THE IDEA OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE BEFORE THE PENSION AUTHORITY

2021 ◽  
Vol specjalny II (XXI) ◽  
pp. 549-561
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Szlachta-Kisiel

The concept of justice, crystallizing over the centuries, is very important in creation of material law and shaping the procedures necessary for their implementation. The importance of ideas and principles of procedural justice for social insurance is essential not only because of the demand of law itself. Procedural justice is also important, because it influences the society. Analysis of the procedure before the pension authority on application for pension or retirement through the prism of the constitutional principle of the rule of law, concept of procedural justice and principle procedural due process indicates that justice is indispensable to realize the principle of the democratic rule of law. Robert S. Summers, recognizing other values of the process, taken from social life, sees the necessity to apply them not so much to the procedure as a means to achieve a specific goal, but to the procedure itself. In this context the procedure before the pension authority should be seen through the prism of the error risk, good result of the procedure, procedure evaluation and participatory management.

2003 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Posthuma

This article compares and contrasts a legal concept known as procedural due process with a psychological concept known as procedural justice. The two concepts are defined and distinguished. Then the similarities between the two concepts are demonstrated by showing how they share similar dimensions and underlying rationale. It is suggested that dimensions of procedural due process may be useful to understand the dimensions of procedural justice. In addition, the procedural due process “balancing test” is adapted and applied to the concept of procedural justice in workplace settings. Applications to personnel management are illustrated.


2021 ◽  
pp. 43-76
Author(s):  
Timothy Endicott

At common law, the judges will hold administrative conduct to be unlawful on any of three grounds: error of law (and certain sorts of error of fact), lack of due process, and the improper exercise of discretionary power. This chapter discusses how (and to what extent) the three grounds of judicial review are supported by constitutional principle. Each ground must be controlled by the principle of comity. The principle of comity requires judges to defer to administrative authorities on some issues, to some extent; the chapter explains the limits of deference and the difference—and the connections—between the rule of law and the rule of judges.


2020 ◽  
pp. 395-418
Author(s):  
J.M. Bernstein

It has been claimed, “If cruelty is no longer declared unlawful, but instead is applied as a matter of policy, it alters the fundamental relationship of man to government. If you make this exception [and permit torture], the whole Constitution crumbles.” The ambition of this chapter is to provide the terms through which this judgment can be vindicated. The judgment’s pivotal assumption is that the prohibition on torture is in some manner foundational for any modern legal system. Three theses help to secure this foundational thesis: (i) Historically, basic rule of law and procedural due process requirements—most profoundly the doctrine of “innocent until proven guilty”—first emerge in the 18th century as the necessary legal bases for prohibiting judicial and penal torture. (ii) What is systematically implied by this historical process is that the modern rule of law is law’s own reflective effort to provide an absolute separation between the force of law and physical force, between legality or lawfulness and state violence. (iii) The rule of law’s emphatic separation between the force of law and the procedures of state violence presupposes that the object of law is the person with dignity, that is, a being possessing intrinsic worth. What dignity minimally means in the modern age is that while the state may deprive subjects of their liberty, it may not directly infringe upon their bodily integrity, or treat them in any manner that would infringe upon their equal intrinsic worth with all other legal subjects.


Author(s):  
Timothy Endicott

At common law, the judges will hold administrative conduct to be unlawful on any of three grounds: error of law, lack of due process, or the improper exercise of discretionary power. This chapter discusses how (and to what extent) the three grounds of judicial review are supported by constitutional principle. Each ground must be controlled by the principle of comity. The principle of comity requires judges to defer to administrative authorities on some issues, to some extent; the chapter explains the limits of deference, and the difference—and the connections—between the rule of law and the rule of judges.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcos José Pinto

This book aims to analyze the crimes against human rights that offended the Democratic Rule of Law in Brazil, committed by state agents in the Brazilian military dictatorship (1964/1985), asserting that they remained unpunished. In view of this, to address this issue, it is proposed that criminal offenders be held liable. The issue of our slow Transitional Justice will also be examined, arguing for the criminal prosecution of state agents who violated human rights in Brazil, demonstrating how and how this can occur, all in order to move away from impunity, hitherto guaranteed by the Brazilian Amnesty Law, ensuring the effectiveness of justice and the strengthening of democracy.


1981 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-493
Author(s):  
Nancy Elizabeth Jones

AbstractWhen a state Medicaid agency terminates its provider agreement with a skilled nursing facility, federal regulations give the state the option of providing a pretermination evidentiary hearing; they do not, however, require that a state provide such a hearing. If a state chooses not to grant a pretermination hearing, as a number of states have done, federal regulations require: (1) an informal written reconsideration made by the state and submitted to the skilled nursing facility before the effective date of the termination, and (2) a posttermination evidentiary hearing.This Article argues that a skilled nursing facility has a right under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the U. S. Constitution to an evidentiary hearing before termination of its Medicaid provider agreement. The author claims that a skilled nursing facility's interest in continued receipt of Medicaid reimbursement under its provider agreement is a property interest entitled to constitutional due process protections, and not merely an expectation of economic benefit that does not implicate constitutional due process considerations.The Article concludes that, except in emergency situations, state Medicaid agencies are constitutionally required to grant a provider a pretermination, rather than a posttermination, evidentiary hearing. This procedure would protect the provider and its patients from the severe effects of an erroneous termination, while furthering the governmental interest in ensuring the health and safety of skilled nursing facility patients. The format for such a hearing should allow for the participation, with the assistance of counsel, of both the skilled nursing facility and its patients.


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