The Pursuit of Guilty Things

Author(s):  
Daniel M. Stout

Chapter one charts out three separate but interrelated nineteenth-century histories: the return and subsequent rise of the corporation as a business entity after 1825; the challenges industrialism posed to tort law; and the problems both eighteenth-century science and Romantic aesthetics had in understanding the identity of collectives. The goal of the chapter is to transform our understanding of the nineteenth-century as a period committed to individualism by seeing the prevalence of collectives within even apparently liberal or individualistic spheres (the law, economics, Romanticism) and the challenges they posed to the basic assumption of liberalism and justice that individual persons can be meaningfully correlated with particular actions and effects.

2009 ◽  
Vol 34 (02) ◽  
pp. 265-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Pearlston

Many married women with separate property held their property as stock‐in‐trade and traded independently from their husbands. However, if the business failed, a married woman trader's ability to take advantage of bankruptcy process depended on the exception to coverture according to which she held her separate property. This article is the first to examine reported bankruptcy cases involving married women in their doctrinal context and in relation to other exceptions to coverture. It analyzes the issues arising in the eighteenth century and argues that they should be understood in relation to the larger picture of married women's law, especially the law of private separation. The article also considers the oblique relationship between private separation jurisprudence and married women's bankruptcy in the nineteenth century, a relationship that was bridged by a line of cases that, on the surface, seem to be unrelated.


Author(s):  
Mark Lunney ◽  
Donal Nolan ◽  
Ken Oliphant

This chapter first discusses the historical development of tort law, covering the origins of tort law; the forms of action; the development of fault-based liability; eighteenth-century developments; the classification of obligations; and the modern pre-eminence of negligence. It then turns to theories of tort, covering the aims of the law of tort and doctrinal classifications. Finally, the chapter considers modern influences on tort law, covering the influence of insurance; the influence of human rights; and concerns about ‘compensation culture’.


1997 ◽  
Vol 30 (119) ◽  
pp. 377-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neal Garnham

In his recent book dealing with the history of duelling in Ireland, James Kelly comes to the conclusion that eighteenth-century Ireland was essentially ‘a violent society’, peopled at least in part ‘by wilful men who put their individual reputations above their lives, their families, their religion, and the law’. Such comments seem to continue a well-established tradition of interpretation that goes back to the nineteenth century. However, this image of a society in which violence was endemic, and conflict a feature of everyday life, has not gone unquestioned by historians. For example, Thomas Bartlett and Sean Connolly have instead noted the relatively controlled nature of popular protest, the early disappearance of banditry, and the reliance, until the very end of the century, on local enforcement of the law, as possible indications that Ireland may not have been as disorderly a society as has been suggested. These differing interpretations have, in turn, an obvious relevance to the wider debate on how eighteenth-century Ireland should be perceived: as a society irreconcilably and uniquely divided by religious and ethnic conflicts, or as a more or less typical part of the European ancient régime.


Author(s):  
C. H. Alexandrowicz

The historian of international law attempting an inquiry into the law of recognition of States and governments during its formative stage, particularly into eighteenth-century sources, is bound to consult the first historical survey of the literature of the law of nations by D. H. L. Ompteda, published in 1785. Ompteda referred to problems of recognition under the general heading of the fundamental right of nations to freedom and independence. All the essays he mentioned as being directly or indirectly relevant to problems of recognition of new States or rulers were written by comparatively unknown authors. Among them, Justi and Steck were perhaps the most active participants in the first attempts to formulate a theory of recognition. This chapter considers these early attempts, in particular the direct influence of Justi and Steck on Martens and Klueber, and through them on Henry Wheaton and some of the early nineteenth-century writers.


Rural History ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
AUDREY ECCLES

Abstract:Madness has been a social problem from time immemorial. Wealthy lunatics were made royal wards so that their estates would be looked after, and the common law very early admitted madness and idiocy as conditions justifying the exemption of the sufferer from punishments for crime. But the vast majority of lunatics have never been either criminal or wealthy, and many wandered about begging, unwelcome in any settled community. Finally, in the eighteenth century, the law made some attempt to determine a course of action which would protect the public and theoretically also the lunatic. This legislation and its application in practice to protect the public, contain the lunatic, and deal with the nuisance caused by those ‘disordered in their senses’, form the subject of this article. Much has been written about the development of psychiatry, mainly from contemporary medical texts, and about the treatment of lunatics in institutions, chiefly from nineteenth-century sources, but much remains to be discovered from archival sources about the practicalities of dealing with lunatics at parish level, particularly how they were defined as lunatics, who made such decisions, and how they were treated in homes and workhouses.


2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-158
Author(s):  
Tom Cornford

In this paper I endorse the basic assumption that informed the Law Commission’s consultation paper on Administrative Redress of 2008, namely that the problem of administrative liability in English law can only be understood by examining both its tortious and its public law dimensions and that a satisfactory solution would involve a form of liability that straddled the public/private divide. In support of this view, I advance a rationale for a form of liability that involves reparation for harms resulting from acts unlawful as a matter of public law and argue that the form of liability that the rationale supports would inevitably impinge upon the territory currently occupied by the law of tort. I then proceed to criticise the views of scholars who have recently argued that a satisfactory law of public authority liability can be arrived at by the use of the concepts of orthodox tort law alone.


2019 ◽  
pp. 443-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence M. Friedman

This chapter discusses the development of tort law in the second half of the nineteenth century. Tort law experienced its biggest growth spurt in the late nineteenth century. The legal world began to sit up and pay attention. The very first English-language treatise on torts appeared in 1859: Francis Hilliard’s book, The Law of Torts, Or Private Wrongs. Then came Charles G. Addison, Wrongs and Their Remedies in 1860, in England. By 1900, there was an immense literature on the law of torts; Joel Bishop and Thomas M. Cooley had written imposing treatises on the subject; the case law had swollen to heroic proportions. Tort law was a product of the industrial revolution; England here had a head start; problems emerged there first, and so did their tentative legal solutions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 61-79
Author(s):  
Paul Davis

This chapter provides an account of Addison’s poetic career—the first such account since the nineteenth century—and confronts the question of why, although Addison wrote several of the most influential and highly regarded poems of the entire eighteenth century, he is so rarely thought of as a poet. The first half of the chapter traces our received image of Addison as an inherently unpoetic figure back to Joseph Warton and the advent of ‘pre-Romantic’ aesthetics in the 1740s, before examining a number of Addison’s poems, particularly from marginalized areas of his verse canon including his neo-Latin pieces and others circulated only in manuscript, which challenge that image. The second half of the chapter explores Addison’s own reluctance to inhabit the role of poet, evident in particular in his serial uses in his verse of the classical trope of ‘recusatio’ (refusal to write a poem). Through detailed analyses of his major poems—especially A Letter from Italy and ‘Milton’s Stile Imitated’, a diptych reflecting the process of self-reassessment he went through while travelling in Italy, the land of poetry, in 1701—it argues that Addison’s serious misgivings about poetry were the making of him as a poet. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of The Campaign (1705), suggesting that Addison’s most famous poem in fact represents not the climax of his career as a poet but its epilogue; by the time he wrote it, Addison had ceased to consider it even a possibility that his future might lie in poetry, and so could versify with detached fluency.


2019 ◽  
pp. 661-702
Author(s):  
Lawrence M. Friedman

This chapter discusses changes in American law in the twentieth century, covering welfare, workers’ compensation, tort law, civil rights, First Nations, Asian Americans, Hispanics, freedom of speech, and religion. One of the most striking developments in the twentieth century was the so-called liability explosion: the vast increase in liability in tort, mostly for personal injuries. The nineteenth century—particularly the early part—had built up the law of torts, almost from nothing; courts created a huge, complicated structure, a system with many rooms, chambers, corridors, but with an overall ethos of limited liability, and something of a tilt toward enterprise. The structure was wobbling a bit, by the end of the nineteenth century, and the twentieth century worked fairly diligently to tear the whole thing down. One of the first doctrines to go was the fellow-servant rule.


1996 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 478-504
Author(s):  
Grayson Carter

The two hundred or so evangelical clergymen who seceded from the Church of England into Protestant Dissent during the first half of the nineteenth century often paid a considerable price for their action. By crossing the subtle social boundary between Anglican priesthood and Nonconformist ministry they forfeited status and often, no doubt, income. A number vanished into comparative obscurity as pastors of small chapels, whether as ministers of a major denomination, Strict and Particular Baptists, Christian Brethren, or preachers in some unlabelled and impoverished chapel. If not so severely penalised for their secession as many of their colleagues who went to Rome, particularly those with wives for whom entry into the Roman priesthood was closed, they usually came off the worse in temporal terms for following the dictates of conscience. This, no doubt, they fully anticipated. What was not anticipated, however, was the imposition of a legal penalty for their act of secession. Though Anglican secessions to Rome or Dissent were not infrequent, their legality was apparently seldom if ever questioned. Liberal Churchmen like Theophilus Lindsey, who had abandoned the establishment for Unitarianism during the eighteenth century, had set up their chapels with impunity. In 1831 the evangelical William Tiptaft received a threat from Thomas Burgess, the bishop of Salisbury, upon seceding from the parish of Sutton Courtney, Berkshire, but nothing came of it. Those who left the via media for Rome were assumed to be acting within the framework of the law when they took up a new ministry as priests of another apostolic confession.


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