scholarly journals Ways of Being and Ways of Knowing: Heidegger's The Question Concerning Technology and Knowledge Organization

NASKO ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Preston R. Salisbury

This paper examines some of the problems within the field of knowledge organization that arise from its roots within the Western philosophical tradition, specifically in relation to the technological view of the world as expressed by Martin Heidegger's The Question Concerning Technology. It attempts not only to outline the weaknesses of this worldview, but also to provide a path towards expansion and inclusion of a larger variety of worldviews. Given the importance of ontology within Heidegger's philosophy, this paper considers epistemology as rooted in ontology, and attempts to center knowledge organization within ontology. The goal is the development of a human-centered approach to knowledge organization which encompasses the creator and the world of the creator as well as the user and the world of the user, and builds upon community and connections between them. The goal of this approach is to arrive at a philosophy of knowledge organization that can successfully interact with knowledge expressed in a wide variety of forms (tools and works of art in addition to verbal treatises) and from a variety of cultures and socio-economic groups.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Sissons

Van Meijl is right to insist that epistemology must be about active, socially contested ‘ways of knowing’ and that understanding the relationship between such ways and their products is as much an ethnographic problem as it is a philosophical one. Ways of knowing, as social practices, are also, more generally, ways of being or becoming and so are not, in my view, radically distinct from the ontologies they produce and reproduce. Phillipe Descola argues strongly that his four ‘ontologies’ are also schemas of practice, fundamental ways that people know, experience and inhabit the world. I think Van Meijl is mistaken, therefore, when he characterises the ontological turn in anthropology as being about different relations between mind and matter. For me, it is most significantly about the different ways that personhood or subjectivity can be understood and embodied.<br>


2019 ◽  
pp. 151-165
Author(s):  
Lia T. Bascomb

This chapter investigates how white homonormative narratives perform tyrannous acts that distort understandings of queerness for people of color. As white queerness romanticizes and celebrates “coming out”—becoming the universal marker of liberation—these fascinations forge a space where other, discrete ways of being in the world appear anachronistic, backwards, or rare. McCune re-opens the case of “white men on the Down Low (DL),” if you will—to elucidate how the larger discourse of the queer triumphant, or queer progress, activates an erasure of all queers (white included) who do not fit the mold of the “out and proud” gay subject. This elision constructs a cultural amnesia around other ways of knowing sexuality outside of coming out—which enables a mis-remembering of a white queer past and present, devoid of discretion. Secondly, these constructions of a white queer past sanitize white queerness and enable a discourse that not only impacts how white queers perpetually privilege progress narratives, but potentially demonizes or distorts queers of color who perform often more illegible enactments of queerness. Bringing back the film Brokeback Mountain as a shape-shifting cultural text—globalizing an understanding of the foregone closet—the chapter forces an interracial non-romance between discretion in whiteface and blackface. Brokeback Mountain and other resonant texts perform a popular queer historiography, which misreads or under-reads the broader histories and social realities of queer people within and outside of the U.S.


2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Greenspan

When people say Shanghai looks like the future the setting is almost always the same. Evening descends and the skyscrapers clustered on the eastern shore of the Huangpu light up. Super towers are transformed into giant screens. The spectacular skyline, all neon and lasers and LED, looms as a science fiction backdrop. Staring out from the Bund, across to Pudong, one senses the reemergence of what JG Ballard once described as an “electric and lurid city, more exciting than any other in the world.” The high-speed development of Pudong – in particular the financial district of Lujiazui – is the symbol of contemporary Shanghai and of China’s miraculous rise. Yet, Pudong is also taken as a sign of much that is wrong with China’s new urbanism. To critics the sci-fi skyline is an emblem of the city’s shallowness, which focuses all attention on its glossy facade. Many share the sentiment of free market economist Milton Friedman who, when visiting Pudong famously derided the brand new spectacle as a giant Potemkin village. Nothing but “the statist monument for a dead pharaoh,” he is quoted as saying. This article explores Pudong in order to investigate the way spectacle functions in China’s most dynamic metropolis. It argues that the skeptical hostility towards spectacle is rooted in the particularities of a Western philosophical tradition that insists on penetrating the surface, associating falsity with darkness and truth with light. In contrast, China has long recognized the power of spectacle (most famously inventing gunpowder but using it only for fireworks). Alongside this comes an acceptance of a shadowy world that belongs to the dark. This acknowledgment of both darkness and light found in traditional Chinese culture (expressed by the constant revolutions of the yin/yang symbol) may provide an alternative method for thinking about the tension between the spectacular visions of planners and the unexpected and shadowy disruptions from the street.


2008 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 5-13
Author(s):  
William McNeill ◽  

The present paper remains modest in its scope: It seeks only to undertake some exploratory and preparatory investigations with a view to addressing a more difficult and far-reaching question. The issue, in brief, is the following: In the 1920s, Heidegger engages in an incisive and comprehensive critique of techn!, which I shall render here as “production” or “productive comportment,” arguing that it furnishes the foundation and horizon for Greek ontology, and by extension for the entire Western philosophical tradition, a horizon that is problematically reductive because the ontology it gives rise to understands the Being of beings in general in terms of independent presence-at-hand, the appropriate mode of access to which is theoretical apprehension. Not only philosophy and ontology, but science and its outgrowth, modern technicity—itself a monstrous transformation of techn!—would be an almost inexorable consequence of this fateful Greek beginning. The project of a “destructuring of the history of ontology” announced in Being and Time would seek to retrieve and to open up an entirely other dimension of Being, a dimension foreclosed by the Greek beginning and yet awaiting us precisely as the unthought of that beginning and the tradition to which it gave rise. The destructuring would take as its guiding thread an understanding of the Being of Dasein—designating the being that we ourselves in each case are—as radically temporal, never simply present-at-hand, and essentially inaccessible to theoretical apprehension. Yet the critical resource for this analytic of the Being of Dasein was, for the early Heidegger, itself provided by Greek philosophy: It was Aristotle’s insight into the Being of the human being as praxis, and its authentic mode of self-disclosure, phron!sis, that led Heidegger to see the radically different kind of temporality pertaining to human existence, by contrast with the theoretically ascertained time of nature as something present-at-hand, and provided a key insight into the essence of “truth” (aletheia) as unconcealment. Aristotle’s insight into this more primordial sense of aletheia or “truth” as the knowing self-disclosure of our radically temporal Being-in-the-world as praxis, as opposed to truth conceived as a property of logos, judgment, or theoretical knowledge, was a forgotten thread of Greek philosophy that could shed light upon the limits and foundations of the theoretical tradition that dominates the subsequent history of ontology.


Author(s):  
Lasana D. Kazembe

For historically marginalized groups that continue to experience and struggle against hegemony and deculturalization, education is typically accompanied by suspicion of, critique of, and resistance to imposed modes, systems, and thought forms. It is, therefore, typical for dominant groups to ignore and/or regard as inferior the collective histories, heritages, cultures, customs, and epistemologies of subject groups. Deculturalization projects are fueled and framed by two broad, far-reaching impulses. The first impulse is characterized by the denial, deemphasis, dismissal, and attempted destruction of indigenous knowledge and methods by dominant groups across space and time. The second impulse is the effort by marginalized groups to recover, reclaim, and recenter ways of knowing, perceiving, creating, and utilizing indigenous knowledge, methods, symbols, and epistemologies. Deculturalization projects in education persist across various global contexts, as do struggles by global actors to reclaim their histories, affirm their humanity, and reinscribe indigenous ways of being, seeing, and flourishing within diverse educational and cultural contexts. The epistemologies, worldview, and existential challenges of historically marginalized groups (e.g., First Nations, African/African American, Latinx, Asian, and Pacific) operate as sites and tools of struggle against imperialism and dominant modes of seeing, being, and making meaning in the world. Multicultural groups resist deculturalization in their ongoing efforts to apprehend, interrogate, and situate their unique cultural ways of being as pedagogies of protracted resistance and praxes of liberation.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Sissons

Van Meijl is right to insist that epistemology must be about active, socially contested ‘ways of knowing’ and that understanding the relationship between such ways and their products is as much an ethnographic problem as it is a philosophical one. Ways of knowing, as social practices, are also, more generally, ways of being or becoming and so are not, in my view, radically distinct from the ontologies they produce and reproduce. Phillipe Descola argues strongly that his four ‘ontologies’ are also schemas of practice, fundamental ways that people know, experience and inhabit the world. I think Van Meijl is mistaken, therefore, when he characterises the ontological turn in anthropology as being about different relations between mind and matter. For me, it is most significantly about the different ways that personhood or subjectivity can be understood and embodied.<br>


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-77
Author(s):  
Akmal Marozikov ◽  

Ceramics is an area that has a long history of making clay bowls, bowls, plates,pitchers, bowls, bowls, bowls, pots, pans, toys, building materials and much more.Pottery developed in Central Asia in the XII-XIII centuries. Rishtan school, one of the oldest cities in the Ferghana Valley, is one of the largest centers of glazed ceramics inCentral Asia. Rishtan ceramics and miniatures are widely recognized among the peoples of the world and are considered one of the oldest cities in the Ferghana Valley. The article discusses the popularity of Rishtan masters, their products made in the national style,and works of art unique to any region


Communicology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 138-148
Author(s):  
NATALIA MALSHINA ◽  

This study examines the ontological problems in the aspect of the ratio of different cognitive practices and their mutual conditionality in the context of communication and their socio-cultural prerequisites, which is possible only if the traditional approach to the distinction between epistemology and faith is revised. Based on the idea of identity of common grounds of cognitive practices “belief” is included in the understanding of interpretation in the communicative situation for true knowledge in each of the modes of being. Belief in the philosophical tradition reveals the ontological foundations of hermeneutics. Three reflections are synthesised: the hermeneutic concept of understanding, the structuralist concept of language, and the psychoanalytic concept of personality. It is necessary to apply the method of phenomenological reduction to the ontological substantiation of hermeneutics in the Christian Orthodox tradition. Hence, the very natural seems the meeting of semantics, linguistics, and onomatodoxy, with the ontology language of Heidegger, the origins of which resides in in Husserl phenomenology. Fundamental ontology and linguistics, cult philosophy - both in different ways open the horizons of substantiation of hermeneutics. The beginning of this justification is the hermeneutic problem in Christianity, which has appeared as a sequence of the question of the relationship between the two Covenants, or two Unions. In the paper, the author attempts to identify the stages of constructing the philosophical concept of Pavel Florensky. As a result, the substantiation of the birth of the world in consciousness by the cult is revealed. Ontological tradenote words can be seen in Florensky through symbols. The symbol makes the transition from a small energy to a larger one, from a small information saturation to a greater one, acting as a lumen of being - when by the name we hear the reality. The word comes into contact with the world that is on the other side of our own psychological state. The word, the symbol shifts all the time from subjective to objective. The communicative model acts as a common point uniting these traditions. The religious approach as part of semiotic approach reveals the horizons of ontological conditionality of language and words, and among the words - the name, as the name plays a central role in the accumulation and transmission of information, understanding of the commonality of this conditionality in the concepts of phenomenology and Christian, Orthodox tradition.


Author(s):  
Harvey Siegel

The Western philosophical tradition has historically valorized the cultivation of reason as a fundamental intellectual ideal. This ideal continues to be defended by many as educationally basic. However, recent philosophical work has challenged it on several fronts, including worries stemming from relativistic tendencies in the philosophy of science, the apparent ubiquity of epistemic dependence in social epistemology, and broad critiques of objectionable hegemony launched from feminist and postmodernist perspectives. This chapter briefly reviews the historical record, connects the cultivation of reason to the educational ideal of critical thinking, spells out the latter ideal, and evaluates these challenges. It ends by sketching a general, “transcendental” reply to all such critiques of reason.


Author(s):  
Anna Wierzbicka

This chapter argues that a philosophical account of human epistemology needs to be complemented by a linguistic one, informed by analytical and empirical experience of cross-linguistic semantics. The author outlines such a complementary account, based on many decades of empirical and analytical research undertaken within the NSM (Natural Semantic Metalanguage) approach. The main conclusion is that KNOW is an indefinable and universal human concept, and that there are four “canonical” frames in which this concept occurs across languages, the most basic one being the “dialogical” frame: “I know,” “I don’t know.” The author contends that both the questions and the answers concerning the “epistemology for the rest of the world” need to be anchored in some conceptual givens, derived neither from historically shaped Anglo English, nor from the European philosophical tradition, but from a more reliable, language- and culture-independent source; and the author shows how this can be done.


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