scholarly journals NORTH KOREAN ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT POLICY: A COMPARISON WITH CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM POLICY

2005 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-49,59
Author(s):  
Hiroko IMAMURA
1999 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 236-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hector E. Schamis

For much of the discipline of economics, a closed economy is seen as the result of efforts of distributional coalitions and rent seekers to maintain sector-specific protections. Accordingly, economic liberalization is explained by the policy consistency of uncompromising reform elites. Students of the politics of economic adjustment in the developing world, in turn, have argued that reform programs concentrate costs in the present and disperse benefits in the future. Hence, losers are prepared to engage in collective action, whereas prospective winners, facing uncertainty about payoffs, remain disorganized. They thus posit the cohesiveness and insularity of policymakers as the main variable for explaining successful reform. Both economists and political scientists, therefore, adopt a collective action approach that overlooks how groups organizein supportof liberalization.In the recent Latin American experience, however, these reforms have preserved market reserves for firms that provided vital political support to, and often colluded with, policymaking elites. This setting has thus reproduced incentives for rent-seeking behavior, even in the presence of comprehensive liberalization. This evidence supports two interrelated theoretical claims. First, distributional coalitions may proliferate when the state withdraws from the economy, not only when it intervenes. Second, interest-based variables retain explanatory power in political economy—which state autonomy arguments disregard—irrespective of whether the economy is closed or open—which neoclassical perspectives overlook. To highlight the centrality of interest groups favoring marketization, therefore, the article suggests modifications to the dominant theories of collective action and the literature on the politics of economic adjustment.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Sam Amadi

This article undertakes a rule of law critique of privatization as economic reform policy in Nigeria. The rule of law approach interrogates not just the policy rationales of the programme but also its methodology. The article distinguishes between a formal and substantive justice conception of rule of law and argues that the substantive justice conception of rule of law and its policy imperatives, sourced from the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy in Chapter 2 of the 1999 Constitution, provides a veritable framework to realize the strategic goals of privatization in Nigeria.Keywords: Privatization, rule of law, justice, efficiency, economic growth, equality, fundamental human rights, social justice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (11) ◽  
pp. 204-212
Author(s):  
Loan Nguyen Thi Huong

Cam Khe is a mountainous district of Phu Tho province, with a lot of potentials and advantages for the development of agriculture, industry and services. From the re-establishment of the district in 1995 until 2015, with the policy of exploiting all local resources to promote the process of socio-economic development, Cam Khe’s economic structure has shifted towards industrialization and modernization. This article focuses on analyzing the conditions, policies, measures and results of the process of economic restructuring in Cam Khe during the period of 1995 - 2015 in order to partly understand the Party’s economic reform policy which has been applied creatively in the local practical situation.


2008 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 438-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas B. Pepinsky

This article investigates the coalitional bases of authoritarian rule to explain striking variation in adjustment policy to the Asian Financial Crisis in Indonesia and Malaysia. Given currency depreciation with financial sector fragility, holders of mobile assets prefer to maintain an open capital account, while owners of fixed assets and labor favor restrictions of capital mobility to facilitate expansionary macroeconomic policies. Differences in adjustment policy across the two countries reflect differences in the political coalitions supporting the authoritarian regimes. These findings illuminate the nature of political conflict during financial crises and show how a nuanced view of the coalitions supporting authoritarian rule can yield powerful insights into the political economy of authoritarianism and economic adjustment in a global economy.


1997 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward L. Gibson

Governing parties face two fundamental tasks: they must pursue policies effectively, and they must win elections. Their national coalitions, therefore, generally include two types of constituencies—those that are important for policy-making and those that make it possible to win elections. In effect, governing parties must bring together a policy coalition and an electoral coalition. This distinction sheds light on how the transitional costs of major economic policy shifts can be made sustainable in electoral terms. It also provides a starting point for analysis of how two of Latin America's most important labor-based parties, the Peronist party in Argentina and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico, maintained electoral dominance while pursuing free-market reforms that adversely affected key social constituencies. Peronism and the PRI are conceived of as having encompassed historically two distinctive and regionally based subcoalitions: a metropolitan coalition that gave support to the parties' development strategies and a peripheral coalition that carried the burden of generating electoral majorities. This framework permits a reconceptualization of the historic coalitional dynamics of Peronism and the PRI and sheds light on the current process of coalitional change and economic reform.


2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 859-860
Author(s):  
Ellen Comisso

Nowadays, it is easy to forget just how pessimistic observers were in 1990 about the possibility of simultaneously introducing capitalism and competitive politics to the ex-socialist states of Eastern Europe. Often, debates seemed to hinge simply on which would subvert which, that is, whether the economic shocks of reform would destabilize democratic governments or whether populist appeals to the losers of economic adjustment would derail economic reform. That popularly elected government and systemic economic change could mutually reinforce each other seemed, at the time, to describe a fool's paradise. Yet now that the dust has begun to settle, this appears to have been exactly what happened.


Author(s):  
BeRamMohan R. Yallapragadath ◽  
Alfred G. Toma ◽  
C. William Roe

Under Dengs liberalized economic policies, foreign direct investment (FDI) started pouring into China, and since then, the Chinese economy is rising at the dizzy annual rate of about 10%. In the early 1990s, India also embarked on a major economic reform policy, liberating the economy and opening it to foreign investors. Substantial foreign capital came into India during the last decade, but the amount of FDI that went into China during the same period can be compared to a tsunami. The world had never witnessed this rare phenomenon of two relatively poor countries that together consist of one third of the worlds population, simultaneously taking off on a steep ascent in their economies. The unprecedented economic growth in these two countries is being noticed by the rest of the world with awe and disbelief. It is being widely predicted that these two countries would soon become the next world economic super powers. This paper presents the several factors of the phenomenal growth taking place in India and China and investigates the possibility of either country attaining world economic supremacy.


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