Trust, Mistrust, and Desertion in Civil Wars

Desertion ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 15-37
Author(s):  
Théodore McLauchlin
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Social Rule ◽  
Armed Group ◽  
South Vietnam ◽  
Military Unit

This chapter mentions Viet Cong (VC) companies in South Vietnam that developed serious morale and motivation problems, which pose a major risk of desertion and defection. It investigates where trust and cooperation will come from if soldiers look for their chance to desert and put up a false front of enthusiasm and conviction. It also proposes a crucial way of keeping soldiers fighting through a norm of cooperation in a military unit, emphasizing a social rule saying that each will fight if others do. The chapter discusses whether an armed group can rely simply on the threat of punishment to keep combatants fighting, even if trust is not in the cards. It describes deeply mistrustful armed groups that use factional memberships or stereotypes to assess soldiers' loyalties, showing coercion as arbitrary persecution.

Seeking Safety: Avoiding Displacement and Choosing Destinations in Civil Wars

2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abbey Steele
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Community Characteristics ◽  
Armed Group ◽  
Seeking Safety ◽  
Direct Violence ◽  
Perverse Effect ◽  
Shared Characteristic

Despite civil war violence, some civilians stay in their communities. Those who leave choose one of many possible destinations. Drawing on fieldwork in Colombia, this article argues that the way armed groups target civilians explains households' decisions about displacement. When groups of civilians are targeted based on a shared characteristic — `collective' targeting — their best options for avoiding violence differ from those targeted selectively or indiscriminately. This article outlines conditions under which people can stay in contexts of collective targeting, and where they are likely to go if these conditions are not met. A civilian facing collective targeting could move to a rival group's stronghold, cluster with others similarly targeted, or seek anonymity in a city or different region. Community characteristics, such as whether it is urban or rural, as well as macro characteristics of the war, such as whether or not there is an ascriptive cleavage, shape which decisions are relatively safest, which in turn leads to implications for aggregate patterns. For example, clustering together has a perverse effect: even though hiding among others with similar characteristics may reduce an individual's likelihood of suffering direct violence, the community may be more endangered as it is perceived to be affiliated with an armed group. This then leads to a cycle of collective targeting and displacement, which has important implications for the development of warfare. In turn, this cycle and related cleavage formation may have long-term impacts on postwar stability and politics.

scholarly journals IDP resettlement and collective targeting during civil wars

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (6) ◽  
pp. 810-824 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abbey Steele
Keyword(s):  
Panel Data ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Internally Displaced ◽  
Armed Group ◽  
Internally Displaced People ◽  
Displaced People ◽  
Policy Priority ◽  
Perverse Effect

Refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) are not always safe where they resettle in ethnic civil wars, in which civilians’ identities overlap with the ethnic profile of armed combatants. This article argues that IDPs are also vulnerable in non-ethnic civil wars, through two related mechanisms that indicate civilians’ loyalties: (1) where the displaced are from and when they left; and (2) resettlement patterns. The first can suggest loyalties when the displacement is associated with territorial conquest and expulsion of suspected sympathizers. In turn, the displaced would be considered disloyal by the armed group responsible for the expulsion, and could be subject to further violence where they resettle. The second mechanism relates to the first: if displaced civilians are considered disloyal, then resettling with other, similarly stigmatized civilians can improve their security by reducing the household’s risk of discovery. However, clustering together with other IDPs can have a perverse effect: even though living in an enclave may reduce a particular household’s likelihood of suffering violence, the group itself is endangered because it is more easily detected. Armed groups can collectively target IDPs who resettle in clusters, either for strategic or retributive reasons. Implications of the argument are tested with detailed subnational panel data on IDP arrivals and massacres in Colombia, and the analyses provide support for the argument. The findings indicate that collective targeting of IDPs occurs even in civil wars without an ethnic cleavage, following voluntary resettlement patterns, and reinforces IDP security as a policy priority.

scholarly journals The Organization of Political Violence by Insurgencies

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Roos Haer
Keyword(s):  
Political Violence ◽  
Probit Model ◽  
Ordered Probit ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Ordered Probit Model ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Armed Group ◽  
The World ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractA range of theories have attempted to explain the variation in civilian abuse of warring parties. Most of these theories have been focused on the strategic environment in which these acts take place. Less attention is devoted to the perpetrators of these human right abuses themselves: the armed groups. This study tries to fill this niche by using the organizational process theory in which it is assumed that armed groups, like every organization, struggles for survival. The leader tries to ensure the maintenance of her armed group by increasing her control over her troops. The relationship between the level of control and the perpetrated civilian abuse is examined with a new dataset on the internal structure of more than 70 different armed groups around the world. With the help of a Bayesian Ordered Probit model, this new dataset on civilian abuse is analyzed. The results show that especially particular incentives play an important role.

Conclusion

Desertion ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 189-202
Author(s):  
Théodore McLauchlin
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Military Units

This chapter explains desertion in civil wars in terms of the complicated and counterintuitive dynamics of trust and mistrust at the heart of military units in times that tear countries apart. It bridges a long-running theoretical debate about how to understand people's motivations in civil wars. It also elaborates the grand causes of civil wars that matter through the interaction of combatants, which accepts that civil wars are both political and personal. The chapter pays attention to relations among combatants as key mechanisms driving armies forward and suggests a new theoretical extension that goes beyond interactions among armed groups. It focuses on signals, trust, and desertion that proposes arguments about when armed groups are likely to adopt the practices that are important for fostering trust and limiting desertion.

Slipping Away

Desertion ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Théodore McLauchlin
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
War Zone ◽  
The World ◽  
Political Commitments ◽  
Military Units

This chapter explains how armed groups in civil wars are able, or not, to prevent desertion as combatants often leave in some wars to go home, switch sides, or flee the war zone altogether. It analyses how some armed groups keep their soldiers fighting over long periods of time and explains why other groups fall apart from desertion and defection. It also explores the world of combatants in military units, with their comrades and commanders. The chapter discusses bonds of trust among combatants that keep them fighting, mistrust that pushes them to leave, and beliefs about political commitments and the motivation to fight. It clarifies how trust and mistrust depend on what soldiers perceive about others' motivations, both political and military.

Handling Foreign Fighters

2019 ◽  
pp. 135-172
Author(s):  
Vera Mironova
Keyword(s):  
Local Population ◽  
Group Cohesion ◽  
The Other ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Additional Source ◽  
Armed Group ◽  
Local Language ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
International War ◽  
Foreign Fighters

There are several major benefits foreign fighters, and only foreign fighters, can offer armed groups. They have knowledge and experience that the local population does not have and have connections in the international war industry. Usually they are more dedicated to their goals. Foreigners are better at raising funds in their home communities and thus provide armed groups with additional source of income. Finally, they can be successfully used by armed groups for propaganda purposes. On the other hand, it is much harder for the leaders of an armed group to manage foreigners versus locals. First, foreign fighters often do not speak the local language and are not familiar with the terrain. Second, they could have problems with the locals. Third, their presence in the group could decrease overall group cohesion. Fourth, they could be recruited as spies by foreign intelligence agencies more easily than locals. And finally, foreign fighters often joined the conflict with different motives than those of local fighters, which could lead to differences in combat strategy and tactics.

scholarly journals Disloyalty and Logics of Fratricide in Civil War: Executions of Officers in Republican Spain, 1936-1939

2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (7) ◽  
pp. 1028-1058 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodore McLauchlin ◽  
Álvaro La Parra-Pérez
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Spanish Civil War ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Unique Data ◽  
Political Forces ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Military Politics

Violence within armed groups in civil wars is important and understudied. Linking literatures on civil war violence and military politics, this article asks when this fratricidal violence targets soldiers who try to defect, and when it does not. It uses a unique data set of executions of officers on the Republican side of the Spanish Civil War. The article finds that while much of the violence appeared to target those who actually tried to defect, many nondefectors were likely shot too, due most likely to a pervasive stereotype that officers in general were disloyal to the Republic. This stereotype was used as an information shortcut and was promoted by political actors. Accordingly, unlikely defectors were likelier to be shot in locations in which less information was available about loyalties and in which political forces that were suspicious of officers as a group were locally stronger.

Ethnicity and strategy in the Bosnian civil war

2012 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 801-815 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Costalli ◽  
Francesco Niccolò Moro
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Geographic Location ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Temporal Dimension ◽  
Strategic Incentives ◽  
Disaggregated Data ◽  
Cross Country ◽  
Ethnic Polarization ◽  
The Impact

The impact of ethnicity for the onset of conflicts has often been dismissed in the cross-country empirical literature on civil wars. Recently, however, several studies using disaggregated data have reached different conclusions and highlight the importance of the configuration of ethno-national groups. This article follows the latter approach and investigates a different phenomenon: the impact of ethnic heterogeneity on the severity of violence. Using disaggregated data at municipality level in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we perform a quantitative analysis to assess the impact of various indices of heterogeneity on the number of casualties that occurred in the 1992–95 war in the 109 municipalities composing the country. We argue that in a context where ethnicity plays a key role in shaping rivalry among groups, ethnic polarization, in particular, creates strategic incentives for severe violence as armed groups try to create ethnically homogenous territories in the first phase of the war. By also including the temporal dimension in the analysis, we show that ethnic polarization loses its impact as the war evolves over time; therefore, the geographic location of the municipalities becomes the best predictor of severe clashes because as the war goes on, ethnic groups shift their objective from creating internally homogenous municipalities to consolidating wider areas. As such, municipalities located on politically and militarily relevant frontlines experience the highest levels of violence.

Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009)

2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
DARA KAY COHEN
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Sierra Leone ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
Cross National

Why do some armed groups commit massive wartime rape, whereas others never do? Using an original dataset, I describe the substantial variation in rape by armed actors during recent civil wars and test a series of competing causal explanations. I find evidence that the recruitment mechanism is associated with the occurrence of wartime rape. Specifically, the findings support an argument about wartime rape as a method of socialization, in which armed groups that recruit by force—through abduction or pressganging—use rape to create unit cohesion. State weakness and insurgent contraband funding are also associated with increased wartime rape by rebel groups. I examine observable implications of the argument in a brief case study of the Sierra Leone civil war. The results challenge common explanations for wartime rape, with important implications for scholars and policy makers.

Militias in Civil Wars

2015 ◽  
Vol 59 (5) ◽  
pp. 755-769 ◽  
Author(s):  
Corinna Jentzsch ◽  
Stathis N. Kalyvas ◽  
Livia Isabella Schubiger
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Political Violence ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Local Population ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Integrated Study

Militias are an empirical phenomenon that has been overlooked by current research on civil war. Yet, it is a phenomenon that is crucial for understanding political violence, civil war, post-conflict politics, and authoritarianism. Militias or paramilitaries are armed groups that operate alongside regular security forces or work independently of the state to shield the local population from insurgents. We review existing uses of the term, explore the range of empirical manifestations of militias, and highlight recent findings, including those supplied by the articles in this special issue. We focus on areas where the recognition of the importance of militias challenges and complements current theories of civil war. We conclude by introducing a research agenda advocating the integrated study of militias and rebel groups.

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