PREVENTIVE SALVAGE: THE GAP IN OPA POLLUTION DEFENSES

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 659-661
Author(s):  
John Arnold Witte

ABSTRACT Despite the strong emphasis on oil spill cleanup in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the United States still faces a major gap in its defenses against oil pollution: the lack of adequate professional ship salvage capability. Availability of preventive salvage capability would contribute to the most effective way of preventing a marine environmental catastrophe: keeping the oil, or chemicals, in the ship. This is especially important in view of the increasing age of the world tanker fleet.

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Tannahill ◽  
Alexis Steen

ABSTRACT Since its inception, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) was intended to greatly improve the ability to respond to large spills in the United States and has been the subject of frequent discussion and debate within the United States and elsewhere. Its provisions created new regulatory programs, expanded existing requirements, and established a variety of competency requirements for those entities and personnel involved in the production, transport, handling, or storage of petroleum within the United States. Tens upon tens of articles have been published in prior Proceedings of the International Oil Spill Conference (IOSC) and in many other venues about legislative intent, subsequent regulatory programs and their implementation, interagency negotiations, industry compliance successes or difficulties, training issues, etc. OPA 90 has also had an impact on U.S. policies internationally and in U.S. participation in international spill conventions/treaties. In recognition of a decade's passage since its enactment, IOSC sponsors commissioned a review and analysis of the effectiveness of OPA 90 and the interrelationship of OPA 90 with other oil spill laws and rules in the world. Another important purpose was to identify issues for the related panel discussion of this topic at the 2001 IOSC. This review was conducted using a questionnaire to acquire input from a broad range of individuals with OPA 90 expertise and experience. An informal survey of 57 questions in four sections was prepared and distributed to 22 participants. These participants were selected to represent a core of knowledge about OPA 90 and its history of implementation. Findings from the survey are presented to foster discussion and debate, educate members of the spill response community, assist with resolution of outstanding issues, and help focus on future issues that will need attention. The rate of response to the survey questions was high and enabled a broad review of the effectiveness of some of the various OPA 90 requirements. Questions were in either multiple-choice or essay format. Commonalties, differences, and issues were identified from all responses and used to evaluate OPA 90. From the commonalties and differences in the responses, selected OPA 90 requirements were classified as effective or ineffective. Based on an analysis of multiple-choice and essay answers, respondents generally agreed that OPA 90 was moderately effective (across all covered provisions). Closer examination of the four survey sections, however, indicated distinct concerns and benefits derived from implementation of OPA 90. In addition, where OPA 90 provisions were judged effective, caveats sometimes followed. Despite the effective rating of many OPA 90 prevention provisions, prevention still needs more attention based on the opinions of the survey respondents. Some respondents felt more attention and resources often are given to preparing to respond to a spill than to preventing spills, even though preventing a spill is considered preferable. Further, some believed that spill prevention would be enhanced if vessels with large, onboard bunker fuel storage also were subject to prevention requirements similar to OPA 90 requirements for vessels carrying petroleum as cargo. Survey feedback indicated that better Area Contingency Plans (ACPs) could result in significant improvements in response preparedness. ACPs need to be improved in many geographic areas. ACPs should be more response-oriented and less like a reference document, and be made more readily available and useable. Many respondents viewed these items as the foundation for any major improvements in response planning. In the United States, spill response using a multiparty management system, which is inclusive of broad stakeholder groups, differs from systems in other countries. Most felt that response activities can impact restoration activities greatly, but the legal structure does not support a seamless and efficient coordination of response and restoration. Coordination between response and restoration needs to be improved to avoid response delays and promote better/faster resource restoration. The biggest concern expressed by survey respondents regarding restoration dealt with management of the Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) process. Damage assessments and restoration management need to be streamlined, partly because too many interested parties make decision making inefficient. Some felt that public review of restoration plans led to better results; others felt public review delayed timely restoration activities. While international cooperation has increased over the last decade, respondents felt there was room for further improvement. In particular, sharing personnel and resources better, joining inspection and control programs, and drafting international restoration guidelines were some of the improvement activities mentioned. Findings from this survey have provided insights on what actions are needed to further improve spill prevention, preparedness, response, and restoration. Now is the time to renew this effort and improve performance to a higher plane globally. 2001 IOSC sponsors and Issue Paper Subcommittee desire the response community's commitment and solicit its involvement toward this goal.


Author(s):  
Helkei S. Hemminger

Abstract # —1141278 — In 2018, the Canadian government purchased the Trans Mountain pipeline, running from Alberta to British Columbia, along with the plans for expansion. The expansion could triple the transport capacity from 300,000 to 890,000 barrels of oil per day, and would increase the tanker traffic in the inland waterways of the Salish Sea, an area known for its sensitive marine habitat, and narrow, difficult to navigate passages. The anticipated increase in tanker traffic in this busy waterway continues to raise concerns about the impact of an oil spill and the financial means to address related injuries, particularly to natural resources. The transboundary nature of any spill further complicates the situation vis-à-vis the applicable liability regimes and response resources. Under the Canada-United States Joint Marine Contingency Plan (“JCP”), the United States Coast Guard and Canadian Coast Guard acknowledge each country's responsibility to fund their own response actions and pursue reimbursement of those costs within their respective jurisdictions. The availability of funding for a response, and to compensate injured parties, however, including the limits of liability of the responsible party, differs under each regime, and could impact the nature and scope of a response. For spills into or posing a substantial threat to the navigable waters of the United States, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 governs and a national fund, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (“OSLTF”), is immediately available to address an incident, including emergency restoration to natural resources. Canada's Marine Liability Act enables the Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund (“SOPF”) to pay claimants who have incurred damages as a result of oil pollution. Both countries' funds operate under the same principal—the polluter pays—but the compensation structure, and claims processes and procedures are entirely different. This paper provides an overview of these funding sources and claims procedures, comparing and contrasting the different systems. The discussion is meant to provide an overall understanding of potential funding pools available for spill responses under each scheme in order to facilitate transboundary spill planning and discussion.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 643-648 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy M. Stolls

ABSTRACT Because the federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) allows state preemption, vessel and facility owners that operate in the United States know that simply complying with federal laws and regulations is not enough. Though some states have enacted legislation similar to OPA 90 and have taken a wait-and-see approach to the promulgation of regulations, many others did not wait for federal agencies to resolve certain issues. This paper reviews new state oil spill laws and regulations in the coastal United States and compares their approaches to contingency planning, prevention, responder immunity, financial responsibility, liability, and other key issues.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 459-461
Author(s):  
Leonard Rich

ABSTRACT The intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) is to ensure the U.S. Government is prepared to protect the environment from a catastrophic spill of the magnitude and complexity of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill. The OPA90 legislation resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the National Strike Force (NSF), and establishment of District Response Groups who are staffed and equipped with mechanical spill recovery assets and are prepared to take prompt actions to mitigate a worst case discharge scenario. During the early 1990s, over $31 million dollars worth of oil spill response equipment was acquired and placed at 23 locations throughout the United States. Since then, an additional $10 million dollars of environmental emergency response equipment has been added to the USCG'S inventory, and are now located at 16 additional sites. This paper will elaborate on the evolution of the USCG'S environmental emergency response capabilities. In terms of preparedness, it will explain how, where and why the Coast Guard has adjusted its resources and capabilities since the OPA90 legislation. The expanded mission requirements include; redistributing and adjusting the locations of the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems, expanding functional use of the pre-positioned equipment for dewatering during shipboard fires, designing and implementing an offload pumping system for viscous oil at each NSF Strike Team, revisiting the condition and continued use of OPA90 procured first response “band-aid’ equipment, modifying the basic response equipment systems for fast current spill response, and the implementation of the Spilled Oil Recovery System. These actions reflect policy and mission adjustments influenced by an ever changing environment. The Coast Guard has re-organized from the bottom up to meet increased port security measures, and the capability to respond to all-hazard incidents. We must continue to maintain a high state of readiness in the oil spill response environment and accept the need to incorporate change to the equipment and the way we conduct our support to the American public.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 801-805
Author(s):  
Jonathan K. Waldron

ABSTRACT The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) promoted a coordinated industry and government enhancement of response resources to combat oil spills effectively in the United States. However, the United States remains vulnerable to oil spills near the borders it shares with Canada, Mexico, and various nations in the Caribbean due to legal and administrative impediments associated with cross-boundary spill response activities. This paper explores cross-boundary related issues that could hinder a response and the relationship and roles of industry and government with regard to such issues, and provides recommendations to enhance improved cooperation between government and industry to facilitate response activities. The international structure that currently exists—globally, regionally, and bilaterally—provides a basic framework that promotes cooperation between nations to respond harmoniously to spills threatening the shores of neighboring countries. However, the existing agreements and understandings only provide a basic umbrella. They require planning and implementation of details and commitment to take the specific actions required to implement these agreements and understandings fully. As a result, the enhanced private response capability that now exists in the United States may not be available in a spill involving cross-boundary operations. Neighboring nations must take action to facilitate cross-boundary activities by responders by providing responder-immunity protection similar to that provided under OPA 90 and by removing potential impediments to response activities: laws and other requirements relating to matters such as customs, immigration, and safety training.


1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 689-690
Author(s):  
Måns Jacobsson

ABSTRACT The international regime on oil spill liability and compensation is based on two international conventions, the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention. The Fund Convention establishes an intergovernmental organization, the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC Fund), with the task of administering the regime of compensation set up by that convention. At present, 67 nations are party to the Civil Liability Convention, 45 to the Fund Convention. The United States is not party to either. In 1984, the conventions were revised by two protocols, which provide higher compensation limits and a wider scope of application than the original conventions. These protocols have not yet come into force. The future of the compensation regime established by these conventions is examined here, with special attention to the prospects for the entry into force of the 1984 protocols. At present, the United States will not ratify these protocols.


2011 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 720
Author(s):  
Declan O'Driscoll

Will 2010 in the future be seen as a year that marked the transformation of the approach by the oil industry to the way it manages the preparedness and response to major oil spills similar to the effect of the Exxon Valdez in 1989? The Exxon Valdez spilled 37,000 tons of crude oil in the Prince William Sound in Alaska. The spill had a profound impact on the local environment and the livelihoods of the local communities. The scale and impact of the incident led to significant regulatory changes in the United States with the introduction of the OPA 90 Act and, internationally, with the ratification and implementation of the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (known as the OPRC Convention). The oil industry has since then undertaken many initiatives both on its own and in co-operation with governments across the world to reduce the occurrence and impact of oil spills. The positive aspect of this has been a major reduction in the number of major marine oil spills matched by increasing awareness and attention to minor oil spills. In recent years, meeting the growing demand for oil in both the developed and developing countries has led to exploration and production in ever more remote and deeper waters around the world. Has the industry adapted appropriately to the challenges of preparedness and response in these areas? The recent tragic loss of the Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico and subsequent massive and extended oil spill raises serious questions for both industry and government. This presentation will give an overview of the developments in the approach to oil spill preparedness and response since the Exxon Valdez, the challenges the industry and government face in the region and how the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico may change the way we manage preparedness and response in the future.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 261-264
Author(s):  
Daniel F. Sheehan

ABSTRACT The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) set a new course for the United States with respect to oil spill liability and compensation. For 15 years preceding the passage of OPA 90, the United States sought to become party to the international regimes. A 1984 international conference was held at the request of the United States, to modify provisions of existing conventions. Passage of OPA 90 rejected those efforts and implemented a more comprehensive and farther reaching regime. Structurally, the regimes are similar, yet they are far apart with respect to key issues of levels of liability, ease with which those limits may be broken, and scope and extent of compensable damages. The issue examined is whether they must remain so far apart and whether there is a mechanism to bring them back together.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 357-362
Author(s):  
Richard R. Lessard ◽  
Gregory DeMarco ◽  
Roger C. Prince ◽  
Robert J. Fiocco ◽  
Jerry Canevari

ABSTRACT The Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 was the largest marine oil spill in U.S. history. It triggered a massive cleanup and accelerated major changes to the U.S. structure for combating oil spills. It also led to a number of successful new programs within Exxon and industry aimed at reducing incidents, minimizing spillage of oil worldwide, and improving the capability to respond in the event of a spill. Exxon's response effort is widely acknowledged as the largest peacetime industrial mobilization ever in the United States and possibly in the world. Exxon immediately accepted responsibility and committed resources and personnel to clean up the environment affected by the spill The Valdez spill is the most studied ever. The cleanup involved the use of technology not previously applied to large spills. Many of these applications are now the subject of ongoing international research programs aimed at improving the ability to respond. This paper, written by several Exxon scientists who conducted technical studies in support of the cleanup, summarizes many of the technical learnings and advances that came out of the spill, and subsequent research studies with emphasis on how these apply to today's spills. This paper discusses only the response and cleanup. Exxon also initiated a number of programs to mitigate impacts on people, communities and wildlife affected by the spill.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1051-1054 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Adams

ABSTRACT The United States has several international oil pollution response agreements for which the U.S. Coast Guard serves as lead agency for implementation. However, the United States does not have an integrated plan for implementing these agreements, the criteria to use in determining what level of cooperation is needed, or a strategy for prioritizing which countries with which to engage to forge new agreements. This paper outlines a strategy for international engagement that allows the United States to participate in response-related expertise exchange to ensure appropriate capabilities are available for spills that threaten U.S. interests. Obstacles to developing and implementing the strategy and ways to overcome them also are identified.


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