The Process-Oriented Conception of Truth in William James

2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-233
Author(s):  
J. Edward Hackett ◽  

In this article, I argue that William Jamess concept of truth can be interpreted accurately if we pay attention to the radical empiricism that underlines the notion in all of James's later writings and if we also see radical empiricism as a type of process thought. When we acknowledge these two conditions, we can see how Cheryl Misak is mistaken in reinscribing subjectivism back into Jamess radical empiricism, which attempted to overcome the subject-object distinction in the first place. In reading James through radical empiricism qua process philosophy, then, the background assumptions of James are set into relief yielding a deeper and richer conception of truth.


1999 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 465-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugene Taylor

Although James and Freud are generally not considered scientific by experimental psychologists, both wrote about their view of what a scientific psychology should look like. Their radically different philosophical epistemologies and historical origins are reviewed, to provide an understanding of their respective visions for psychology. James took his stand on a new metaphysical foundation for the way experiments should be conducted with his formulation of radical empiricism. Freud attempted a neurological explanation of the unconscious in his “Project for a Scientific Psychology.” Remarkably, their definitions of psychology as a science had a similar ring. Likely, this is because both took a phenomenological position with regard to how they defined science, which is also probably the primary reason their ideas on the subject have always been rejected by experimentalists. The humanistic implications of the neuroscience revolution, however, have caused a reassessment of their respective positions, as philosophical questions about the nature of consciousness have brought both Freud and James back into vogue, but in new and unexpected ways.



1977 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-326
Author(s):  
David B. Myers

It would be misleading to make any reference to Marx's “theory” of truth-for nowhere in the corpus of Marx's writings will one find an essay dealing with truth in a thematic way. Marx's scattered remarks on truth occur within the context of discussions of social questions. What one can pull together on the topic of truth amounts at most to the sketch of a concept which applies to social knowledge and not knowledge in general. My aim will be to reconstruct Marx's concept of social truth on the basis of his writings on society and social theory.Those who want a systematic essay developing a general Marxist theory of knowledge have, of course, Lenin's classical formulation of Marxist epistemology in Materialism and Empiriocriticism. We also have Leszek Kolakowski's bold and heretical attack on Lenin's interpretation in “Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth” where we find the astounding claim that Marx's view of truth is closer to that of William James than to that of Lenin.Kolakowski's essay has been the subject of numerous attacks both by predictably indignant true believers and by independent, creative Marxists.



2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-186
Author(s):  
Evelyn Wan

Abstract This paper reflects upon the methodological questions entailed by what digital media materiality could be, and how one could analytically approach it via theories of experience such as radical empiricism and process philosophy. I argue that for digital media, becoming material means to ‘enter into experience’. However, this notion of ‘experience’ is not defined in relation to the phenomenological, distinctly-human subject. I offer instead an expanded notion of experience that resides in non-human objects, networks and other physical entities like mobile phones and computers. Operating system (OS) and intelligent assistants such as Samantha in Spike Jonze’s Her (2013) and the next-generation Siri in development, Viv the Global Brain, can be seen as representations of what such a non-human experience could be like, as digital objects communicate with one another. William James, father of radical empiricism, argues that the definition of matter as something that lies behind physical phenomena is merely a postulate of thought. In his philosophy, the world is made up of only one primal material - that of experience. While James could not have anticipated our era of digital technologies at the time of writing in 1890, radical empiricism offers an interesting angle in approaching what digital materiality could be. Mark Hansen’s latest monograph, Feed Forward: On the Future of Twenty-First-Century Media (2015), turns to Alfred North Whitehead in an attempt to understand how 21st-century media operations feature in a world of objects where humans are implicated in, but not central to digital networks. Referring to Whitehead, he analyses how media operations (like those superalgorithms computing in OS systems) reconfigure the notion of perception in experience. In a similar theoretical move, I turn to William James’s radical empiricism to analyse how the digital may be material/ised in a world of beyond-human experience.



Author(s):  
Daniel A. Dombrowski

In this work two key theses are defended: political liberalism is a processual (rather than a static) view and process thinkers should be political liberals. Three major figures are considered (Rawls, Whitehead, Hartshorne) in the effort to show the superiority of political liberalism to its illiberal alternatives on the political right and left. Further, a politically liberal stance regarding nonhuman animals and the environment is articulated. It is typical for debates in political philosophy to be adrift regarding the concept of method, but from start to finish this book relies on the processual method of reflective equilibrium or dialectic at its best. This is the first extended effort to argue for both political liberalism as a process-oriented view and process philosophy/theology as a politically liberal view. It is also a timely defense of political liberalism against illiberal tendencies on both the right and the left.





2018 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 121-141
Author(s):  
Alberto Villalobos Manjarrez

The aim of this work is to explore the relations between the concepts of experience, reality and truth in the philosophy of William James, through a dialogue with Henri Bergson, a decisive influence for the pragmatist. This text is divided into five parts: 1) a brief introduction to the problem; 2) the development of the concept of experience in James philosophy; 3) the explanation of the concept of reality in this radical empiricism; 4) the exposition of three forms of truth that correspond to antiquity, modenity and pragmatism; 5) and, finally, a brief conclusion about the posterities and the actuality of this empirical philosophy.



2004 ◽  
Vol 8 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 213-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Sheppard

AbstractIncreased awareness of the breadth and depth of existing environmental challenges is part of an environmental education. One effect of this increased awareness that can manifest itself in the environmental ethics classroom is pessimism. I outline two varieties of pessimism that have a tendency to hold sway in the environmental ethics classroom: 1) pessimism about the general state of the environment; and, 2) pessimism about being able to do anything about the general state of the environment. After outlining a few of the potential educational and vocational consequences of allowing pessimism to take root, I offer a pedagogical method for reducing the sway of pessimism in the classroom. I argue that William James' and John Dewey's writings on the subject of meliorism offer a framework that, when combined with some of the insights of incrementalism theory in environmental policy, can not only help students to reduce the sway of pessimism in the classroom, but also in their chosen career paths by, among other things, highlighting the "possibility of possibility".



2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 338-356
Author(s):  
Lars Albinus

Abstract This article explores various ways in which the concept of truth is actually used across discursive boundaries separating common sense, science, mathematics, and religion. Although my overall approach is pragmatic, I argue that we also need to take some semantic restrictions into consideration. The main objective of the article is the issue of translating concepts of truth in various linguistic and cultural contexts without losing sight of the particular network of connotations. I come to the conclusion that with regard to a religious discourse, a translatable concept of truth typically enters the grammatical place of the subject rather than the predicate. From this position the discursive constraints of authority, authenticity and expressivity are held in check by an internal predetermination of the implied possibility of falsehood. Most of all, however, the article focuses on non-propositional aspects of a religious expression of truth, in which case the very distinction between true and false becomes patently irrelevant.



2011 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-80
Author(s):  
Margus Vihalem

The present paper outlines some basic concepts of Alain Badiou’s philosophy of the subject, tracking down its inherent and complex philosophical implications. These implications are made explicit in the criticism directed against the philosophical sophistry which denies the pertinence of the concept of truth. Badiou’s philosophical innovation is based on three nodal concepts, namely truth, event and subject, and it must be revealed how the afore-mentioned concepts are organized and interrelated, eventually leading to reformulating the concept of the subject. In its exercise, philosophy is intimately affiliated to the four adjacent procedures of mathematics, art, love and politics that could be understood as overall conditions on the margins of which philosophical thinking takes place. Separating philosophy from ontology and charging philosophy with what exceeds being, Badiou transforms it to the general theory of the event. Consequently the concept of the subject is disconnected from that of the object, the subject being not an instance of knowledge, but always a part of generic procedures and thus definable simply as a finite fragment or an operative configuration of the traces of the event. Therefore, it could be stated that Badiou’s theory of the subject is formal and refuses all essentialist connotations.



Empiricisms ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 289-305
Author(s):  
Barry Allen

William James introduced the expression “radical empiricism.” The chapter explains what was supposed to make empiricism radical, and why James thought that was worth trying to do. That requires explaining the connection between radical empiricism and other themes in James’s work, including pluralism and the idea of pure experience. His work belongs to an effort from the latter nineteenth century to make empiricism more consistently empirical by overcoming the legacy of Ockham and nominalism, and it is this anti-nominalist animus that radicalizes James’s empiricism.



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