Restrictions on Trading in Agricultural Land and European Union law

2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (0) ◽  
pp. 51-60
Author(s):  
Michał Giżewski

30 April 2016 saw the entering into force of the Act of 14 April 2016 on the Suspension of Sale of Land of the Agricultural Property Stock of the State Treasury and on Amending Numerous Acts . The amendments pertained to, inter alia, the Act of 11 April 2003 on the Formation of the Agricultural System , and introduced a variety of alterations thereto, thus restricting significantly the freedom of trading in agricultural land. This article provides an analysis of conformity of Polish legislation with European Union legislation and also explains the liability of the State Treasury in case of violations of EU law.

2012 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 585-611
Author(s):  
Arwel Davies

AbstractAs a consequence of the state unity theory, the conduct of all state organs is attributed to the state in an undifferentiated manner. It follows that, in both international and European Union law, state liability can be based on the substance of judicial decisions despite the independence of the judicial branch. However, beyond the matter of attribution, there is a significant divergence between the two legal systems. In international law, the judicial origin of challenged decisions does not influence the application of liability criteria, whereas, in EU law, the liability criteria can be applied to judicial decisions in a tightened manner. This article has the twofold aim of establishing and explaining this difference.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1073-1098 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Derlén ◽  
Johan Lindholm

AbstractThe case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is one of the most important sources of European Union law. However, case law's role in EU law is not uniform. By empirically studying how the Court uses its own case law as a source of law, we explore the correlation between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a CJEU case—type of action, actors involved, and area of law—and, on the other hand, the judgment's “embeddedness” in previous case law and value as a precedent in subsequent cases. Using this approach, we test, confirm, and debunk existing scholarship concerning the role of CJEU case law as a source of EU law. We offer the following conclusions: that CJEU case law cannot be treated as a single entity; that only a limited number of factors reliably affect a judgment's persuasive or precedential power; that the Court's use of its own case law as a source of law is particularly limited in successful infringement proceedings; that case law is particularly important in preliminary references—especially those concerning fundamental freedoms and competition law; and that initiating Member State and the number of observations affects the behavior of the Court.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-23
Author(s):  
Marija Daka

The paper presents some of the most relevant aspects of European nondiscrimination law established th rough European Union law and the European Convention on Human Rights, looking also at the evolution of the norms and milestones of case-law on equal treatment within the two systems. The paper gives an overview of the non-discrimination concept as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union and by the European Court of Human Rights. We examine the similar elements but also give insight into conceptual differences between the two human rights regimes when dealing with equal treatment. The differences mainly stem from the more complex approach taken by EU law although, based on analysed norms, cases, and provisions, the aspects of equal treatment in EU law are largely consistent with the practice of the ECtHR. Lastly, the paper briefl y places the European non-discrimination law within the multi-layered human rights system, giving some food for thought for the future potential this concept brings.


2021 ◽  
pp. 124-141
Author(s):  
Colin Faragher

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses the Treaty framework and sources of EU law as well as the institutions of the EU. It covers the legal background to the UK’s departure from the EU, the legal process through which the UK left the EU, the key provisions of the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (2020), and the European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020. This chapter also discusses the effect of the UK’s departure from the EU on the status of the sources of EU law and the effect of leaving the EU on the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as well as failure to transpose a Directive into national law and the effect of leaving the EU on the Francovich principle.


Public Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 835-868
Author(s):  
Andrew Le Sueur ◽  
Maurice Sunkin ◽  
Jo Eric Khushal Murkens

This chapter discusses the reception of Community (now EU law) in the UK courts, and in particular how UK courts reconciled the doctrine of supremacy with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. The chapter will examine three ways in which the UK courts have attempted to reconcile these competing doctrines: by constructing national law in light of EU law; by disapplying conflicting national law; and by reasserting national sovereignty and threatening not to apply EU law automatically. Finally, the chapter will briefly re-visit the case of Miller in order to evaluate that case in light of earlier cases on the relationship between UK and EU law.


ICL Journal ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
László Blutman ◽  
Nóra Chronowski

AbstractWhile the European Union is in the process of carefully navigating among the various forms of sub-federalism, Member States - including recent ones like Hungary, trying to find an equilibrium between their sovereignty and European supranationalism - have to cope with possible conflicts between their national legal systems and EU law. Since Hungary's accession to the European Union, the Hungarian Constitutional Court has faced questions regarding the constitutionality of EU legal rules and conflicts between European and national legal norms. This article examines these issues and analyzes criteria of constitutional review that the Court has gradually set out in dealing with some of these conflicts. So far, it has established two principles marking the boundaries of future constitutional practice. First, it will treat the founding and amending treaties of the European Union as part of domestic law for the purposes of constitutional review, thereby setting up a two-tier system of legal rules applicable within Hungarian legal practice instead of a possible three-tier construction that would distinguish between national, international and European law. Second, in the absence of jurisdiction to review substantive (un)constitutionality (as opposed to procedural constitutionality), the Constitutional Court does not regard a conflict between domestic law and EU law as a constitutionality issue and this mandates the ordinary courts to resolve such conflict of a sub-constitutional nature. Taking these conclusions as starting points, this article sets out the possible types of conflicts that may occur between EU rules and other legal rules applicable in Hungary, weighing the constitutional relevance of these conflicts; it also outlines the directions along which the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court may develop in this respect.


ICL Journal ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ágoston Mohay ◽  
Norbert Tóth

AbstractThe construction of names and the use of nobility titles is not regulated by European Union law. Yet the Court of Justice of the EU has had to deal with such issues on various occasions where national rules on names or titles had to be contrasted with the EU law on equal treatment, Union citizenship and free movement and residence. Rules on names fall essentially within the competence of the member states, but the states have to regard EU law when exercising this competence. Our paper undertakes to analyse this issue in light of a recent relevant judgment, the Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff case, having regard also to the Court’s reasoning regarding the national constitutional identity clause [Art 4 (2)TEU]. We argue – inter alia – that the Court of Justice decided in this judgment not to favour the rights of a free-moving EU citizen (even if the judgment admittedly affects only a limited circle of individuals) and put national constitutional identity first, yet the way in which the identity clause was used by the Court is also debatable in our view.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-191
Author(s):  
Georgi Mihaylov

Abstract The article examines cases of conflict between the national law of the EU Member States and European Union Law. There is an analysis of the legal advantage of EU law over national law or vice versa. Conclusions have been drawn that the national law should maintain its advantage when the reason for it is contained in the Constitution of the respective state.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-41
Author(s):  
Roman Kwiecień

The paper addresses the issue of a judicial forum entitled to resolve conflicts between European Union law and national constitutional rules. First and foremost, the issue is discussed under the old primacy/supremacy of EU law controversy. The author seeks to answer whether the national law, including constitutional rules, of a Member State can be ineffective owing to being contradictory to EU law. If so, by whom can national laws be held ineffective? In other words, which of the two judicial fora (national and European) have the last word in these conflicts or who is the ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality of law within the European legal space? The author argues that legal reasoning should reconcile, on the one hand, the specificity of the EU’s unique legal order and effective application of its provisions and, on the other hand, the international legal status of the Member States and their constitutions. This approach leads to the conclusion that there is no ultimate judicial arbiter within the European legal space.


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