scholarly journals United States and Canada Transboundary Oil Spill Liability and Compensation Regimes: An Overview

Author(s):  
Helkei S. Hemminger

Abstract # —1141278 — In 2018, the Canadian government purchased the Trans Mountain pipeline, running from Alberta to British Columbia, along with the plans for expansion. The expansion could triple the transport capacity from 300,000 to 890,000 barrels of oil per day, and would increase the tanker traffic in the inland waterways of the Salish Sea, an area known for its sensitive marine habitat, and narrow, difficult to navigate passages. The anticipated increase in tanker traffic in this busy waterway continues to raise concerns about the impact of an oil spill and the financial means to address related injuries, particularly to natural resources. The transboundary nature of any spill further complicates the situation vis-à-vis the applicable liability regimes and response resources. Under the Canada-United States Joint Marine Contingency Plan (“JCP”), the United States Coast Guard and Canadian Coast Guard acknowledge each country's responsibility to fund their own response actions and pursue reimbursement of those costs within their respective jurisdictions. The availability of funding for a response, and to compensate injured parties, however, including the limits of liability of the responsible party, differs under each regime, and could impact the nature and scope of a response. For spills into or posing a substantial threat to the navigable waters of the United States, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 governs and a national fund, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (“OSLTF”), is immediately available to address an incident, including emergency restoration to natural resources. Canada's Marine Liability Act enables the Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund (“SOPF”) to pay claimants who have incurred damages as a result of oil pollution. Both countries' funds operate under the same principal—the polluter pays—but the compensation structure, and claims processes and procedures are entirely different. This paper provides an overview of these funding sources and claims procedures, comparing and contrasting the different systems. The discussion is meant to provide an overall understanding of potential funding pools available for spill responses under each scheme in order to facilitate transboundary spill planning and discussion.

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 459-461
Author(s):  
Leonard Rich

ABSTRACT The intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) is to ensure the U.S. Government is prepared to protect the environment from a catastrophic spill of the magnitude and complexity of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill. The OPA90 legislation resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the National Strike Force (NSF), and establishment of District Response Groups who are staffed and equipped with mechanical spill recovery assets and are prepared to take prompt actions to mitigate a worst case discharge scenario. During the early 1990s, over $31 million dollars worth of oil spill response equipment was acquired and placed at 23 locations throughout the United States. Since then, an additional $10 million dollars of environmental emergency response equipment has been added to the USCG'S inventory, and are now located at 16 additional sites. This paper will elaborate on the evolution of the USCG'S environmental emergency response capabilities. In terms of preparedness, it will explain how, where and why the Coast Guard has adjusted its resources and capabilities since the OPA90 legislation. The expanded mission requirements include; redistributing and adjusting the locations of the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems, expanding functional use of the pre-positioned equipment for dewatering during shipboard fires, designing and implementing an offload pumping system for viscous oil at each NSF Strike Team, revisiting the condition and continued use of OPA90 procured first response “band-aid’ equipment, modifying the basic response equipment systems for fast current spill response, and the implementation of the Spilled Oil Recovery System. These actions reflect policy and mission adjustments influenced by an ever changing environment. The Coast Guard has re-organized from the bottom up to meet increased port security measures, and the capability to respond to all-hazard incidents. We must continue to maintain a high state of readiness in the oil spill response environment and accept the need to incorporate change to the equipment and the way we conduct our support to the American public.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1051-1054 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Adams

ABSTRACT The United States has several international oil pollution response agreements for which the U.S. Coast Guard serves as lead agency for implementation. However, the United States does not have an integrated plan for implementing these agreements, the criteria to use in determining what level of cooperation is needed, or a strategy for prioritizing which countries with which to engage to forge new agreements. This paper outlines a strategy for international engagement that allows the United States to participate in response-related expertise exchange to ensure appropriate capabilities are available for spills that threaten U.S. interests. Obstacles to developing and implementing the strategy and ways to overcome them also are identified.


1994 ◽  
Vol 31 (03) ◽  
pp. 175-182
Author(s):  
Hans Hofmann ◽  
George Kapsilis ◽  
Eric Smith ◽  
Robert Wasalaski

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 has mandated that by the year 2015 all oil tankers operating in waters subject to jurisdiction of the United States must have double hulls. This paper examines the Act and the status of regulatory initiatives it has generated. Guidance for new hull construction and retrofit of existing vessels is outlined, and both IMO (International Maritime Organization) and U.S. Coast Guard requirements are discussed. Finally, the structural changes necessary to convert the U.S. Navy's T-AO Class oil tankers to meet the requirements of the Act are specified and illustrated.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 659-661
Author(s):  
John Arnold Witte

ABSTRACT Despite the strong emphasis on oil spill cleanup in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the United States still faces a major gap in its defenses against oil pollution: the lack of adequate professional ship salvage capability. Availability of preventive salvage capability would contribute to the most effective way of preventing a marine environmental catastrophe: keeping the oil, or chemicals, in the ship. This is especially important in view of the increasing age of the world tanker fleet.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017027
Author(s):  
Tim Gunter

Among the variety of oil spill response countermeasures, including mechanical, chemical, in-situ burning and bioremediation, deployment of chemical dispersants has been successfully utilized in numerous oil spills. This paper will review the history of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) C-130 Air Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) capability, deployment in remote areas, and associated challenges. ADDS consists of a large tank with dispersant(e.g., 51,000 pounds), owned and operated by an industry partner, used aboard USCG C-130 aircraft designed to be ADDS capable as specified in various agreements for marine environmental protection missions. ADDS is a highly complex tool to utilize, requiring extensive training by air crews and industry equipment technicians to safely and properly deploy during an oil spill response. In 2011, the Commandant of the USCG, Admiral Papp reaffirmed the USCG's C-130 ADDS capability during a hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and the Coast Guard. The use of ADDS in remote areas creates unique challenges, such as logistical coordination between the USCG and spill response industry partners and maintaining proficiency with personnel. It is critical for federal, state, and local agencies, industry, and academia to understand the history and challenges of ADDS to ensure the successful utilization of this response tool in an actual oil spill incident.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 655-658
Author(s):  
Daniel F. Sheehan

ABSTRACT The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) was forged in the legislative cauldron of the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez casualty. However, its genesis really began with Congressional consideration and debate concerning whether to adopt an international liability and compensation regime or improve the unilateral system unique to the United States. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 significantly expanded the scope of the unique U.S. mechanism, while at the same time it urged the Administration to continue to examine the possibilities of becoming party to an international regime. Ten years after the Exxon Valdez casualty provides a convenient and appropriate time frame for reflection on how well the public has been served by the establishment and implementation of the regime of which the OSLTF is a major element. The impact on various publics served and stakeholders impacted will be analyzed and evaluated. While there are clearly differences in scope, application, and funding mechanisms between the U.S. and international regime, there are substantial similarities in terms of process, administration, areas of concern and interest.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2389-2407
Author(s):  
Lisa C. Symons ◽  
Joseph Paulin ◽  
Atuatasi Lelei Peau

ABSTRACT: 2017-226 Fa’a-Samoa (the Samoan way) is a living tradition and continues to define the Samoan way of life. It is the foundation of Polynesia’s oldest culture - dating back some 3,000 years. Fa’a-Samoa is interconnected with Samoan lands and waters and by sharing the intact and vibrant traditions, values, and legends that connect the Samoan people to the land and sea, the local community plays an INTEGRAL role in the protection and preservation of natural and cultural resources of the area. Fa’a-Samoa places great importance on the dignity and achievements of the group rather than individuals. On April 14, 2016, the 62 ft. FV NO1 JI HYUN lost the main engines and grounded off the west side of Aunu’u Island in the National Marine Sanctuary of American Samoa (NMSAS). This area is of ecological and cultural significance for the local residents using hook-and-line, casting nets, spearfishing (non-scuba assisted) and other non-destructive fishing methods including those traditionally used for sustenance and cultural purposes such as gleaning, ‘enu and ola. The village on Aunu’u was extremely wary of inclusion of the waters of Aunu’u in the expansion of the sanctuary being concerned about loss of control of their traditional uses of the nearshore environment. In what became an extension of Fa’a-Samoa, the United States Coast Guard (USCG), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the American Samoa Territorial government worked, together to address both the pollution hazards from the incident and the impact to the coral reef ecosystem even after the fuel was removed. While a relatively straight forward response were it to happen in the continental U.S., severe weather (Tropical Cyclone Amos), high winds and swells, limitations on site access, daylight high tides, and availability of resources to include tugs, tow lines and trained personnel made this quite challenging. Three removal attempts occurred under Oil Pollution Act (OPA) authorization and three efforts occurred under the National Marine Sanctuaries Act (NMSA), with guidance from a professional salvage master. This prolonged 4-month response has prompted some new dialogue and hopefully new commitment to increase preparedness and spill response capabilities within the territory. The designation of the NMSAS allowed for the use of the combined authorities of OPA and the NMSA, forging new path that protects and preserves both the natural and cultural resources of the region from the impacts of pollution and from future groundings whether large or small.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Tannahill ◽  
Alexis Steen

ABSTRACT Since its inception, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) was intended to greatly improve the ability to respond to large spills in the United States and has been the subject of frequent discussion and debate within the United States and elsewhere. Its provisions created new regulatory programs, expanded existing requirements, and established a variety of competency requirements for those entities and personnel involved in the production, transport, handling, or storage of petroleum within the United States. Tens upon tens of articles have been published in prior Proceedings of the International Oil Spill Conference (IOSC) and in many other venues about legislative intent, subsequent regulatory programs and their implementation, interagency negotiations, industry compliance successes or difficulties, training issues, etc. OPA 90 has also had an impact on U.S. policies internationally and in U.S. participation in international spill conventions/treaties. In recognition of a decade's passage since its enactment, IOSC sponsors commissioned a review and analysis of the effectiveness of OPA 90 and the interrelationship of OPA 90 with other oil spill laws and rules in the world. Another important purpose was to identify issues for the related panel discussion of this topic at the 2001 IOSC. This review was conducted using a questionnaire to acquire input from a broad range of individuals with OPA 90 expertise and experience. An informal survey of 57 questions in four sections was prepared and distributed to 22 participants. These participants were selected to represent a core of knowledge about OPA 90 and its history of implementation. Findings from the survey are presented to foster discussion and debate, educate members of the spill response community, assist with resolution of outstanding issues, and help focus on future issues that will need attention. The rate of response to the survey questions was high and enabled a broad review of the effectiveness of some of the various OPA 90 requirements. Questions were in either multiple-choice or essay format. Commonalties, differences, and issues were identified from all responses and used to evaluate OPA 90. From the commonalties and differences in the responses, selected OPA 90 requirements were classified as effective or ineffective. Based on an analysis of multiple-choice and essay answers, respondents generally agreed that OPA 90 was moderately effective (across all covered provisions). Closer examination of the four survey sections, however, indicated distinct concerns and benefits derived from implementation of OPA 90. In addition, where OPA 90 provisions were judged effective, caveats sometimes followed. Despite the effective rating of many OPA 90 prevention provisions, prevention still needs more attention based on the opinions of the survey respondents. Some respondents felt more attention and resources often are given to preparing to respond to a spill than to preventing spills, even though preventing a spill is considered preferable. Further, some believed that spill prevention would be enhanced if vessels with large, onboard bunker fuel storage also were subject to prevention requirements similar to OPA 90 requirements for vessels carrying petroleum as cargo. Survey feedback indicated that better Area Contingency Plans (ACPs) could result in significant improvements in response preparedness. ACPs need to be improved in many geographic areas. ACPs should be more response-oriented and less like a reference document, and be made more readily available and useable. Many respondents viewed these items as the foundation for any major improvements in response planning. In the United States, spill response using a multiparty management system, which is inclusive of broad stakeholder groups, differs from systems in other countries. Most felt that response activities can impact restoration activities greatly, but the legal structure does not support a seamless and efficient coordination of response and restoration. Coordination between response and restoration needs to be improved to avoid response delays and promote better/faster resource restoration. The biggest concern expressed by survey respondents regarding restoration dealt with management of the Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) process. Damage assessments and restoration management need to be streamlined, partly because too many interested parties make decision making inefficient. Some felt that public review of restoration plans led to better results; others felt public review delayed timely restoration activities. While international cooperation has increased over the last decade, respondents felt there was room for further improvement. In particular, sharing personnel and resources better, joining inspection and control programs, and drafting international restoration guidelines were some of the improvement activities mentioned. Findings from this survey have provided insights on what actions are needed to further improve spill prevention, preparedness, response, and restoration. Now is the time to renew this effort and improve performance to a higher plane globally. 2001 IOSC sponsors and Issue Paper Subcommittee desire the response community's commitment and solicit its involvement toward this goal.


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