Coping with Language
This chapter has two main tasks. First, it argues that Wittgenstein’s position shows how language is grasped prepredicatively as a linguistic form of knowing-how. Having considered the link between rule-following and customs or institutions – activities lacking the rational transparency of paradigmatically intellectual activities – it takes Wittgenstein’s discussions of the limits of justification, which imply that justification is grounded in a stratum of language-games preceding justification, as a model in to develop an account of prepredicative language use. Second, it shows how Wittgenstein’s views complement Merleau-Ponty’s and Heidegger’s in filling out the Heideggerian framework, before summarizing how the resultant phenomenological conception of language defines language’s role in world disclosure by combining a general picture of language as language-in-the-world with a specific view of linguistic signs’ disclosive function, as instruments characterized by both presentational and pragmatic sense.