The Causal Theory of Ethics

Author(s):  
Mark Fedyk

This chapter introduces a novel ethical theory that is designed to help bridge research in the social sciences with research in moral psychology. According to the causal theory of ethics, what makes certain norms ethical norms is that they are realized in the behaviour of different population, and their realization tends to produce outcomes that are good and valuable for the relevant population.

Author(s):  
Mark Fedyk

In this book, Mark Fedyk offers a novel analysis of the relationship between moral psychology and allied fields in the social sciences. Fedyk shows how the social sciences can be integrated with moral philosophy, argues for the benefits of such an integration, and offers a new ethical theory that can be used to bridge research between the two. Fedyk argues that moral psychology should take a social turn, investigating the psychological processes that motivate patterns of social behavior defined as ethical using normative information extracted from the social sciences. He points out methodological problems in conventional moral psychology, particularly the increasing methodological and conceptual inconsilience with both philosophical ethics and evolutionary biology. Fedyk's "causal theory of ethics" is designed to provide moral psychology with an ethical theory that can be used without creating tension between its scientific practice and the conceptual vocabulary of philosophical ethics. His account aims both to redirect moral psychology toward more socially realistic questions about human life and to introduce philosophers to a new form of ethical naturalism—a way of thinking about how to use different fields of scientific research to answer some of the traditional questions that are at the heart of ethics.


2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-300
Author(s):  
Allen Buchanan ◽  
Russell Powell

Abstract Commentators on The Evolution of Moral Progress: A Biocultural Theory raise a number of metaethical and moral concerns with our analysis, as well as some complaints regarding how we have interpreted and made use of the contemporary evolutionary and social sciences of morality. Some commentators assert that one must already presuppose a moral theory before one can even begin to theorize moral progress; others query whether the shift toward greater inclusion is really a case of moral progress, or whether our theory can be properly characterized as ‘naturalistic’. Other commentators worry that we have uncritically accepted the prevailing evolutionary explanation of morality, even though it gives short shrift to the role of women or presupposes an oversimplified view of the environment in which the core elements of human moral psychology are thought to have congealed. Another commentator laments that we did not make more extensive use of data from the social sciences. In this reply, we engage with all of these constructive criticisms and show that although some of them are well taken, none undermine the core thesis of our book.


Author(s):  
Mark Fedyk

This chapter defines descriptive moral psychology as any psychological research that investigates the cognitive and emotional foundations of the patterns of behaviour that are described by an example of hard-question social theory. Descriptive moral psychology therefore studies the psychological dimensions of the patterns of behaviour which have their social dimensions described by research in the social sciences and humanities.


Author(s):  
Mark Fedyk

An implication of the causal theory of ethics is that, sometimes, researchers in the social sciences and humanities will provide evidence that norms realized by the behaviour of certain groups of people will help to produce good outcomes for those people. This chapter provides several examples of this kind of research, which illustrates the diversity of the kinds of research that count as generating ethical insights according to the causal theory of ethics.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven I. Miller ◽  
L. Arthur Safer

Within the philosophy of the social sciences, the relationship between evidence, ethics, and social policy is in need of further analysis. The present paper is an attempt to argue that while important social policies can, and perhaps ought to be, grounded in ethical theory, they are seldom articulated in this fashion due to the ambiguity surrounding the "evidence condition." Using a consequentialist-utilitarian framework, and a case study of a policy dilemma, the authors analyze the difficulties associated with resolving policy-based dilemmas which must appeal to evidential support as a justification for an ethical stand. Implication for the relevance of ethics to social policy formulation are discussed in detail.


Methodology ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Knut Petzold ◽  
Tobias Wolbring

Abstract. Factorial survey experiments are increasingly used in the social sciences to investigate behavioral intentions. The measurement of self-reported behavioral intentions with factorial survey experiments frequently assumes that the determinants of intended behavior affect actual behavior in a similar way. We critically investigate this fundamental assumption using the misdirected email technique. Student participants of a survey were randomly assigned to a field experiment or a survey experiment. The email informs the recipient about the reception of a scholarship with varying stakes (full-time vs. book) and recipient’s names (German vs. Arabic). In the survey experiment, respondents saw an image of the same email. This validation design ensured a high level of correspondence between units, settings, and treatments across both studies. Results reveal that while the frequencies of self-reported intentions and actual behavior deviate, treatments show similar relative effects. Hence, although further research on this topic is needed, this study suggests that determinants of behavior might be inferred from behavioral intentions measured with survey experiments.


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