scholarly journals Corporate Governance Features and Efficiency: Evidence from the Saudi Arabian Banks

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Adel Bogari
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Technical Efficiency ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Saudi Arabian ◽  
Foreign Ownership ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Scale Efficiency ◽  
Private Ownership ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Banking Efficiency

The aim of this article is to examine the effect of the Corporate Governance features as measured by the Independence of the board of directors, the board size and the ownership structure (private ownership/State ownership and foreign ownership) on the banking efficiency of Saudi Arabian banks. A data set of the twelve biggest banks for the period 2000 to 2017 is used. As for banking efficiency scores, the methodology is based on the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). It allows for Technical Efficiency, Pure Technical Efficiency and Scale Efficiency scores. The results of this study point to the significant role of The Independence (INDEP) variable supported by a positive and significant effect on efficiency in all regressions, indicating a positive relationship with the Technical Efficiency (TE) and the Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE). In the contrary, the independence of the board directors has a negative and significant effect on scale efficiency (SE). According to Board Size variable, results related to this later reveal a negative and a significant effect on technical efficiency (TE), Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) and Scale Efficiency (SE) in all regressions. Finally, as for the ownership structure variables, results confirm that Private Ownership (OWEN-P) provides positive and significant effects on both the Technical and the Scale Efficiency. This effect seems to be turn to be negative and significant when it is correlated to the Pure Technical Efficiency. State Ownership (OWEN-S) impacts positively and significantly the Technical Efficiency, the Pure Technical Efficiency and Scale Efficiency separately. As for the Foreign Ownership (OWEN-F) variable, except for the Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE), we note a positive and significant effect on the Technical and Scale Efficiency. This study implies better Corporate Governance practices should be supported to improve the overall efficiency and its components. This includes in particular, the Board Size and the Ownership structure variables.

Production efficiency of Chinese banks: a revisit

2014 ◽  
Vol 40 (10) ◽  
pp. 969-986 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaotian Tina Zhang ◽  
Yong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Technical Efficiency ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Production Efficiency ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Rapid Expansion ◽  
Scale Efficiency ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Public Banks ◽  
Big Four

Purpose – The last decade witnessed the reform of China's financial sector, during which Chinese commercial banks’ ownership and operation had been significantly changed in order to improve efficiency. The purpose of this paper is to investigates whether these banks have improved their productivity efficiency during their rapid expansion and growth in the post reform era from 2004 to 2011. Design/methodology/approach – Data envelopment analysis is used to investigate the production efficiency of Chinese commercial banks during 2004-2011. First, the technical efficiency (TE) score is constructed to evaluate bank productivity. The TE score is disintegrated into pure technical efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE) to examine the effects of technical factors and scale economies. Second, the Malmquist index is constructed to explore the year-by-year productivity. Lastly, regression analysis examines how bank characteristics and ownership structure affect productivity efficiency. Findings – The Big Four banks are less efficient than other commercial banks, and public banks are less efficient than private banks. The low efficiency is primarily due to scale inefficiency, rather than PTE. In addition, ownership structure impacts production efficiency. Specifically, foreign ownership is related to high efficiency while state ownership is associated with lower productivity. Research limitations/implications – There were small observations of public banks in China. Thus, a more comprehensive test is impractical to explore whether or not annual changes in ownership structure improve their production efficiency. With more date, such a test will reveal further information about the relationship between ownership and productivity. Originality/value – The authors are the first to assess the production efficiency of Chinese commercial banks after the recent financial reform during which Chinese commercial banks had undergone significant structural changes. The lower overall productivity of Big Four and public banks is a result of scale inefficiency, although these banks are better than their peers with respect to input-output transformation.

scholarly journals Three Essays on Corporate Governance in China

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Zonghao Chen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Women Directors ◽  
Director Compensation ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Director Characteristics ◽  
Chinese Public

<p>This thesis consists of three empirical papers on corporate governance in Chinese listed firms. The first essay examines the influence of director characteristics and ownership structure on director compensation. Over the period 2005 through 2015, we find that director compensation in Chinese listed firms is influenced by both director characteristics and ownership structure. We measure director compensation by both the propensity to be paid and the level of compensation. For independent directors, we find that director busyness, tenure, and ownership concentration positively influence and state-ownership negatively influences director compensation. For non-independent directors, we find that tenure positively influences and that both state-ownership and related directors negatively influence director compensation. Lastly, our evidence suggests that women directors in China are not underpaid.  The second essay examines the influence of rookie independent directors on board functions and firm performance in Chinese public companies from 2008 to 2014. We find that rookie independent directors attend more board meetings than seasoned independent directors. Independent directors with higher board meeting attendance are more likely to remain in the firm in the following year (lower turnover rate). This influence of board attendance on re-appointment is stronger for rookie independent directors. Further, we find that boards with more rookie independent directors tunnel less to controlling shareholders, suggesting that rookie independent directors are efficient monitors. Lastly, we find that firms with more rookie independent directors are associated with higher accounting returns.  In the third essay, we investigate the influence of board networks on directors’ career outcomes in Chinese public firms from 2005 to 2014. We find that board connections increase compensation for independent directors. We find that board connections are positively associated with director turnover for non-related directors, but negatively associated with director turnover for related directors. Further, we find that board connections lead to additional future directorships. Overall, we find that board connections both directly lead to higher compensation and indirectly through labor mobility and additional board seats.</p>

scholarly journals The board of directors and firm performance: empirical evidence from listed companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 508-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Merendino ◽  
Rob Melville
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Content Type

PurposeThis study aims to reconcile some of the conflicting results in prior studies of the board structure–firm performance relationship and to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of agency theory in the specific context of Italian corporate governance practice.Design/methodology/approachThis research applies a dynamic generalised method of moments on a sample of Italian listed companies over the period 2003-2015. Proxies for corporate governance mechanisms are the board size, the level of board independence, ownership structure, shareholder agreements and CEO–chairman leadership.FindingsWhile directors elected by minority shareholders are not able to impact performance, independent directors do have a non-linear effect on performance. Board size has a positive effect on firm performance for lower levels of board size. Ownership structure per se and shareholder agreements do not affect firm performance.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by reconciling some of the conflicting results inherent in the board structure–performance relationship. Firm performance is not necessarily improved by having a high number of independent directors on the board. Ownership structure and composition do not affect firm performance; therefore, greater monitoring provided by concentrated ownership does not necessarily lead to stronger firm performance.Practical implicationsThis paper suggests that Italian corporate governance law should improve the rules and effectiveness of minority directors by analysing whether they are able to impede the main shareholders to expropriate private benefits on the expenses of the minority. The legislator should not impose any restrictive regulations with regard to CEO duality, as the influence of CEO duality on performance may vary with respect to the unique characteristics of each company.Originality/valueThe results enrich the understanding of the applicability of agency theory in listed companies, especially in Italy. Additionally, this paper provides a comprehensive synthesis of research evidence of agency theory studies.

scholarly journals The effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the financial leverage–profitability relation

2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 387-409
Author(s):  
Hanh Song Thi Pham ◽  
Duy Thanh Nguyen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Financial Leverage ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the moderating effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the financial leverage–profitability relation in emerging market firms. Design/methodology/approach The paper examines the impacts by estimating the empirical model in which a firm’s accounting profitability is a dependent variable, while financial leverage, board size, board independence, CEO duality, CEO ownership, state ownership and the interaction variables are predictors. The paper uses the panel data set of 295 listed firms in Vietnam in the period 2011-2015 and two key econometric methods for panel data, namely, the two-stage least square instrumental variable and general moments method. Findings The paper finds the evidence for the significant and positive effect of board size, board independence and state ownership on the financial leverage–profitability relation. The effect of CEO duality on the financial leverage–profitability relation tends to be negative, and the impact CEO ownership inclines to be positive, although both of them are statistically insignificant. The results are consistent across different estimation methods. Originality/value This paper is the first investigating the moderating effect of various corporate governance mechanisms on the financial leverage–profitability relationship in emerging market firms.

scholarly journals Capital Structure, Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance of SMEs in Ghana

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (01) ◽  
pp. 45
Author(s):  
Ibrahim Anyass Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Regression Model ◽  
Developing Country ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Small And Medium Enterprises ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Medium Enterprises ◽  
The Relationship

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between three variables; capital structure, ownership structure and corporate governance. Although these issues have been largely researched, less attention has been focused on small and medium enterprises (SMEs). At the time of this study, evidence was not found for a study analyzing all three variables in relation to SMEs, within the context of a developing country. This current study examines the link between capital structure, ownership structure, and corporate governance. Using an appropriate regression model, the study assesses how governance mechanisms and ownership decisions affect the choice of financing SMEs. The results show a positive relationship for all corporate governance variables except for board size. Ownership structure is found to be positive and significantly related to capital structure. The signs indicated by control variables are those which are in consonance with conventional capital structure literature. Generally, ownership and corporate governance are found to affect the financing mix of SMEs in Ghana.

scholarly journals Impact of corporate governance on financial disclosures: Evidence from India

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 874-889 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mehul Raithatha ◽  
Varadraj Bapat
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Disclosure Requirements ◽  
Financial Disclosures

The paper aims at identifying impact of corporate governance variables i.e. board structure (board size, board independence, board activity and board busyness) and ownership structure (foreign promoters holding, institutional shareholding and CEO duality) on financial disclosures made by the Indian firms. Using cross sectional data of 325 listed firms for the financial year 2009-10, we compute financial disclosure score (using 171 checklist points) based on disclosure requirements of accounting standards. We find average disclosure score of 73%, maximum and minimum being 100% and 46% respectively. Our finding support agency theory in terms of monitoring role of board since board size is found to be significant however we do not find any influence of board independence on the disclosures. The study also supports resource dependency theory in terms of outside directorship which might provide exposure to different corporate environment, brings diverse perspectives and knowledge to the directors and this in turn leads to improved disclosures. We also support the notion that having foreign promoter shareholding improves disclosures

The relationship between ownership structure and firm financial performance

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 319-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tariq Tawfeeq Yousif Alabdullah
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Foreign Ownership ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Firm Financial Performance ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose Previous studies that dealt with corporate governance have witnessed gradually significant growth that created some new trends. The purpose of this paper is to be involved in such trends through examining the link between ownership structure as one of the important corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance in Jordan as one of emerging economies. Design/methodology/approach The current study used the multiple regression method to analyze available data for non-financial firms listed in the Amman Stock Exchange for the fiscal year 2012. Findings The findings revealed that managerial ownership has a positive impact on performance. On the other hand, the findings surprisingly showed no evidence to support the impact of foreign ownership on performance. Moreover, there is a significant evidence to support the fact that company size has no impact on firm performance. The findings also revealed that industry type has no impact on firm performance. Practical implications The practical implications of the current study demonstrated that good corporate governance is imperative to all organizations and must be encouraged for the interest of all stakeholders. Unlike the majority of the previous studies, the current study unexpectedly found that foreign ownership is not significantly contributing to the firm performance. Thus, Jordanian Government and other related/responsible parties should formulate policies for the foreign investors. Originality/value Interestingly, from developed and developing countries perspective, the study is the first of its kind that exclusively chose the mechanisms of ownership structure in its relationship with firm performance represented by market share, where no previous study has tested foreign ownership in such relationship. In that, this study is the first study in emerging economies to investigate such a link. Such new insights on this relationship by current study provide helpful information that is of great value to the government, academics, policy makers, and other stakeholders.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance Quality, Ownership Structure, Agency Costs and Firm Performance. Evidence from an Emerging Economy

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 154
Author(s):  
Haroon ur Rashid Khan ◽  
Waqas Bin Khidmat ◽  
Osama Al Hares ◽  
Naeem Muhammad ◽  
Kashif Saleem
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Governance Quality ◽  
Corporate Governance Quality ◽  
The Relationship

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance quality and ownership structure on the relationship between the agency cost and firm performance. Both the fixed-effects model and a more robust dynamic panel generalized method of moment estimation are applied to Chinese A-listed firms for the years 2008 to 2016. The results show that the agency–performance relationship is positively moderated by (1) corporate governance quality, (2) ownership concentration, and (3) non-state ownership. State ownership has a negative effect on the agency–performance relationship. Various robust tests of an alternative measure of agency cost confirm our main conclusions. The analysis adds to the empirical literature on agency theory by providing useful insights into how corporate governance and ownership concentration can help mitigate agency–performance relationship. It also highlights the impact of ownership type on the relationship between agency cost and firm performance. Our study supports the literature that agency cost and firm performance are negatively related to the Chinese listed firms. The investors should keep in mind the proxies of agency cost while choosing a specific stock. Secondly; the abuse of managerial appropriation is higher in state-held firms as compared to non-state firms. Policymakers can use these results to devise the investor protection rules so that managerial appropriation can be minimized.

scholarly journals Risk Management in Corporate Governance Framework

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (9) ◽  
pp. 5015
Author(s):  
Hania Rehman ◽  
Muhammad Ramzan ◽  
Muhammad Zia Ul Haq ◽  
Jinsoo Hwang ◽  
Kyoung-Bae Kim
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Emerging Markets ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Foreign Ownership ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Governance Framework ◽  
The Relationship

There is a scarcity of literature involving studies about the effect of risk management on the relationship between corporate governance and a firm’s financial performance, especially in emerging markets. The study fills this gap and adds to the existing literature by investigating whether risk management acts as a mediator between corporate governance and the firm’s financial performance. This study found that risk management partially mediates the relationship between board size and financial performance. Our results further indicate that risk management acts as a partial mediator between foreign ownership and financial performance.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document