Does Transparency Make a Difference? The Example of the European Council of Ministers

Author(s):  
David Stasagage

In the panoply of European institutions that have been criticized for their secrecy and lack of accountability, the European Council of Ministers certainly ranks near the top of the list. However, others insist that the secrecy of the policy process within the European Union is exaggerated, and that the public already has access to plentiful information about decision making. This chapter examines empirical evidence that may be used to determine the extent to which secrecy of the EU Council of Ministers is costly or beneficial. It also discusses the effect of efforts made by the Council since 1993 to become more open in its proceedings. Though the focus of the chapter is on whether contributions of individual members of a decision-making body are observable, there are more basic levels of transparency that might be considered, in particular whether there is a ‘giving reasons requirement’, whereby a decision-making body is obliged to provide an explanation for its decisions.

Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

The aims of this chapter are threefold. It first briefly considers the events that have led to the creation of the European Community (EC) and the European Union (EU). Secondly, it introduces the reader to the principal institutions of the Union: the European Council; the Council of Ministers; the European Commission; the European Parliament; and the Court of Justice of the EU and General Court. The nature and functions of each of these bodies is considered. Thirdly, the chapter indicates, where appropriate, the nature of the institutional reforms which have occurred following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by the member states.


Author(s):  
Fiona Hayes-Renshaw

This chapter examines the inhabitants of, and working visitors to, the Council of Ministers’s headquarters in Brussels. The Council of Ministers has always occupied an important position among the European institutions and in European policy-making. As a European Union institution, it is involved in all areas of EU activity, both by legislating in tandem with the European Parliament (EP) and by coordinating the member states’ policies in particular fields. The chapter first traces the origins of the present-day Council of Ministers before discussing its hierarchy and what the Council does. It then considers how the Council deals with the other EU institutions such as the European Council, the EP, and the European Commission. It shows that the Council embodies the enduring tension between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism as explanatory tools for understanding the construction of the EU.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

This chapter has three aims. It first briefly considers the origins of the what is now the European Union (EU). Secondly, it discusses the institutions of the Union, the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the EU and General Court. The nature and functions of these bodies is considered. Thirdly, the chapter indicates the nature of institutional reforms which have occurred following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.


Politics ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-87
Author(s):  
Mark Baimbridge ◽  
Brian Burkitt

The disagreement within the European Union (EU) concerning the system of qualified majority voting highlighted the inequalities within the present allocation of votes. With enlargement these inequalities are likely to intensify. We suggest that the EU should examine alternative methods for the allocation of Council votes. Two possible scenarios are allocation according to population size, and second, allocation based upon contributions to the EU budget. We conclude that either of these methods would offer a greater degree of equity, stability and flexibility in the decision-making process of the European Council.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-130
Author(s):  
Gavrilov Doina

AbstractThe EU decision-making process is one that has changed over time with the Treaties, with the extension, modification of EU policies and the areas where the EU is acting. In addition to the above, in 2016 we have one more reason to add to the changing of the decisional process “-Brexit”- a political turnaround that stimulates new changes at the decision-making level and raises questions about the future of the European Union. Federalists claim that these events will lead to a strengthening of the Union, and euro-skeptics claim that this is a step towards breaking the Union. Two years after the Brexit started, the European Union continues to remain a prominent actor in the international arena, but another question is being raised: “Will EU institutions act on the same principles? Or will there be changes in the decision-making process?”. In this article, we will analyse the state coalitions in the decision-making process, and the role of Brexit in forming coalitions for establishing a decisional balance in the European Council. Following the analysis of the power rapport in the European Council, we refer to small and medium-sized states that work together closely to counterbalance the decisions of the big states, and the new coalitions to achieve their goals in the new political context.


Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter discusses the four major European Union institutions: the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Court. The provisions dealing with the EU institutions are split between the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Directly elected by the European citizens, the Parliament constitutes not only the most democratic institution; it is also the most supranational institution of the EU. Ultimately, each of the EU institutions is characterized by its distinct composition and its decision-making mode. Importantly, the EU is not based on a strict separation of functions between its institutions but follows a ‘checks and balances’ version of the separation-of-powers principle. This means that various EU institutions share in the exercise of various governmental functions.


Res Publica ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 40 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 435-461
Author(s):  
Bart Kerremans

The European Union bas recently started negotiations on its enlargement with a first group of six countries. This will probably be followed by a second wave of enlargements that would include five or six more countries. A question that can be raised in whether the institutional structure of the EU is ready to cope with an expanded membership. This article aims at analyzing this question as far as the Council of Ministers is concerned. It points at the rising tension between the capacity of the Council to act and the extent of control that each member states can exert on Council decision-making. The IGC that resulted in the Amsterdam Treaty basically failed to resolve this problem. The article looks at the reasons why it failed since these reasons expound the problems the EU will have to face in the near future when preparing its institutions for an expanded membership.


2016 ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Monika Poboży

The article poses a question about the existence of the rule of separation of powers in the EU institutional system, as it is suggested by the wording of the treaties. The analysis led to the conclusion, that in the EU institutional system there are three separated functions (powers) assigned to different institutions. The Council and the European Parliament are legislative powers, the Commission and the European Council create a “divided executive”. The Court of Justice is a judicial power. The above mentioned institutions gained strong position within their main functions (legislative, executive, judicial), but the proper mechanisms of checks and balances have not been developed, especially in the relations between legislative and executive power. These powers do not limit one another in the EU system. In the EU there are therefore three separated but arbitrary powers – because they do not limit and balance one another, and are not fully controlled by the member states.


This book provides the first comprehensive analysis of the withdrawal agreement concluded between the United Kingdom and the European Union to create the legal framework for Brexit. Building on a prior volume, it overviews the process of Brexit negotiations that took place between the UK and the EU from 2017 to 2019. It also examines the key provisions of the Brexit deal, including the protection of citizens’ rights, the Irish border, and the financial settlement. Moreover, the book assesses the governance provisions on transition, decision-making and adjudication, and the prospects for future EU–UK trade relations. Finally, it reflects on the longer-term challenges that the implementation of the 2016 Brexit referendum poses for the UK territorial system, for British–Irish relations, as well as for the future of the EU beyond Brexit.


2002 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 551-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Ballmann ◽  
David Epstein ◽  
Sharyn O'Halloran

Although relatively unknown outside of Europe, comitology committees are an object of considerable controversy in the European Union (EU). Controversy stems from their pivotal role in overseeing policy implementation authority delegated from the Council of Ministers (Council) to the European Commission (Commission). In this article, we employ a game-theoretic model to analyze the influence of these, committees on policy outcomes. Our analysis provides three important insights. First, we show that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, comitology committees move outcomes toward the Commission's preferred policies rather than the Council's. Second, we demonstrate that the possibility of a Council veto may also move outcomes away from Council members' policy preferences and toward the Commission's. Third, the 1999 changes to the comitology procedures, designed to enhance the Commission's autonomy in policymaking, may have had the exact opposite effect. Paradoxically, we conclude that comitology serves to enhance the Commission's role in policy implementation and thereby strengthens the separation of powers within the EU.


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