Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-191
Author(s):  
Alexander A. Pechenkin ◽  

Two conceptions of the contemporary philosophy of science are taken under consideration: scientific realism and constructive empiricism. Scientific realism presupposes 1) the conception of truth as the correspondence of knowledge to reality, 2) the real existence of entities postulated by a theory. The constructive empiricism puts forward the idea of empirical adequacy: science aims to give us the theories which are empirically adequate and acceptance of the theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. To compare methodological resources of these two positions in the philosophy of science the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics is involved. As a methodological realization of scientific realism the ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics is taken under consideration. K.Popper’s version

Author(s):  
Dominik Giese ◽  
Jonathan Joseph

This chapter evaluates critical realism, a term which refers to a philosophy of science connected to the broader approach of scientific realism. In contrast to other philosophies of science, such as positivism and post-positivism, critical realism presents an alternative view on the questions of what is ‘real’ and how one can generate scientific knowledge of the ‘real’. How one answers these questions has implications for how one studies science and society. The critical realist answer starts by prioritizing the ontological question over the epistemological one, by asking: What must the world be like for science to be possible? Critical realism holds the key ontological belief of scientific realism that there is a reality which exists independent of our knowledge and experience of it. Critical realists posit that reality is more complex, and made up of more than the directly observable. More specifically, critical realism understands reality as ‘stratified’ and composed of three ontological domains: the empirical, the actual, and the real. Here lies the basis for causation.


2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (11n13) ◽  
pp. 1496-1503
Author(s):  
B. C. SANCTUARY

Entangled EPR spin pairs can be treated using the statistical ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics. As such the singlet state results from an ensemble of spin pairs each with its own specific axis of quantization. This axis acts like a quantum mechanical hidden variable. If the spins lose coherence they disentangle into a mixed state that contains classical correlations. In this paper an infinitesimal phase decoherence is introduced to the singlet state in order to reveal more clearly some of the correlations. It is shown that a singlet state has no classical correlations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (121) ◽  
pp. 64-75
Author(s):  
Ruben M. Nagdyan ◽  

This article is a continuation of the previous one, published in this journal under the same title. The article continues the theoretical consideration of signs of the unity of transcendental psychology (TP) and quantum mechanics (QM) in the vision of Aristotle's metaphysics. In the context of the metaphysical triad necessary-possible-real, the «intersection points» of A. I. Mirakyan’s transcendental psychology and the interpretation of quantum mechanics by A. Yu. Sevalnikov. It is shown that in the both transcendental psychology and quantum mechanics epistemological problems are associated with the impossibility of using the language of their classical predecessors. In both sciences, it becomes necessary to use a new language, a new way of thinking and a new logic of understanding the phenomena under study. All this allows us to conclude that both in transcendental psychology and in quantum mechanics, researchers are dealing with a new ontology of reality that differs from that studied in classical physics and in the phenomenology of classical psychology. It became necessary to divide reality into observable and unobservable. This allows us to say that we are talking about polyontic (or modal) philosophy – different modalities or modes of being, within the framework of which it is necessary to consider the relationship between the necessary, the possible and the real things. Both sciences are the sciences of becoming. If QM is the science of the formation of the observed world, then TP is the science of the generation of phenomena of psychical reality. This is one of the reasons for the unity of their methodological foundations. There is a fairly close similarity in the understanding of the concept of «coexisting opportunities» (or «potential opportunities»). In TP, it coincides with the concept of the coexistence of functionally equal opportunities for reflecting various concomitant properties of objects, and in QM – with the principle of superposition of states of elementary particles. The relative nature of the formation of the phenomenon in the reality of the real follows it. In TP, this is expressed in the realization of one of the coexisting possibilities of reflecting any of the presented properties of the object, and in QM this is expressed as a result of the reduction of the wave function to one of the possible states of a quantum object. The relativity of the formation of a specific phenomenon, determined by the existence of «coexisting possibilities», is realized according to the principle of relativity to the means of observation.


2005 ◽  
Vol 37 (109) ◽  
pp. 29-63
Author(s):  
Mauricio Suárez

It is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of science that the domain of application of a theory is typically larger than its explanatory covering power: theories can be applied to phenomena that they do not explain. I argue for an analogous thesis regarding the notion of empirical adequacy. A theory’s domain of application is typically larger than its domain of empirical adequacy: theories are often applied to phenomena from which they receive no empirical confirmation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seungbae Park

In contemporary philosophy of science, the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are regarded as the strongest arguments for and against scientific realism, respectively. In this paper, the author constructs a new argument for scientific realism, which he calls the anti-induction for scientific realism. It holds that, since past theories were false, present theories are true. The author provides an example from the history of science to show that anti-inductions sometimes work in science. The anti-induction for scientific realism has several advantages over the no-miracles argument as a positive argument for scientific realism.


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