scholarly journals Russia in Nagorno Karabagh Conflict: A Mediator or an Arms Dealer

2018 ◽  
Vol III (I) ◽  
pp. 01-17
Author(s):  
Gasparyan Gevorg ◽  
Wang Li

In the post-Soviet era, the Nagorno Karabagh conflict has been a major source of tension in the South Caucasus. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia, the United States, and France have all been involved in the mediation process between Nagorno Karabagh, Armenia, and Azerbaijan over the resolution of the conflict. Russia, given its historical ties, economic interests, political clout, and military relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, appears to be the most influential and vital moderator in this conflict. This dates back to the outbreak of violence in early 1990s. Russia has tried to help the participants in the Nagorno Karabagh conflict to maintain the status quo, and has provided a framework of dialogue for Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia has been the main supplier of arms to both sides, which calls into question Russia's motive and goals in its role as a mediator, and its role is subject of much controversy in the Nagorno Karabagh conflict. This paper argues that Russia's role as a mediator is primarily focused on maintaining the status quo, and ensuring the equilibrium of military capabilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in order to discourage any military escalations between the two states. We assert that despite the fact that this strategy has been successful for Russia in maintaining the status quo, a different approach, which moves beyond military balancing, is required in order to reach a long-term solution for the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno Karabagh.

1970 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 451-478
Author(s):  
Marian P. Kirsch

Three momentous events of the 1960's—the war in Vietnam, the steady worsening of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons—portend a shift in the political center of gravity from Europe to Asia in the last third of this century. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia only temporarily ruffled Europe's political terrain, and, while it damaged Moscow's international prestige, it never threatened to'escalate into superpower confrontation on the continent. The United States and its North Adantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, in fact, went out of their way to avoid provoking the Soviet Union; the ritualistic tone of their denunciations of the invasion indicated that, as after Hungary in 1956, the West was resigned to Moscow's freedom of action in its Eastern European “sphere of influence”. Emboldened by the Western response, the Soviet Union reiterated with increased vigor its proposal for a European security conference to freeze the status quo in Europe.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Peacock

Purpose – This paper aims to explore the relationship between childhood, consumption and the Cold War in 1950s America and the Soviet Union. The author argues that Soviet and American leaders, businessmen, and politicians worked hard to convince parents that buying things for their children offered the easiest way to raise good American and Soviet kids and to do their part in waging the economic battles of the Cold War. The author explores how consumption became a Cold War battleground in the late 1950s and suggests that the history of childhood and Cold War consumption alters the way we understand the conflict itself. Design/Methodology/Approach – Archival research in the USA and the Russian Federation along with close readings of Soviet and American advertisements offer sources for understanding the global discourse of consumption in the 1950s and 1960s. Findings – Leaders, advertisers, and propagandists in the Soviet Union and the USA used the same images in the same ways to sell the ethos of consumption to their populations. They did this to sell the Cold War, to bolster the status quo, and to make profits. Originality/Value – This paper offers a previously unexplored, transnational perspective on the role that consumption and the image of the child played in shaping the Cold War both domestically and abroad.


2020 ◽  
pp. 233-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexei D. Voskressenski

Russia’s relations with China (and vice versa) have evolved steadily during the post-Soviet period. Leaders on both sides have proclaimed, for a number of years now, that their bilateral relations are at their best point in history. How did the China-Russia relationship reach such a stage, especially given their long (and largely discordant) history? This chapter traces the evolution of China-Russia relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It identifies the commonalities and common purposes Moscow and Beijing have in world affairs, as well as their bilateral economic, cultural, and military relations. The China-Russia relationship has important implications for the United States, as well as American allies in the world.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 398-408
Author(s):  
Olga Krasnyak

Summary The 1958 Lacy-Zarubin agreement on cultural, educational and scientific exchanges marked decades of people-to-people exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite the Cold War tensions and mutually propagated adversarial images, the exchanges had never been interrupted and remained unbroken until the Soviet Union dissolved. This essay argues that due to the 1958 general agreement and a number of co-operative agreements that had the status of treaties and international acts issued under the authority of the US State Department and the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the exchanges could not proceed without diplomatic supervision. This peculiarity puts academic and technical exchanges specifically into the framework of science diplomacy, which is considered a diplomatic tool for implementing a nation state’s foreign policy goals determined by political power.


1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (5) ◽  
pp. 115-117
Author(s):  
Herbert Scoville

In speaking about arms control negotiations in a multipolar world, it is necessary to bear in mind that we are not really in a multipolar world right now. But perhaps we are starting toward one, at least as far as nuclear power is concerned. Britain, France, and China possess only relatively small nuclear forces at present but they will grow in time and eventually will have to be taken into consideration at least in arms control negotiations involving nuclear weapons. France and Britain at the present do have a nuclear deterrent force which would deter an attack as far as the Soviets are concerned. The status of the Chinese nuclear force is very much more uncertain. It is possible that they now possess a very limited deterrent to an attack by the Soviet Union. Certainly there is no question that at the present time they do not have any means by which they can threaten, even in retaliation, a nuclear attack against the United States. As a consequence, the Chinese do not provide any direct threat to us and we can go ahead and negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union without any real consideration of Chinese participation. One need not conclude from the growing Chinese nuclear power that they must necessarily be brought into the SALT negotiations in the near future.


Slavic Review ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 905-913
Author(s):  
Marko Pavlyshyn

Liberalized cultural discussion in the Soviet Union after the Twenty-seventh Party Congress in 1985 was concerned in part with the nature of a literature that would be appropriate to the new ideals of openness and restructuring. In Ukraine, as elsewhere, the debate brought forth a list of imperatives that, without challenging the socialist realist principle that literature must serve overarching social and political goals, amounted to a formula for a new kind of literary engagement. Literature must “boldly intrude into contemporary reality,” it must defend the historical, cultural, linguistic, and ecological heritage and must unmask the crimes and abuses of the past and present. It must no longer be bland and inoffensive and must not avoid controversial issues or praise the status quo as a matter of course.


Author(s):  
Marc Trachtenberg

This chapter details events that occurred from 1963 to 1975. John F. Kennedy's most fundamental goal as president of the United States was to reach a political understanding with the Soviet Union based on the following principle: America and Russia were both very great powers and therefore needed to respect each other's most fundamental interests. The United States was thus prepared, for its part, to recognize the USSR's special position in eastern Europe. America would also see to it that West Germany would not become a nuclear power. In exchange, the Soviets would have to accept the status quo in central Europe, especially in Berlin. If a settlement of that sort could be worked out, the great problem that lay at the heart of the Cold War would be resolved. However, to reach a settlement based on those principles, Kennedy had to get both the USSR and his own allies in Europe to accept this sort of arrangement.


2018 ◽  
pp. 55-59
Author(s):  
Khatuna Chapichadze

After providing a brief overview of the US policy in the South Caucasus from the beginning of the 90s of the 20th century as there have emerged three new countries in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the article mainly focuses on relatively less active engagement from the side of the United States into the affairs of the South Caucasus since the presidency of Barack Obama maintained if not untypically deepened even more under Donald Trump currently as well. These trends are explained through the prism of the general standpoints of the latest American administrations promoting the idea of less or non-interference of the superpower in other countries’, regions’ or continents’ notably domestic matters. There are discussed major implications of such, i.e. the less active US foreign policy observed among others, also in the South Caucasus lately, although in the case of this region clearly primarily with less desirable effects as it appears in fact, taking into account on the other hand however quite diverse needs and interests of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. The article critically analyses the consequences the US recent withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, as well as its re-imposition of economic sanctions against Iran might have for the South Caucasian countries, addresses the factor of latest uncertainty over the NATO member Turkey, covers the Russian problem, and raises one of the crucial issues whether the current US President Donald Trump has more actual decisive power than the Congress, also in terms of foreign policy implementation, or not.


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