4. The MRTA and the Shining Path: Common Enemy; Virtually No Threat in Common

2019 ◽  
pp. 94-114
Keyword(s):  
2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 644-664 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kris De Jaegher ◽  
Britta Hoyer

Soon after his accession to the English throne William’s two navies started combined operations against the common enemy France. The Nine Years War had broken out, and this was followed after a short interval by the War of the Spanish Succession. Combined naval operations by two allies were nothing uncommon in those days. Anglo- French fleets had fought the Dutch in no fewer than four fierce battles in 1672 and 1673. French and Dutch squadrons had cooperated against the English Navy in 1666, and much earlier in 1596 and 16252727 Anglo- Dutch fleets jointly attacked Spanish ports (1). In these examples cooperation never lasted long nor was it very close. Problems concerning the command structure were seldom satisfactorily solved. Allies regularly changed sides during the 17th century. The Glorious Revolution, however, can be treated as a turning point. England became involved in a generations-long struggle against France. The Dutch Republic under William III had already started to fight Louis XIV’s urge for expansion, more than 15 years earlier. Both countries almost became traditional allies. Right from the beginning in 1689 detailed arrangements were made for naval cooperation, long-standing ones as later developments showed.


1974 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Pettman

Zambia inherited a system of government and administration in 1964 which was ill-suited to the tasks of political development to which her new leaders were dedicated. What little national unity and mobilisation had been achieved in the independence struggle declined with the removal of the common enemy. The Government rested on a fragile base, without the support of agreed rules and practices to limit and contain conflict, and without adequate instruments available for the implementation of its policies. So the search began for a more suitable political system, which could cope with the new needs of independence, and provide for the stability of the state and the survival of the Government.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eaman Jahani ◽  
Natalie McDaniel Gallagher ◽  
Friedolin Merhout ◽  
Nicolo Cavalli ◽  
Douglas Guilbeault ◽  
...  

Longstanding theory indicates the threat of a common enemy can mitigate conflict between members of rival groups. We tested this hypothesis in a pre-registered experiment where 1,670 Republicans and Democrats in the United States were asked to complete a collaborative online task with an automated agent or “bot” that was labelled as a member of the opposing party. Prior to this task, we exposed respondents to primes about a) a common enemy (involving threats from Iran, China, and Russia); b) a patriotic event; or c) a neutral, apolitical prime. Though we observed no significant differences in the behavior of Democrats as a result of these primes, we found that Republicans—and particularly those with very strong conservative views—were significantly less likely to cooperate with Democrats when primed about a common enemy. We also observed lower rates of cooperation among Republicans who participated in our study during the 2020 Iran crisis, which occurred in the middle of our fieldwork. These findings indicate common enemies may not reduce inter-group conflict in highly polarized societies, and contribute to a growing number of studies that find evidence of asymmetric political polarization. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for research in social psychology, political conflict, and the rapidly expanding field of computational social science.


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