Using the Status Quo as an Opportunity: OSCE Conflict Management Exemplified by the South Caucasus

2020 ◽  
pp. 139-150
Author(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 83-91
Author(s):  
Başaran AYAR

Turkey and Iran have maintained stable relations for decades and established cooperation by exploring their common interests despite many political disputes, ideological differences, or economic competition. But recently, many emerging disagreements of the two neighbors started to test the breaking point of this longtime balance. Today, Ankara and Tehran are trying to get a better hand against each other through diplomatic, military, and economic instruments. Starting by presenting an overview of Turkish-Iranian relations, this article focuses on the main points of friction between the two actors in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The region is going through a critical juncture with crucial events such as the Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 and the aftermaths of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. So far, Turkey has increased its regional influence by strengthening its economic and diplomatic presence and establishing military cooperation. This target is pursued through the Turkic identity, which provides the ideological basis for Ankara’s regional strategy. The Islamic Republic of Iran, on the other hand, is trying to defend the regional status quo to resist the containment strategy and international isolation that it has been facing since the revolution. The “axis of resistance” idea that Iran pursues, especially in the Middle East, is almost nonexistent in the Central Asian and Caucasian region due to the Russian factor, lack of sympathy to such an approach on the part of the regional actors, and the Regime’s reluctance to change the status quo in its Northern and Eastern borders. In addition to Ankara and Tehran’s competing regional desires, several bilateral problems to solve in energy, trade, security, and migration management put the actors on the opposing sides. The study claims that the incompatibility between the actors’ regional strategies increases to the point that their rivalry in the Middle East will expand to Central Asia and the Caucasian region. But in contrast to this slow process, there are imminent common issues that can only be solved by a joint effort by Turkey and Iran, and this necessity will restrain the damages of this incompatibility on bilateral relations.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ersan Bocutoğlu

After the liberation of Dağlık Karabağ and close vicinity from the long-standing Armenian occupation by Azerbaijan in 2020, different scenarios concerning the future of Armenia and South Caucasus have come to fore. Therefore, there should be a realistic evaluation of status quo of Armenian political elites, diasporas and Armenian economy relations before taking into account of the scenarios. It is not difficult to estimate that since the realization of optimistic scenarios need a mental transformation of Armenian political elites and diasporas that takes considerable time, they are not likely to happen let alone in the short run but even in the medium run. The aim of this paper is to investigate the status quo of Armenian political elites, diasporas, and Armenian economy relations during 1991-2019 period so as to be able to set up a scientific base on which the evaluation of scenarios concerning the future of Armenia and South Caucasus is placed. The method adopted in the paper is a descriptive one and data are collected via internet. Paper suggests that the divergence of Armenian political elites and diasporas on fundamental issues such as Armenia-diaspora relations, Armenia-Russia relations, Armenia-the West Relations and Armenia-Turkey-Azerbaijan relations blackens not only the future of Armenia but also the future of South Caucasus.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 284-297
Author(s):  
M. S. Suvanova

The South Caucasus region traditionally has an important role to play in global politics. This region for centuries has been an arena of confrontation for geopolitical and geostrategic interests between regional states and world powers; this affected the main transport routes, different cultures and religions. With the collapse of the USSR, the South Caucasus became an important and strategic place for Western countries; this bolstered the weakening of Russian influence in the region and the creation of a catalyst for further strengthening of its partners. Western countries sought to establish control over the extraction and diversification of Azerbaijani hydrocarbons. To fulfill these goals Western countries have relied on their ally Turkey, which also pursues its interests in the South Caucasus region.Since the early 1990s, Turkey’s policy towards the countries of the South Caucasus has intensified. Turkey developed policies of expanding its influence in the region. These policies were complex; it included both economic, energy and cultural components. A key element of Turkey’s policy in the region was the energy aspect. In the issue of diversifying the energy resources of the South Caucasus Turkey has made significant progress by implementing projects of pipelines going through its territory, she achieved the status of an energetic conveyor. Another important area of Turkey’s policy in the South Caucasus was the cultural and educational aspect. It is based on the policy of «neo-Ottomanism», which includes elements of «pan-Turkism». The main purpose of this idea was to expand Turkey’s influence by educating pro-Turkic youth in the countries of the region, and also create a positive image for Turkey among various segments of the population that would support its policies.The peculiarity of Turkey’s policy is a multilateral and flexible policy that includes both economic integration, energy cooperation, and a soft and effective policy that includes cultural interaction based on ethnic and linguistic similarity. 


2018 ◽  
Vol III (I) ◽  
pp. 01-17
Author(s):  
Gasparyan Gevorg ◽  
Wang Li

In the post-Soviet era, the Nagorno Karabagh conflict has been a major source of tension in the South Caucasus. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia, the United States, and France have all been involved in the mediation process between Nagorno Karabagh, Armenia, and Azerbaijan over the resolution of the conflict. Russia, given its historical ties, economic interests, political clout, and military relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, appears to be the most influential and vital moderator in this conflict. This dates back to the outbreak of violence in early 1990s. Russia has tried to help the participants in the Nagorno Karabagh conflict to maintain the status quo, and has provided a framework of dialogue for Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia has been the main supplier of arms to both sides, which calls into question Russia's motive and goals in its role as a mediator, and its role is subject of much controversy in the Nagorno Karabagh conflict. This paper argues that Russia's role as a mediator is primarily focused on maintaining the status quo, and ensuring the equilibrium of military capabilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in order to discourage any military escalations between the two states. We assert that despite the fact that this strategy has been successful for Russia in maintaining the status quo, a different approach, which moves beyond military balancing, is required in order to reach a long-term solution for the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno Karabagh.


1984 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Van Wingen

In his classic, Southern Politics, Key used the term “one-party factionalism” to describe the electoral politics of the South during the 1930s and 1940s: “one-party” because the Republicans offered, at best, only minimal opposition to the Democrats, and “factional” because several groups tended to vie for control of the top state offices via electoral victories in the Democratic primaries. According to Key, severe consequences accompanied one-party factionalism. In most of the southern states, primary voters could not even vote the “ins” out of office, for the competing factions were so fluid that it was never clear who, if anyone, represented the ins. The haves in southern society normally controlled government; although those in power had their differences, particularly in style, most of them agreed that the status quo needed protection. The less privileged lacked organized avenues for expressing their needs.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (21) ◽  
pp. 9053
Author(s):  
Qingchang Li ◽  
Seungkook Roh ◽  
Jin Won Lee

The current South Korean government headed by President Moon Jae-in has put a great deal of effort into electricity mix reform by pushing forward the phasing out of coal and nuclear power and the expansion of natural gas and new renewable energy in the country’s electricity generation processes. Noting the importance of understanding public responses to energy policy, the present study segmented the South Korean public according to their preferred direction for electricity mix reform using a nationwide sample. Through a series of latent class analyses, we extracted four distinct segments: Gradual Reformists, Drastic Reformists, Selective Gradual Reformists, and Status-quo Seekers. Overall, apart from the Status-quo Seekers segment (8.75%), support for the transition from coal and nuclear power to natural gas and new renewable energy seems to be the prevailing opinion of the Korean public. However, the degree of such preferences varies across the segments. In addition, regardless of the segment, the South Korean public generally seems to categorize the energy sources in a manner consistent with the underlying framework of the government’s electricity mix reform: they tend to treat coal and nuclear power similarly and natural gas and new renewable energy similarly.


Author(s):  
Gerd-Rainer Horn

Much attention has been rightfully devoted to the invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944 and—less so—the Allied landing on the Mediterranean coastline. This chapter focuses on the contribution by antifascist resistance activists to the liberation of France. It is often overlooked that much of Southern France south of the Loire and Lake Geneva was liberated to a significant extent by resistance units. Obviously, without the engagements responsible for the liberation of the Northern half of France by Allied troops, the resistance would not have been able to carry this out. Still, the liberation of roughly half of France by resistance groups had major consequences for the plans of French antifascists for post-liberation society. The most significant acts of defiance of the smooth return to the status quo ante bellum occurred precisely in those areas where the resistance had been largely responsible for the expulsion of German troops.


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