Italy, Italian Americans, and the Politics of the McCarran-Walter Act

Author(s):  
Stefano Luconi

This chapter reconstructs the eventually fruitless efforts by which the Italian government of Alcide De Gasperi and Italian Americans pursued changes to the U.S. legislation that would have let a larger number of Italian immigrants move to the United States in the early 1950s. It focuses specifically on the exploitation of the anti-communist climate of the Cold War during the Truman administration in a campaign to prevent the passing of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act, a measure that reaffirmed the national origins system discriminating against prospective Italian newcomers. The essay concludes that this operation ultimately failed because Washington allowed exceptions to its restrictive immigration laws almost exclusively for expatriates from countries under Communist rule, which was not the case of Italy.

2020 ◽  
pp. 97-117
Author(s):  
Sebastián Hurtado-Torres

This chapter focuses on the role of copper policies in the relations between the United States and Chile during the Frei administration, especially as they relate to the developmental efforts of the Christian Democratic project. During the Frei administration, the political debate on copper policies reached a climax. Since U.S. capitals were among the most significant actors in the story, the discussions around the issue of copper converged with the ideological visions of the United States and the Cold War held by the different Chilean political parties. As the Frei administration tried to introduce the most comprehensive and consistent reform around the structure of the property of the Gran Minería del Cobre, the forces in competition in the arena of Chilean politics stood by their ideological convictions, regarding both copper and the United States, in their opposition or grudging support for the policies proposed by the Christian Democratic government. Moreover, the U.S. government became deeply involved in the matter of copper in Chile, first by pressuring the Chilean government into rolling back a price increase in 1965 and then, mostly through the personal efforts of Ambassador Edward Korry, by mediating in the negotiation between the Frei administration and Anaconda on the nationalization of the U.S. company's largest mine, Chuquicamata, in 1969.


Author(s):  
Iñigo García-Bryce

This chapter explores Haya’s changing relationship with the United States. As an exiled student leader he denounced “Yankee imperialism” and alarmed observers in the U.S. State Department. Yet once he entered Peruvian politics, Haya understood the importance of cultivating U.S.-Latin American relations. While in hiding he maintained relations with U.S. intellectuals and politicians and sought U.S. support for his embattled party. His writings increasingly embraced democracy and he maneuvered to position APRA as an ally in the U.S. fight fascism during the 1930s and 40s, and then communism during the Cold War. The five years he spent in Lima’s Colombian embassy awaiting the resolution of his political asylum case, made him into an international symbol of the democratic fight against dictatorship. He would always remain a critic of U.S. support for dictatorships in Latin America.


2008 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Mastanduno

There is striking consistency in the international economic behavior of the United States across the bipolar and unipolar eras. The United States has been simultaneously a system maker and privilege taker, and its ability to play that dual role has required the willing collaboration of foreign partners. U.S. influence over those partners, however, has changed in important ways. During the cold war the United States dominated international economic adjustment struggles. Its ability to prevail in those struggles after the cold war has been significantly compromised. The United States, notwithstanding its preponderant power, no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed, and the very success of the U.S.-centered world economy has opened a greater range of international and domestic economic options for America's supporters. In the unipolar era the United States may continue to act its own way, but it can no longer count on getting its own way.


Author(s):  
N. Sokov

The article analyzes the dynamics, causes and implications of the collapse of the Open Skies Treaty in the broader context of gradual dismantlement of the network of arms control and confidence building regimes created at the end of the Cold War. The central focus is on the explanation of the declining U.S. support for the treaty since the 2010s and the eventual withdrawal addressed against the background of the evolution of the U.S. approach to arms control during the first two decades of the 21st century. While policies changed from one president to another, a sequence of U.S. administrations shared growing loss of interest in arms control and unwillingness to invest in generating domestic support for existing and new agreements. The weakening of arms control became preferable to limitations on the U.S.’ own programs and forces, in line with the belief that the United States was sufficiently advanced to remain ahead of any possible competitors, including Russia. While arms control issues are more effectively addressed through detailed, difficult negotiations and compromises, the evolving U.S. approach to perceived treaty violations by Russia amounted to an ultimatum to Moscow to admit violations and fix them the way the U.S. wants them to be fixed. Russia’s decision to follow suit by withdrawing from the treaty, while not immediate or preordained, is explained as driven both by political motives and, in cost-benefit terms, by concerns that the United States would keep access to data on Russia collected under the treaty through the U.S. NATO allies. The prospects for modest upgrade of the arms control agenda under the Biden administration are also addressed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-9
Author(s):  
Trevor Sullivan

This paper describes the complex challenges to present-day state relations between the United States and the Russian Federation, and how the worsening of state relations between these two powers is indicative of the reincarnation of the Cold War of the 20th century. In describing the complexities of the U.S.-Russia relationship, this paper explores three contemporary international issues that have led to its aggravation. First, it examines the apparent Russian hacking of the U.S. Democratic Party during the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and how such interference is comparable to that which occurred during the 20th century Cold War era. Secondly, it analyzes how the Syrian Civil War, characterized by the United States and Russia supporting opposing sides of the conflict, shares a likeness to the proxy wars of the 20th century Cold War. Lastly, it describes how the Russian annexation of Crimea, and the American-led response to it, are reminiscent of the Soviet and American practices of expanding the limits of their own power while trying to limit that of their rival following the Second World War.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 26-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Una Bergmane

This article examines the official U.S. reaction to the Soviet government's use of force in the Baltic republics in January 1991, not only showing the complexity of the U.S. position but also demonstrating how reactions in Washington became harsher in the space of a week, eroding the previous “Gorbachev first” attitude. The article identifies the main reasons for this shift, especially West European reactions, domestic pressures, and growing concerns that violence in the Baltics marked the end of perestroika. The analysis sheds light on a larger debate between Kristina Spohr and Celeste Wallander about Western attitudes toward the Baltic question at the Cold War endgame. The article is based on newly available archival materials in the United States and France as well as on documents from the archives of the Gorbachev Foundation in Moscow and in the Latvian State Archives.


Author(s):  
Andrew J. Rotter

This chapter examines the history of the Cold War in South Asia. It describes the position of South Asia in the Cold War, and investigates the reasons why Pakistan decided to side with the United States while India sought to avoid great power alliances and keep the Cold War at arm's length. The chapter highlights the negative reaction of India on the decision of the U.S. government to provide military aid to Pakistan, its main rival, and also considers Cold War legacies and the legacy of colonialism in India and Pakistan.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 114-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongshan Li

This article examines the interactions between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and African-American activists during the Cold War. Relying mostly on archival records and personal documents in English as well as Chinese, the article shows that the construction of the new “black bridge” was made possible because of the PRC's determination to achieve its policy objectives, the African-American activists' needs in fighting for racial equality, and the U.S. government's strict ban on travel to China. Both the PRC and the black activists were new to these transnational interactions, and they worked together in such an unprecedented manner that they redefined the nature and function of Sino-American cultural relations. The black bridge facilitated a limited flow of people and information but also carried misinformation that eventually led to greater misunderstanding and fiercer confrontation. The bridge began to fade in the late 1960s and early 1970s as Beijing was forced to readjust its policy toward the United States, which soon lifted its ban on travel to the PRC.


2006 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press

For nearly half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear-armed states have been locked in a condition of mutual assured destruction. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the nuclear balance has shifted dramatically. The U.S. nuclear arsenal has steadily improved; the Russian force has sharply eroded; and Chinese nuclear modernization has progressed at a glacial pace. As a result, the United States now stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy, meaning that it could conceivably disarm the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia and China with a nuclear first strike. A simple nuclear exchange model demonstrates that the United States has a potent first-strike capability. The trajectory of nuclear developments suggests that the nuclear balance will continue to shift in favor of the United States in coming years. The rise of U.S. nuclear primacy has significant implications for relations among the world's great powers, for U.S. foreign policy, and for international relations scholarship.


2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-334
Author(s):  
Jianwei Wang

Ever since the end of the Cold War, the United States—from the government to the public, from the White House to Congress, from policymakers to pundits, from China specialists to people who know little about China—has engaged itself in the seemingly endless debate on China. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, people debated whether China was still important to the United States and whether the Sino-U.S. special relationship was worth preserving. Since the early 1990s, with China's remarkable economic “soft landing” and the consequent robust and sustained economic growth, Americans seemed to have reached a consensus that China still matters to the United States for better or worse. U.S.-China relations were often referred to as one of the most important bilateral relations to the United States. But important in what way? Much debate ensued with a series of frictions between the two countries that climaxed in the dispatch of two U.S. aircraft carriers to the South China Sea during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, the U.S.-led NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the midair collision between the two air forces in 2001. The U.S. media tirelessly asked the question: “China: friend or foe?” The pattern for U.S. China policy since the end of the Cold War is that whenever the relationship appeared to be stabilizing and a consensus was shaping, new crises emerged and destroyed the hard-won progress, triggering another round of debate on China as if people never learned anything from the previous debate; the old and familiar discourse started all over again.


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