Oil spill preparedness and response—has the paradigm changed?

2011 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 720
Author(s):  
Declan O'Driscoll

Will 2010 in the future be seen as a year that marked the transformation of the approach by the oil industry to the way it manages the preparedness and response to major oil spills similar to the effect of the Exxon Valdez in 1989? The Exxon Valdez spilled 37,000 tons of crude oil in the Prince William Sound in Alaska. The spill had a profound impact on the local environment and the livelihoods of the local communities. The scale and impact of the incident led to significant regulatory changes in the United States with the introduction of the OPA 90 Act and, internationally, with the ratification and implementation of the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (known as the OPRC Convention). The oil industry has since then undertaken many initiatives both on its own and in co-operation with governments across the world to reduce the occurrence and impact of oil spills. The positive aspect of this has been a major reduction in the number of major marine oil spills matched by increasing awareness and attention to minor oil spills. In recent years, meeting the growing demand for oil in both the developed and developing countries has led to exploration and production in ever more remote and deeper waters around the world. Has the industry adapted appropriately to the challenges of preparedness and response in these areas? The recent tragic loss of the Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico and subsequent massive and extended oil spill raises serious questions for both industry and government. This presentation will give an overview of the developments in the approach to oil spill preparedness and response since the Exxon Valdez, the challenges the industry and government face in the region and how the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico may change the way we manage preparedness and response in the future.

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 659-661
Author(s):  
John Arnold Witte

ABSTRACT Despite the strong emphasis on oil spill cleanup in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the United States still faces a major gap in its defenses against oil pollution: the lack of adequate professional ship salvage capability. Availability of preventive salvage capability would contribute to the most effective way of preventing a marine environmental catastrophe: keeping the oil, or chemicals, in the ship. This is especially important in view of the increasing age of the world tanker fleet.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 655-658
Author(s):  
Daniel F. Sheehan

ABSTRACT The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) was forged in the legislative cauldron of the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez casualty. However, its genesis really began with Congressional consideration and debate concerning whether to adopt an international liability and compensation regime or improve the unilateral system unique to the United States. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 significantly expanded the scope of the unique U.S. mechanism, while at the same time it urged the Administration to continue to examine the possibilities of becoming party to an international regime. Ten years after the Exxon Valdez casualty provides a convenient and appropriate time frame for reflection on how well the public has been served by the establishment and implementation of the regime of which the OSLTF is a major element. The impact on various publics served and stakeholders impacted will be analyzed and evaluated. While there are clearly differences in scope, application, and funding mechanisms between the U.S. and international regime, there are substantial similarities in terms of process, administration, areas of concern and interest.


Author(s):  
Donald W. Davis ◽  
Roland J. Guidry

Immediately after the Exxon Valdez incident, the United States Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was passed. This Act clarified the lines of responsibility associated with future oil spills. In addition to this Federal legislation, Louisiana lawmakers in 1991 enacted the Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act. Financial awards associated with this Act support a wide-range of research activities. Since 1993, 24 projects have been funded. The scope and nature of this research includes: • Oil Spill Awareness through Geoscience Education (OSAGE); • Used Oil Recycling in Louisiana’s Coastal Communities; • Evaluation and Characterization of Sorbents; • Landsat TM and Synthetic Aperture Radar to Facilitate Coastline Delineation; • Environmental Effects and Effectiveness of In-Situ Burning in Wetlands; • Bioremediation Protocol for Small-Scale Oil Spills; • Oil Spill Risk on Louisiana’s Largest Waterway; • River Time-of-Travel Modeling; • Composting Technology for Practical and Safe Remediation of Oil-Spill Residuals; • Predictability of Oceanic and Atmospheric Conditions off the Mississippi Delta; and • Phytoremediation for Oil Spill Cleanup and Habitat Restoration in Louisiana’s Marshes. Each of these projects, and others, are the result of the marriage of industry and university researchers in the identification and solution of applied oil-spill-related problems. The alliance is a good one. Important environmental issues are addressed because the selection process ensures each research initiative has the potential of being implemented by the response community. The work and knowledge gained from these projects is a clear indication of how industry and the university community can function in a collaborative manner to solve important issues — a significant partnership that clearly shows how both can benefit and a model for others to follow.


1992 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
David G. Shaw

Major oil-spills, such as occurred following the grounding of the tanker Exxon Valdez in March 1989 in Prince William Sound, Alaska, account for only a small fraction of the total anthropogenic input of petroleum to the marine environment. Yet major spills can result in significant and even acute impacts, trigger ecological changes requiring decades for recovery, and command considerable public attention. Thus catastrophic oil-spills in general, and the Exxon Valdez spill in particular, differ from other chronic human alterations of coastal marine systems.Estimates of the fate of the 38,000 metric tons of crude oil lost by the Exxon Valdez are imprecise, but perhaps 30–40% evaporated, 10–25% was recovered, and the rest remains in the marine environment. Roughly 1,500 km of coastline were oiled in varying degrees. Much of this coastline consists of gravel beaches into which oil penetrated to depths as great as 1 m.The ecological effects of the spill on the marine environments of Prince William Sound and adjacent coastal areas of the Gulf of Alaska were extensive, but natural recovery, aided by clean-up efforts, is expected. Judging by the consequences of other oil-spills affecting rocky shorelines, as well as previous natural and anthropogenic disturbances to Prince William Sound, it appears likely that most affected biotic communities and ecosystems will recover to approximately their pre-spill functional and structural characteristic within from five to twenty-five years.This oil-spill had major social effects. Many individuals, whether personally present or viewing the spill around the world on television, were saddened by the environmental damage, and felt that an important public trust had been broken. These feelings, together with dissatisfaction with the results of early clean-up efforts, gave rise to popular sentiment in favour of every possible clean-up and mitigation effort — regardless of cost, effectiveness, or possible negative consequences.The response to the Exxon Valdez oil-spill by government and the oil industry revealed serious inadequacies in the plans and institutions for dealing with major marine oilspills in the United States. Attempts to recover spilled oil, and to respond to the spill's environmental consequences, were hampered by a low level of preparedness and lack of clear agreement about the goals of response efforts. Attempts are under way to improve oil-spill prevention and response capabilities in Alaska and the rest of the United States. However, these efforts are not yet complete, and it remains to be seen whether an improved response will be made to the next major oil-spill.


1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-91
Author(s):  
Ken Matsumoto

ABSTRACT There are many ways to evaluate the overall performance of an oil spill response operation. There is, or there should be, however, a common standpoint for looking at such operations, irrespective of the size of the spill. Lessons learned through an incident, however trivial, can provide valuable clues to the future improvement of the operation in refineries and oil terminals. But the number of incidents at one location is too few to stand the test of analysis. Evaluation by a variety of methods is now possible based on information and data available through the worldwide news and reporting networks. This paper presents a guideline, which is widely accepted by the Japanese oil industry, for evaluating responses to oil spills, and introduces a concise equation based on the rating of many response elements.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 439-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlie Henry

ABSTRACT Since the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), dispersants have been used as part of a combined response to mitigate seven oil spills in United States Gulf of Mexico (GOM) waters. Of the dispersant operations reported, four utilized the Regional Response Team VI pre-approval authority to the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) that requires a monitoring plan. The successful integration of dispersant pre-authorization along with a fully funded ready response delivery system maintained by industry contributed to the successful use of dispersants to aid in mitigating spilled oil. A key element to gaining the original pre-approval authority was a functional operational monitoring plan. While each response was considered a successful dispersant operation, each incident provided valuable lessons learned that have been integrated into subsequent contingency planning and modifications to existing pre-authorization requirements in the GOM. This paper provides a chronological review of oil spill responses where dispersants were applied in the GOM since OPA 90.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 1131-1139
Author(s):  
Roger C. Helm ◽  
R. Glenn Ford ◽  
Harry R. Carter

ABSTRACT Oil released into the marine environment killed millions of seabirds in the twentieth century and every year tens of thousands of sick, debilitated, moribund, and dead oiled seabirds are beached or sink at sea (Piatt et al. 1990a, Camphuysen & Heubeck 2001, Wiese & Ryan 2003). In the U.S., hundreds to thousands of birds are killed each year by oil released from pipelines, platforms, and vessels (Burger & Fry 1993, Carter 2003, USFWS 2005). Huge oil spills from tankers have killed tens to hundreds of thousands of seabirds in a single event (e.g., Exxon Valdez, Prestige) and even relatively small volumes of oil released from a vessel at sea can kill thousands of seabirds (Page et al. 1990, Piatt et al. 1990b, Burger 1993). Prior to the March 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, little attention was paid to the loss of seabirds from oil spills and damage claims for injury to natural resources, such as seabirds, were rare. Since the Exxon Valdez spill, and the subsequent passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), the pursuit of damages for injury to natural resources has become an expected element of the overall cost of an oil spill. This paper discusses: (1) how the enactment of OPA 90 appears to have affected the oil and marine transportation industries in the U.S., especially along the west coast, (2) how, following the Exxon Valdez spill, natural resource damage (NRD) claims for injury to seabirds have become commonplace, but distinctly different when comparing U.S. west coast oil spills with those on the U.S. east and Gulf of Mexico (hereafter “gulf”) coasts, and (3) predictions on the future source of vessel spills and the changing nature of NRD claim resolution nationwide. An earlier version of this manuscript was provided in Helm et al. (2006); this updated version is similar but provides more details on certain points.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-266
Author(s):  
Jean R. Cameron

ABSTRACT An issue of increasing concern worldwide is that of oil spills from nontank vessels that carry large quantities of petroleum product as fuel or lubricants. The New Carissa incident in Oregon in 1999 is only one of several that have impacted the U.S. West Coast in the last few years. Others include the M/V Kuroshima, which grounded in Dutch Harbor, Alaska in 1997, and the M/V Kure, which spilled oil in Humbolt Bay also in 1997. The Tenyo Maru was cut in half in a collision and sank with the loss of one life and a spill of at least 100,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil and diesel in Washington State in 1991. Additional examples of both spills and threats of spills are sited, both in the United States and worldwide. This paper examines a number of actions that have been taken in response to this threat. One such model is the Canadian requirement that vessel owner/operators demonstrate a formal agreement with an approved response contractor, and list that contractor in their Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP). A more comprehensive approach would be to establish approved “umbrella” contingency plans for major port areas, supported by contracts with oil spill removal organizations (OSROs). This preferred model has been adopted by the U.S. West Coast states, and affords the opportunity for the contracted responders to drill with emergency response officials, thus improving the likelihood of an efficient, coordinated spill response. This paper also proposes spill prevention design elements for nontank vessels.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 684710
Author(s):  
Jim Elliott

Abstract The marine salvage industry plays a vital role in protecting the marine environment. Governments, industry and the public, worldwide, now place environmental protection as the driving objective, second only to the safety of life, during a marine casualty response operation. Recognizing over 20 years after the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that the effectiveness of mechanical on-water oil recovery remains at only about 10 to 25 percent while the international salvage industry annually prevents over a million tons of pollutants from reaching the world's oceans, ten years ago the United States began implementing a series of comprehensive salvage and marine firefighting regulations in an effort to improve the nation's environmental protection regime. These regulations specify desired response timeframes for emergency salvage services, contractual requirements, and criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a salvage and marine firefighting service provider. In addition to this effort to prevent surface oil spills, in 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard also recognized the salvage industries advancements in removing oil from sunken ships and recovering submerged pollutants, issuing Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) classification standards for companies that have the capabilities to effectively respond to non-floating oils. Ten years after the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulatory framework, this paper will review the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulations and non-floating oil detection and recovery requirements; analyze the impacts and effectiveness of these new policies; and present several case studies and recommendations to further enhance salvage and oil spill response effectiveness.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-265
Author(s):  
Jon Neel ◽  
John Bones ◽  
Elizabeth Dimmick ◽  
Lynn J. Tomich Kent ◽  
Roger Dunstan ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force was established in 1989 to enhance spill coordination among the West Coast states and British Columbia, and to address a number of issues that became apparent during the Nestucca barge and Exxon Valdez oil spills. Task Force members are the directors of the oil spill prevention and response agencies in Alaska, British Columbia, California, Oregon, and Washington. The Task Force has become a national model for facilitating cooperation and building consensus between coastal states and provinces and their federal governments. In October of 1990, the task force issued a report containing a comprehensive set of recommendations addressing oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response. The group had achieved remarkable consensus, and many of the report's recommendations have been included in recent legislation enacted by the member states. The success of the task force's approach to regional coordination has also reduced the need for a proposed Pacific Oceans Resources Interstate Compact, which has been proposed to expand the states' role in areas of regulation that are otherwise federally preempted. The task force has become an effective mechanism for developing vigorous, productive relationships between government agencies, industry, and the public in both the United States and Canada. It has created important linkages between state/provincial and federal regulatory activities; for example, by providing input to Coast Guard and EPA rulemaking that implemented the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. It also assisted in assuring a well-coordinated international response to the July 1991 Tenyo Maru oil spill outside the Strait of Juan De Fuca between Washington and British Columbia. The task force is continuing to advance its goals of promoting public policy on oil spill prevention; cooperative management of major spills by government and industry; protection of the states/provincial rights and their natural and economic resources; and inter-governmental consistency in regulations adopted for oil spill prevention, contingency planning, and resource damage assessment.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document