Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Simply Trying to Do the Right Thing

Author(s):  
Roger Brownsword

In a context of rapidly emerging technologies, this chapter considers the bearing of human dignity on the regulatory environment. It opens by suggesting that one of the reasons why moral communities are now debating human dignity with such intensity is because of concerns arising from the rapid development of novel biotechnologies. Next, it considers how far it is possible to satisfy ideals of regulatory coherence when the regulation of emerging technologies hinges on our divided understanding of human dignity. Thirdly, it identifies two threats to human dignity that are immanent in modern regulatory thinking. One threat is a risk-management mentality that marginalizes (and possibly excludes) moral considerations; and the other is an over-reliance on technological instruments such that the complexion of the regulatory environment denies humans the opportunity to express their dignity.

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 188-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorg Sladič

Legal privilege and professional secrecy of attorneys relate to the right to a fair trial (Article 6 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) as well as to the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 ECHR). The reason for protecting the lawyer via fundamental rights is the protection of fundamental rights of the lawyer’s clients. All legal orders apply legal privileges and professional secrecy; however, the contents of such are not identical. Traditionally there is an important difference between common and civil law. The professional secrecy of an attorney in civil law jurisdictions is his right and at the same time his obligation based on his membership of the Bar (that is his legal profession). In common law legal privilege comprises the contents of documents issued by an attorney to the client. Professional secrecy of attorneys in civil law jurisdictions applies solely to independent lawyers; in-house lawyers are usually not allowed to benefit from rules on professional secrecy (exceptions in the Netherlands and Belgium). On the other hand, common law jurisdictions apply legal professional privilege, recognized also to in-house lawyers. Slovenian law follows the traditional civil law concept of professional secrecy and sets a limited privilege to in-house lawyers. The article then discusses Slovenian law of civil procedure and compares the position of professional secrecy in lawsuits before State’s courts and in arbitration.


2021 ◽  
pp. 316-341
Author(s):  
Richard Martin

Similar to the street-level bureaucrats in Lipsky’s classic study, the custody officers met in the course of fieldwork for this study were faced with a dilemma emergent from competing occupational demands and police functions. On the one hand, they were conscious of their statutory duties under PACE to act as guardians of suspects’ rights, and that the routine practices of their fellow officers could undermine the right to liberty. On the other, they were confronted with considerable organizational pressure to process arrests in custody and, in doing so, help their over-worked frontline colleagues who tirelessly bounced from one response call to another. This chapter aims to answer the question emerging from the last chapter: how did custody officers respond to the pressure they faced to authorize the detention of suspects, especially where the arrest seemed to be on dubious grounds? Did they succumb to workplace demands and authorize detention, or did they feel able to push back and challenge arresting officers and their supervisors? By the end of this chapter, the reader will come to understand how and, more importantly, why, the former attitude prevailed and what this tells us about custody officers as human rights practitioners.


Author(s):  
Valeria Ottonelli

This chapter sides with those who believe that a right to stay should be counted among fundamental human rights. However, it also acknowledges that there are good reasons for objecting to the most popular justifications of the right to stay, which are based on the assumption that people have valuable ties to their community of residence and that people’s life plans are located where they live. In response to these qualms, this chapter argues that the best way to make sense of the right to stay is to conceive it as belonging to the category of “control rights”; these are the rights that protect people’s control over their own bodies and personal space, which is an essential condition for personhood and human dignity. This account of the right to stay can overcome the most pressing objections to its recognition as a fundamental human right.


Author(s):  
Predrag Stojanović ◽  

Public-private partnership is often proposed as one of the better ways to establish sustainable and economically efficient use of water resources. On the other hand, we are witnessing an obvious crisis of legitimacy in the liberalization of public utilities, both by various civic movements and authors who challenge the success of this concept in financing water supply, emphasizing that numerous practical examples of private capital participation in this area have led to adverse effects on the poorest population strata. In this paper, the author analyzes the results of research related to the concept of public-private partnership, and attempts to answer whether such solutions appear to be necessary and whether they can be harmonized with the current tendency of public policies to recognize the right to water and include it in the catalogue of basic human rights.


2021 ◽  
pp. 327-340
Author(s):  
William A. Schabas

Some fundamental rights, variously described as ‘solidarity rights’, ‘people’s rights’ or ‘third generation rights’ are not fully reflected in the human rights instruments. Indeed their place within human rights law remains somewhat controversial although that does not imply that they are not customary in nature. Among them are the right to peace, the right to a healthy environment, the right of peoples to self determination, and the right to development. The main distinction between these rights and other human rights relates to the jurisdiction of human rights bodies. They have a collective dimension that is not present in the same way with the other categories of human rights.


Author(s):  
Nima Norouzi ◽  
Hussein Movahedian

The right to use one's mother language is affected by examining the nature of this right in the international human rights system. Speaking of linguistic rights requires examining this right in the context of general human rights and the rights of minorities. On the one hand, the right to use one's mother tongue is rooted in the “right to be different,” which itself is inspired by human dignity, and, on the other hand, because the linguistic rights of the majority are better guaranteed than the linguistic rights of the minority. This chapter examines the right to use one's mother tongue in the minority system; therefore, language rights can be divided into two approaches based on tolerance, which prohibits any interference with the choice of language and its use by governments, as well as an extension-based approach that seeks to protect the right to use language in various fields such as education, court, public arena, and government institutions.


Author(s):  
Carozza Paolo G

This article examines the issue of human dignity in relation to human rights. It analyses the functions and principle of human dignity and its use in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments. It suggests that human dignity seems to help justify expansive interpretations of human rights and strengthens the centrality and importance of the right in question and limiting possible exceptions or limitations to that right. This article also contends that the difficulty of reaching greater consensus on the meaning and implications of human dignity in international human rights law may be attributed to the fact that it refers to both a foundational premise of human rights and to a principle that affect interpretation and application of specific human rights.


Author(s):  
John Vorhaus

Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares: 'Everyone has the right to education.' This implies that the right to education and training applies to all persons, including all persons in prison. This position is considered here from a philosophical point of view and it will receive some support. Yet it is not obvious that the position is correct, nor, if it is, how it is best explained. I will examine the basis for asserting a right to education on behalf of all prisoners, and consider what is required by way of its defence in the face of common objections. I illustrate how international conventions and principles express prisoners' right to education, and I look at how this right is defended by appeal to education as a means to an end and as a human right – required by respect for persons and their human dignity.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-117
Author(s):  
Billy Holmes

Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights facilitates inequality regarding the imposition of the death penalty and thus, it cannot ensure universality for the protection of the right to life. Paragraph two of this article states: ‘sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes.’ This article argues that the vagueness of the phrase ‘the most serious crimes’ allows states to undermine human rights principles and human dignity by affording states significant discretion regarding the human rights principles of equality and anti-discrimination. The article posits that this discretion allows states to undermine human dignity and the concept of universal human rights by challenging their universality; by facilitating legal inequality between men and women. Accordingly, it asserts that the implications of not expounding this vague phrase may be far-reaching, particularly in the long-term. The final section of this article offers a potential solution to this problem.


2019 ◽  
Vol 76 ◽  
pp. 283-296
Author(s):  
Ryszard Piotrowski

The rapid development of information and communication technology has made it imperative that new human rights be spelled out, to cope with an array of expected threats associated with this process. With artificial intelligence being increasingly put to practical uses, the prospect arises of Man’s becoming more and more AI-dependant in multiple walks of life. This necessitates that a constitutional and international dimension be imparted to a right that stipulates that key state-level decisions impacting human condition, life and freedom must be made by humans, not automated systems or other AI contraptions. But if artificial intelligence were to make decisions, then it should be properly equipped with value-based criteria. The culture of abdication of privacy protection may breed consent to the creation and practical use of technologies capable to penetrate an individual consciousness without his or her consent. Evidence based on such thought interference must be barred from court proceedings. Everyone’s right to intellectual identity and integrity, the right to one’s thoughts being free from technological interference, is as essential for the survival of the democratic system as the right to privacy – and it may well prove equally endangered.


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