Asia and the Indian Ocean rim; both branches also involve development of energy networks. 2017 will be a critical year as some projects near completion and spending on others ramps up sharply.


2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 763-766
Author(s):  
Valeska Huber

What can we gain by looking at maritime spaces? Does this enable us to work towards a global history of the Middle East that moves beyond at times arbitrary geographical and disciplinary borders? In this essay I argue that maritime spaces might be particularly suitable for exploring the boundaries of Middle East studies and their interconnection with global history. By implication, the study of Middle Eastern maritime connections might be especially well fitted to develop new and more complex global histories. To make this point, a specific and perhaps unusual maritime site in the Middle East will be assessed. The Suez Canal opened in 1869 and quickly turned into a major artery of traffic between Europe on the one side, and Asia, East Africa, and Australia on the other. More importantly for our purposes, it is located at the very heart of the Middle East, where Africa and Asia, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea (and with it the Indian Ocean world), and water and desert intersect.


Author(s):  
Peter Baldwin

To Parse The Subtle Distinctions between Europe and America must strike observers from other parts of the globe as an exercise in the narcissism of minor differences. Like twins keen to differentiate themselves, some nations eagerly distinguish among countries that are, seen globally, much of a muchness. During the cold war, the unity of the North Atlantic nations against the Soviet empire was obvious. But after the fall of the Berlin Wall, new antagonisms emerged. Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan, Israel: these are the immediate bones of contention. The larger issue has been the role of the United States, the one remaining superpower, as its regnum is tested by Middle Eastern wars, Russian saber rattling, and Chinese aspirations to great power status. Perhaps, as some Europeans argue, the United States has become a rogue state, unilaterally exempting itself from the strictures of mutual dependence in an increasingly interwoven world. Perhaps, as some Americans reply, Europeans live in a cloud-cuckoo land where conflict is considered ultimately to be based on misunderstandings, not real differences, and talk can therefore replace guns. These are geopolitical debates we need not enter into here. We are concerned, however, with the geopoliticians’ frequent and facile elisions between internal and external politics. Because Americans own guns, they like to go to war. Because they drive big cars, they need to secure oil supplies in the Middle East. Because they are religious, they see themselves as crusaders. Because continental Europeans do not have functioning armies and refuse to pay for any, they turn foreign policy into a talking shop. Because they spend their money on social benefits, they cannot afford to defend themselves and must therefore appease the aggressors. Because of their own traumatic past, they refuse to acknowledge the continuing reality of evil in the world. In this book, I have shown that, in almost every quantifiable respect, the United States and Western Europe approximate each other. Earlier, I have accounted for some of the ways that social scientists have tried, and failed, to typologize differences between Europe and America.


Author(s):  
Jenny Andersson

Alvin Toffler’s writings encapsulated many of the tensions of futurism: the way that futurology and futures studies oscillated between forms of utopianism and technocracy with global ambitions, and between new forms of activism, on the one hand, and emerging forms of consultancy and paid advice on the other. Paradoxically, in their desire to create new images of the future capable of providing exits from the status quo of the Cold War world, futurists reinvented the technologies of prediction that they had initially rejected, and put them at the basis of a new activity of futures advice. Consultancy was central to the field of futures studies from its inception. For futurists, consultancy was a form of militancy—a potentially world altering expertise that could bypass politics and also escaped the boring halls of academia.


Author(s):  
Christine LM. Joseph ◽  
Alexandra R. Sitarik ◽  
Rachel Kado ◽  
Gillian Bassirpour ◽  
Cheryl A. Miree ◽  
...  

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