Empire

Quarters ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 89-126
Author(s):  
John Gilbert McCurdy

This chapter examines how colonial resistance to quartering British soldiers led the British Parliament to authorize the Quartering Act in 1765. Built on the ideal of the unitary empire, the Quartering Act sought to transfer British rights and responsibilities to North America by requiring that the colonists supply and barrack troops, but exempted private houses from billeting soldiers. Enforcement of the Quartering Act was delayed due to the Stamp Act riots, and implementation failed in Canada. From 1766 to 1768, General Gage enforced the law throughout the American colonies, deriving monies for quartering expenses from eight colonies, although he was only able to do so by recognizing the different legislative approaches of the different American colonies and abandoning the ideal of the unitary empire.

Author(s):  
Andrew R. Murphy ◽  
Adrian Chastain Weimer

Highly mobile and often confrontational, Quakers came into frequent conflict with magistrates in the Anglo-American colonies. As they endured fines, whippings, and banishment, Quakers put pressure on emerging colonial legal systems, which they denounced as anti-Christian and unjust. In the ‘Quaker colonies’, however, the movement looked quite different. Quakers in West Jersey and Pennsylvania adapted to the roles of organizing institutions and enforcing the law. Across British North America, Quakers maintained strong ties to London. They increasingly developed networks across colonies as well, especially among meetings in Barbados, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.


1976 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 308-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Berens

November! gloomy Month! approaches fast,When Liberty was doom'd to brethe [sic] her last,All, all her Sons agree to fast that Day,To mourn, lament and sigh, and hope,—and prayThat the Almighty god of all below,Some Pity would to suffering Mortals show1.With these lines an anonymous American poet addressed the first day of November 1765, the date the Stamp Act was to take effect throughout British North America. The hopes of patriots and lovers of liberty, he argued, rested upon the interposition of God on behalf of the American colonies. If the Lord would look with mercy on his afflicted people and come to their aid, their freedoms could yet be preserved. In assigning the continuation of American liberty to the intervention and protection of divine providence, this patriotic poet employed one of the deepest and most popular strands of American thought expressed during the era of the American Revolution.


Author(s):  
William E. Nelson

This volume begins where volumes 2 and 3 ended. The main theme of the four-volume project is that the law of America’s thirteen colonies differed profoundly when they first were founded, but had developed into a common American law by the time of the Revolution. This fourth volume focuses on what was common to the law of Britain’s thirteen North American colonies in the mid-eighteenth century, although it also takes important differences into account. The first five chapters examine procedural and substantive law in colonies and conclude that, except in North Carolina and northern New York, the legal system functioned effectively in the interests both of Great Britain and of colonial localities. The next three chapters examine changes in law and the constitution beginning with the Zenger case in 1735—changes that ultimately culminated in independence. These chapters show how lawyers became leading figures in what gradually became a revolutionary movement. It also shows how lawyers used legal and constitutional ideology in the interests, sometimes of an economic character, of their clients. The book thereby engages prior scholarship, especially that of Bernard Bailyn and John Phillip Reid, to show how ideas and constitutional values possessed independent causal significance in leading up to the Revolution but also served to protect institutional structures and socioeconomic interests that likewise possessed causal significance.


Author(s):  
James B. Bell

In step with the gradually unfolding imperial policies of the successive governments of King Charles I and later monarchs, the Church of England was extended to the northern part of the Western hemisphere between 1662 and 1829. Under the supervision of the Board of Trade and Plantations until 1701, and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts from that year, decade after decade an increasing number of men of differing origins and places of collegiate education in Britain came to serve missions of the Church in early America. The ranks included natives of England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland, and the American colonies, who were supported by the SPG or the legislatures of the provinces in which the Church was established. Development was shaped by imperial policies and administration over 160 years amid rising populations, changing political situations, and the consequences of war and diplomacy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-136
Author(s):  
Adam J. Kolber
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  

Abstract The law inevitably draws lines. These lines distinguish, for example, whether certain conduct reflects ordinary recklessness constituting manslaughter or more extreme recklessness constituting murder. There is no way to meaningfully draw such lines, however, absent shared ways of representing amounts of recklessness or at least knowledge of the consequences of drawing lines in particular places. Yet legal actors frequently draw lines in the dark, establishing cutoffs along a spectrum with little or none of the information required to do so in a way that suits the law’s goals. For example, jurors must decide whether some conduct constitutes extreme recklessness without knowing prior precedent nor the sentencing consequences of drawing cutoffs in particular places. Judges and lawyers cite line drawing precedents from other jurisdictions without considering whether the lines drawn in prior cases had the same consequences as those in the case at bar. And scholars argue about how to classify conduct without making clear what consequences they believe ought to attach once the classification is made, leaving it hard to tell when scholars have substantive or simply superficial disagreements. In this Article, I discuss some line drawing problems and briefly suggest ways we can add meaning to cutoffs. More generally, I argue, we can “smooth” certain features of the law to both reduce our vulnerability to line drawing in the dark and improve the fit between the law and what our best theories of law recommend. Even when we cannot easily smooth the law, thinking about the law in a smoother fashion can help reduce the jurisprudential pathologies I describe.


Author(s):  
Paul Cliteur

This chapter discusses the difference between a nonsecular or religious critique of religious ethics and politics and a specifically secular critique. It introduces the central notion of a secular critique, autonomy, and its two types, moral and political. Moral autonomy entails the separation of religion from ethics. The ideal of making that separation is called “moral secularism.” The opposite of moral autonomy is “moral heteronomy.” An extreme case of moral heteronomy is discussed: Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his own son when God commanded him to do so. Next, the importance of political autonomy and political secularism is illustrated with reference to the conflict between the king Ahab (the model of a secular ruler) and the prophet Elijah (the model of a religious leader). Some stories in the holy scriptures of the monotheist religions held in common by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are unfavorable toward secularism (both moral and political).


2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 926-946 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen MacDonald

AbstractFrom the mid-twentieth century, England's coroners were crucial to the supply of organs to transplant, as much of this material was gleaned from the bodies of people who had been involved in accidents. In such situations the law required that a coroner's consent first be obtained lest removing the organs destroy evidence about the cause of the person's death. Surgeons challenged the legal requirement that they seek consent before taking organs, arguing that doing so hampered their quick access to bodies. Some coroners willingly cooperated with surgeons while others refused to do so, coming into conflict with particular transplanters whom they considered untrustworthy. This article examines how the phenomenon of “spare part” surgery challenged long-held conceptions of the coroner's role.


1986 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. R. Clayton

Britain's most important American colonies did not rebel in 1776. Thirteen provinces did declare their independence; but no fewer than nineteen colonies in the western hemisphere remained loyal to the mother country. Massachusetts and Virginia may have led the American revolution, but they had never been the leading colonies of the British empire. From the imperial standpoint, the significance of any of the thirteen provinces which rebelled was pale in comparison with that of Jamaica or Barbados. In the century before 1763 the recalcitrance of these two colonies had been more notorious than that of any mainland province and had actually inspired many of the imperial policies cited as long-term grievances by North American patriots in 1774. Real Whig ideology, which some historians have seen as the key to understanding the American revolution, was equally understood by Caribbean elites who, like the continental, had often proved extremely sensitive on questions of constitutional principle. Attacks of ‘frenzied rhetoric’ broke out in Jamaica in 1766 and Barbados in 1776. But these had nothing whatsoever to do with the Stamp Act or events in North America.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sattam Eid Almutairi

AbstractThe phenomenon of mass surveillance has confronted legal systems throughout the world with significant challenges to their fundamental norms and values. These dilemmas have been most extensively studied and discussed in relation to the kind of privacy cultures that exist in Europe and North America. Although mass surveillance creates the same kinds of challenges in Muslim countries, the phenomenon has rarely been discussed from the perspective of Shari’a. This article seeks to demonstrate that this neglect of mass surveillance and other similar phenomena by Shari’a scholars is unjustified. Firstly, the article will address objections that Shari’a does not contain legal norms that are relevant to the modern practice of state surveillance and that, if these exist, they are not binding on rulers and will also seek to show that, whatever terminology is employed, significant aspects of the protection of privacy and personal data that exists in other legal systems is also be found deeply-rooted in Shari’a. Secondly, it will assess the specific requirements that it makes in relation to such intrusion on private spaces and private conduct and how far it can benefit from an exception to the general prohibition on spying. Finally, it is concluded that mass surveillance is unlikely to meet these Shari’a requirements and that only targeted surveillance can generally do so.


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