scholarly journals Ontology, metaphysics and criticism as Transcendental Semantics as of Kant

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (44) ◽  
pp. 459 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Omar Perez
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Position ◽  
Work Program ◽  
The Core ◽  
Fundamental Part ◽  
Conditions Of Possibility

The aim of this paper is to present the core of Kant´s critique of traditional metaphysics and ontology as a transcendental semantics that allows reformulating the problem about the objects and their reality. In order to achieve this purpose, we propound a paper divided in two parts: 1. A brief justification of Kant’s semantics interpretation; 2. A work program based on a semantics comprehended as a fundamental part of a method of resolution of philosophical problems. Basically, we can state that the critical position against traditional metaphysics and ontology leads to the question upon: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? This question leads to its conditions of possibility, that is: sensible representations; intellectual representations; syntactic rules; semantic rules (or referential rules, on the relation between intellectual representations and some sort of sensibility or affection); the operator of the syntactic and semantic rules (subject, man, human nature, gender, people etc.). This is what we call the core of Kant’s critique and with which we may begin to solve philosophical problems even beyond those presented by our philosopher. As such, we are briefly going to observe the following steps: 1. From metaphysics in its various senses to the ontology of sensible objects; 2. A critique of pure reason against dogmatic metaphysics; 3. Criticism as semantics; 4. The semantic project and the kinds of judgments; 5. Human nature and the theory of judgment; 6. The work program within Kant’s own work; 7. Subsequent results of Kant’s project

Three Kantian Routes to the Synthetic A Priori

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Insufficient Attention ◽  
Synthetic A Priori ◽  
The One ◽  
Philosophical Importance

Abstract Kant influentially distinguished analytic from synthetic a priori propositions, and he took certain propositions in the latter category to be of immense philosophical importance. His distinction between the analytic and the synthetic has been accepted by many and attacked by others; but despite its importance, a number of discussions of it since at least W. V. Quine’s have paid insufficient attention to some of the passages in which Kant draws the distinction. This paper seeks to clarify what appear to be three distinct conceptions of the analytic (and implicitly of the synthetic) that are presented in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and in some other Kantian texts. The conceptions are important in themselves, and their differences are significant even if they are extensionally equivalent. The paper is also aimed at showing how the proposed understanding of these conceptions—and especially the one that has received insufficient attention from philosophers—may bear on how we should conceive the synthetic a priori, in and beyond Kant’s own writings.

scholarly journals Epistemologia Kanta jako rozwiązanie sporu empiryzmu z racjonalizmem

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-168
Author(s):  
Michał Wendland
Keyword(s):  
Turning Point ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
German Philosophy ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
Pure Intuition ◽  
History Of ◽  
Main Ideas

The article concerns some of the most important elements of I. Kant’s epistemology and its connections with earlier epistemological ideas, namely rationalism and empiricism. The history of dispute between rationalism (Descartes, Leibniz) and empiricism (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) is hereby shortly presented while Kant’s own philosophical achievements are suggested to be both alternative and synthesis of these. The main core of this paper is summary of basis of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason; some most important categories are described: apriorism, synthetic and analytical judgements, knowledge a priori and a posteriori, main ideas of transcendental esthetics (two forms of pure intuition: time and space), main ideas of transcendental logic (forms of judgement and twelve categories). Also the meaning of Kant’s „copernican revolution” is presented as a turning point for classical German philosophy as well as for whole modern epistemology.

Kant on Time I: The Kinematics of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science

Kant-Studien ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 110 (3) ◽  
pp. 477-497
Author(s):  
David Hyder
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Analytical Mechanics ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Principle Of Relativity ◽  
Theory Of Motion ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Moving Bodies

Abstract The theory of space-time developed in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his (1786) Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science is connected to Leonhard Euler’s proof of invariance under Galilean transformations in the “On Motion in General” of the latter’s 1736 Analytical Mechanics. It is argued that Kant, by using the Principle of Relativity that is the output of Euler’s proof as an input to his own proof of the kinematic parallelogram law, makes essential use of absolute simultaneity. This is why, in the Transcendental Aesthetic, he observes that “our theory of time explains as much a priori knowledge as the general theory of motion displays.” (KrV, B 67) In conclusion, it is shown that the same proof-method, under a different definition of simultaneity, leads to the parallelogram law of the “Kinematic Part” of Einstein’s 1905 “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies”.

scholarly journals LA ANGUSTIA, MÁS ACÁ DEL CONOCIMIENTO

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (30) ◽  
pp. 132-143
Author(s):  
Maximiliano Ariel Maximiliano
Keyword(s):  
Jacques Lacan ◽  
Fundamental Difference ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Object A ◽  
Conditions Of Possibility

ResumenEn el presente artículo nos proponemos abordar un aspecto escasamente trabajado en la bibliografía lacaniana, a saber, la recepción de la Crítica de la razón pura –especialmente, “La estética trascendental”-– en el seminario La angustia de Jacques Lacan. Efectivamente, los comentadores de la obra de Lacan se han centrado casi de manera exclusiva en la recepción de la filosofía práctica de Kant que ha realizado el psicoanalista francés, dejando de lado la importancia de la Crítica de la razón pura para delimitar al objeto a. En este punto, será necesario evocar la distinción fundamental entre objetividad y objetalidad para distinguir, así, el deseo a la base de las condiciones de posibilidad del conocimiento al deseo.Palabras claves: objetividad, objetalidad, epistemología, Kant, objeto a. AbstractThis paper aims at addressing one aspect barely studied of the Lacanian bibliography, i.e., the reception of the Critique of Pure Reason –especially, the “Transcendental Aesthetic”– in Jacques Lacan's seminary on Anxiety. Indeed, commentators of Lacan's work have almost exclusively focused on his reception of Kant's practical philosophy, putting aside the importance of the Critique of Pure Reason to delimit the object a. In this point, it will be necessary to recall the fundamental difference between objectivity and objectality in order to distinguish the desire on the base of the conditions of possibility from knowledge to desire.Keywords: objectivity, objectality, epistemology, Kant, object a. Résumé Cet article aborde un aspect peu étudié de l'œuvre lacanienne, à savoir, la réception de la Critique de la raison pure - notamment “L'esthétique transcendantale "– dans le séminaire L'angoisse de Jacques Lacan. En effet, les commentateurs de l'œuvre de Lacan se sont focalisés presque exclusivement sur la réception de la philosophie pratique de Kant de la part du psychanalyste français, en oubliant l'importance de la Critique de la raison pure pour délimiter l'objet a. Sur ce point, il est nécessaire d'évoquer la distinction fondamentale entre objectivité et objectalité, pour différencier ainsi le désir à la base des conditions de possibilité de la connaissance au désir.Mots-clés : objectivité, objectalité, épistémologie, Kant, objet a. 

scholarly journals Kant’s Response to Hume’s Critique of Pure Reason

2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 376-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin de Boer
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
General Question ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Synthetic A Priori ◽  
Priori Knowledge

Abstract In this article I argue that Kant considered Hume’s account of causality in the Enquiry to be primarily relevant because it undermines proofs for the existence of God and, moreover, that this interpretation is plausible and text-based. What the Prolegomena calls ‘Hume’s problem’ is, I claim, the more general question as to whether metaphysics can achieve synthetic a priori knowledge of objects at all. Whereas Hume denied this possibility, I show how the solution Kant develops in the Critique of Pure Reason is in agreement with Hume’s critique of dogmatic metaphysics, but salvages the synthetic a priori principles he takes to be constitutive of empirical cognition.

scholarly journals THE LOGIC AND TOPOLOGY OF KANT’S TEMPORAL CONTINUUM

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-206
Author(s):  
RICCARDO PINOSIO ◽  
MICHIEL VAN LAMBALGEN
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Critical Period ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
And Topology ◽  
Transcendental Theory ◽  
Synthetic A Priori

AbstractIn this paper we provide a mathematical model of Kant’s temporal continuum that yields formal correlates for Kant’s informal treatment of this concept in theCritique of Pure Reasonand in other works of his critical period. We show that the formal model satisfies Kant’s synthetic a priori principles for time (whose consistence is not obvious) and that it even illuminates what “faculties and functions” must be in place, as “conditions for the possibility of experience”, for time to satisfy such principles. We then present a mathematically precise account of Kant’s transcendental theory of time—the most precise account to date.Moreover, we show that the Kantian continuum which we obtain has some affinities with the Brouwerian continuum but that it also has “infinitesimal intervals” consisting of nilpotent infinitesimals; these allow us to capture Kant’s theory of rest and motion in theMetaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.While our focus is on Kant’s theory of time the material in this paper is more generally relevant for the problem of developing a rigorous theory of the phenomenological continuum, in the tradition of Whitehead, Russell, and Weyl among others.

scholarly journals Darwinism as the Missing Link in Kant’s Critical Philosophy

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 51-80
Author(s):  
Igor K. Kalinin
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Physical Nature ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Entire System ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Critical Attitude ◽  
Logical Functions

I proceed from the hypothesis that the difficulties in Kant’s presentation of his plan and, accordingly, the implicit reason for the critical attitude to this plan on the part of many contemporary philosophers stem from the fact that he had no theoretical link at his disposal which would offer a more solid scientific grounding for his entire system. I believe that Darwinism is such a link which bolsters the central but ungrounded thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason on the existence of a priori synthetic judgments. The synthesis of Darwinism and critical philosophy dictates, however, a substantial restructuring of the latter since some of its key elements prove to be weak in the light of modern studies and need to be revised or even reversed. The first reversal explored in this article determines the origin of the categories which are now revealed not “from the top down” where Kant sought them, i. e. not in logical functions in accordance with metaphysical deduction and not in self-consciousness as transcendental deduction claims, but “from the bottom up” if one considers things in the evolutionary dimension, i. e. in the instincts. The second reversal shifts the freedom of will which Kant placed in the same ontological basket with things in themselves at “the top,” to another level of the pyramid of ontologies, by changing dualism to pluralism because dualism is too narrow to accommodate all the autonomous components of critical philosophy. Thus spirit and freedom find a new place separate from the sphere of physical nature; the category of adaptation explains how different ontologies can coexist; while the problem of two interpretations of transcendental idealism (two-world vs. two-aspect interpretation) finds a solution through their reconciliation.

scholarly journals O PAPEL DA AFINIDADE TRANSCENDENTAL ENTRE OS FENÔMENOS NA TEORIA DO CONHECIMENTO KANTIANA

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gualtiero LORINI
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
The Core ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Opus Postumum ◽  
Shed Light

The article focuses on a concept placed at the core of the A-Deduction, of which the B-Version provides a different but not necessarily better exposition. It is the concept of “transcendental affinity” [transcendentale Affinität] (A 144). This concept is not present in the whole B-Edition of the KrV, and even the term “Affinity” does not appear in the B-Deduction, but only four times in the Transcendental Dialectic, and twice in the Discipline of the Pure Reason. In the economy of the A-Deduction, the concept of “transcendental affinity” plays a central role. It represents indeed the “thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws” of all the possible phenomena. This connection is presupposed by transcendental consciousness insofar as it has a representation of these phenomena and their relationships, since what all the possible phenomena share is their determination in space and time according to the synthetic unity of the apperception. The concept of transcendental affinity between all the possible phenomena is intimately linked to imagination, which makes this affinity arise by reproducing a phenomenon in space and time according to the a priori laws of understanding. The necessary link between transcendental affinity and imagination represents an important passage in this paper. One goal is to point out that the implications of transcendental affinity are not rejected but rather deepened in the B-Deduction. On these assumptions, we consider the role of the “I think” in the B-Deduction, in order to claim that it implicitly relies upon the concept of transcendental affinity too. The last part of the paper aims to point out that the transcendental affinity between the phenomena describedin the A-Deduction is particularly apt to understand the unity of the representation of nature. To shed light on this point, we will deal with some significant passages from the Opus postumum.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document