scholarly journals A Broomean Model of Rationality and Reasoning

2019 ◽  
Vol 116 (11) ◽  
pp. 585-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franz Dietrich ◽  
Antonios Staras ◽  
Robert Sugden ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Reasoning Process ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
Negative Results ◽  
Structural Types ◽  
John Broome ◽  
Requirements Completeness

John Broome has developed an account of rationality and reasoning which gives philosophical foundations for choice theory and the psychology of rational agents. We formalize his account into a model that differs from ordinary choice-theoretic models through focusing on psychology and the reasoning process. Within that model, we ask Broome’s central question of whether reasoning can make us more rational: whether it allows us to acquire transitive preferences, consistent beliefs, non-akratic intentions, and so on. We identify three structural types of rationality requirements: consistency requirements, completeness requirements, and closedness requirements. Many standard rationality requirements fall under this typology. Based on three theorems, we argue that reasoning is successful in achieving closedness requirements, but not in achieving consistency or completeness requirements. We assess how far our negative results reveal gaps in Broome's theory, or deficiencies in choice theory and behavioral economics.

Cognitive Biases in Decision Making in Post-Bureaucratic Organizations

2017 ◽  
pp. 358-382
Author(s):  
Marie-Therese Claes ◽  
Thibault Jacquemin
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Bureaucratic Organization ◽  
System 2 ◽  
System 1

In today's post-bureaucratic organization, where decision-making is decentralized, most managers are confronted with highly complex situations where time-constraint and availability of information makes the decision-making process essential. Studies show that a great amount of decisions are not taken after a rational decision-making process but rather rely on instinct, emotion or quickly processed information. After briefly describing the journey of thoughts from Rational Choice Theory to the emergence of Behavioral Economics, this chapter will elaborate on the mechanisms that are at play in decision-making in an attempt to understand the root causes of cognitive biases, using the theory of Kahneman's (2011) System 1 and System 2. It will discuss the linkage between the complexity of decision-making and post-bureaucratic organization.

scholarly journals DISAGREEMENT AND EASY BOOTSTRAPPING

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Eyal Tal
Keyword(s):  
Irrational Belief ◽  
Rational Belief ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Rational Beliefs ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
First Response ◽  
The One

ABSTRACTShould conciliating with disagreeing peers be considered sufficient for reaching rational beliefs? Thomas Kelly argues that when taken this way, Conciliationism lets those who enter into a disagreement with an irrational belief reach a rational belief all too easily. Three kinds of responses defending Conciliationism are found in the literature. One response has it that conciliation is required only of agents who have a rational belief as they enter into a disagreement. This response yields a requirement that no one should follow. If the need to conciliate applies only to already rational agents, then an agent must conciliate only when her peer is the one irrational. A second response views conciliation as merely necessary for having a rational belief. This alone does little to address the central question of what is rational to believe when facing a disagreeing peer. Attempts to develop the response either reduce to the first response, or deem necessary an unnecessary doxastic revision, or imply that rational dilemmas obtain in cases where intuitively there are none. A third response tells us to weigh what our pre-disagreement evidence supports against the evidence from the disagreement itself. This invites epistemic akrasia.

Two interpretations of the rational choice theory and the relevance of behavioral critique

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 464-489 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Hudik
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Decision Procedure ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Human Populations ◽  
Aggregate Level ◽  
Price Theory ◽  
Jel Codes

I compare two interpretations of the rational choice theory: decision-theoretic and price-theoretic. The former takes the assumption of utility maximization as a literal description of a decision procedure. The latter considers it as a modeling device used to explain changes/variability of behavior on an aggregate level. According to the price-theoretic interpretation, these changes/variability are explained by constraints (“prices”) rather than differences in intrinsic characteristics between human populations (“tastes”). While the decision-theoretic interpretation of rationality represents a possible foundation of the price-theoretic interpretation of rationality, I argue that it is not its only possible foundation. I then show that critiques raised by behavioral economics apply to the decision-theoretic interpretation and much less so to the price-theoretic one. From the perspective of the price theory, behavioral and rational choice models are predominantly complementary. Price-theoretic interpretation helps to explain why the rational choice theory continues to play an important role in economics, even after the behavioral revolution. JEL codes: D01, D03, B41, A10

scholarly journals Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 3-30
Author(s):  
Herman Cappelen ◽  
Josh Dever
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Verbal Communication ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
Explainable Ai ◽  
The Media ◽  
Philosophical Debates

This chapter introduces the topic of the book: the philosophical foundations of AI, and in particular the powerful contemporary AI that guides our lives and receives so much attention in the media. It introduces the idea of a neural network, and poses the central puzzle of the book: when a given system’s outputs take the form of what appear to be acts of verbal communication, what is going on? When an AI system indicates, for example, that we are not creditworthy, is it saying that we are not? Can it speak? Along with posing this central question, the chapter also makes clear what the book is not about—ethics, for example—and areas in which the book might have relevance for extra-philosophical debates, such as the need for explainable AI.

The Limits of Behavioral Economics in Tort Law

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Pi
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Punitive Damages ◽  
The Law ◽  
Substantive Law

Abstract Skeptics of rational choice theory have long predicted that behavioral economics would radically transform the legislation, adjudication, and analysis of law. Using tort law as an exemplar, this Article maps out the narrow set of conditions where substantive law can be modified to accommodate irrational decision-makers. Specifically, this Article demonstrates that if injurers are systematically biased, and the due care standard can be expressed quantitatively, and victims are unable to take meaningful precautions, then imposing punitive damages can induce irrational injurers to exercise efficient precautionary care. In all other cases, it is better that the law adopt a presumption of rationality, regardless whether individuals behave rationally in fact.

scholarly journals Normative rational choice theory: Past, present, and future

2015 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bojan Krstic ◽  
Milos Krstic
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Economic Literature ◽  
Economic Psychology ◽  
The Third

In this paper, we have tried to explain the normative turn in more recent work on experimental economics and behavioral economics. In section two, we discussed the various arguments that philosophers have offered in related to a normative interpretation of rational choice theory. We used the Friedman-Savage work on Expected Utility Theory as an example of the differences between the way that economists and philosophers see rational choice theory. We concluded that economists have traditionally equated the normative with ethically. In the third part, we examined the results of experimental and behaviorial economic literature with emphasis on the influence of experimental psychology. We presented a number of empirical anomalies and we agreed that representatives of economic psychology tend to view rational choice theory as a normative theory of rationality. In the last part, we examined some of the causes and consequences of the normative turn.

Starving the Beast

2020 ◽  
pp. 80-100
Author(s):  
David Stoesz
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Welfare State ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Public Debt ◽  
Tax Reform ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Chicago School ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Keynesian Economics ◽  
The Welfare State

The evolution of the Chicago school of economics and public choice theory provided an alternative to Keynesian economics, which had served as the basis for financing the welfare state. Accordingly, Grover Norquist established Americans for Tax Reform to contain taxes, denying the welfare state essential revenues. Despite the success of the antitax movement, unanticipated problems became evident: the expansion of tax expenditures exacerbated inequality and skyrocketed public debt. Behavioral economics emerged as a research-based alternative to conventional economic theory.

Democratic Deliberation and Social Choice

2018 ◽  
pp. 462-489 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian List
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Escape Route ◽  
Democratic Deliberation ◽  
Opinion Change ◽  
Negative Results ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Shed Light

In normative political theory, it is widely accepted that democracy cannot be reduced to voting alone, but that it requires deliberation. In formal social choice theory, by contrast, the study of democracy has focused primarily on the aggregation of individual opinions into collective decisions, typically through voting. While the literature on deliberation has an optimistic flavour, the literature on social choice is more mixed. It is centred around several paradoxes and impossibility results identifying conflicts between different intuitively plausible desiderata. In recent years, there has been a growing dialogue between the two literatures. This paper discusses the connections between them. Important insights are that (i) deliberation can complement aggregation and open up an escape route from some of its negative results; and (ii) the formal models of social choice theory can shed light on some aspects of deliberation, such as the nature of deliberation-induced opinion change.

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