OPA 90 Effectiveness: Past, Present, and Future

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Tannahill ◽  
Alexis Steen

ABSTRACT Since its inception, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) was intended to greatly improve the ability to respond to large spills in the United States and has been the subject of frequent discussion and debate within the United States and elsewhere. Its provisions created new regulatory programs, expanded existing requirements, and established a variety of competency requirements for those entities and personnel involved in the production, transport, handling, or storage of petroleum within the United States. Tens upon tens of articles have been published in prior Proceedings of the International Oil Spill Conference (IOSC) and in many other venues about legislative intent, subsequent regulatory programs and their implementation, interagency negotiations, industry compliance successes or difficulties, training issues, etc. OPA 90 has also had an impact on U.S. policies internationally and in U.S. participation in international spill conventions/treaties. In recognition of a decade's passage since its enactment, IOSC sponsors commissioned a review and analysis of the effectiveness of OPA 90 and the interrelationship of OPA 90 with other oil spill laws and rules in the world. Another important purpose was to identify issues for the related panel discussion of this topic at the 2001 IOSC. This review was conducted using a questionnaire to acquire input from a broad range of individuals with OPA 90 expertise and experience. An informal survey of 57 questions in four sections was prepared and distributed to 22 participants. These participants were selected to represent a core of knowledge about OPA 90 and its history of implementation. Findings from the survey are presented to foster discussion and debate, educate members of the spill response community, assist with resolution of outstanding issues, and help focus on future issues that will need attention. The rate of response to the survey questions was high and enabled a broad review of the effectiveness of some of the various OPA 90 requirements. Questions were in either multiple-choice or essay format. Commonalties, differences, and issues were identified from all responses and used to evaluate OPA 90. From the commonalties and differences in the responses, selected OPA 90 requirements were classified as effective or ineffective. Based on an analysis of multiple-choice and essay answers, respondents generally agreed that OPA 90 was moderately effective (across all covered provisions). Closer examination of the four survey sections, however, indicated distinct concerns and benefits derived from implementation of OPA 90. In addition, where OPA 90 provisions were judged effective, caveats sometimes followed. Despite the effective rating of many OPA 90 prevention provisions, prevention still needs more attention based on the opinions of the survey respondents. Some respondents felt more attention and resources often are given to preparing to respond to a spill than to preventing spills, even though preventing a spill is considered preferable. Further, some believed that spill prevention would be enhanced if vessels with large, onboard bunker fuel storage also were subject to prevention requirements similar to OPA 90 requirements for vessels carrying petroleum as cargo. Survey feedback indicated that better Area Contingency Plans (ACPs) could result in significant improvements in response preparedness. ACPs need to be improved in many geographic areas. ACPs should be more response-oriented and less like a reference document, and be made more readily available and useable. Many respondents viewed these items as the foundation for any major improvements in response planning. In the United States, spill response using a multiparty management system, which is inclusive of broad stakeholder groups, differs from systems in other countries. Most felt that response activities can impact restoration activities greatly, but the legal structure does not support a seamless and efficient coordination of response and restoration. Coordination between response and restoration needs to be improved to avoid response delays and promote better/faster resource restoration. The biggest concern expressed by survey respondents regarding restoration dealt with management of the Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) process. Damage assessments and restoration management need to be streamlined, partly because too many interested parties make decision making inefficient. Some felt that public review of restoration plans led to better results; others felt public review delayed timely restoration activities. While international cooperation has increased over the last decade, respondents felt there was room for further improvement. In particular, sharing personnel and resources better, joining inspection and control programs, and drafting international restoration guidelines were some of the improvement activities mentioned. Findings from this survey have provided insights on what actions are needed to further improve spill prevention, preparedness, response, and restoration. Now is the time to renew this effort and improve performance to a higher plane globally. 2001 IOSC sponsors and Issue Paper Subcommittee desire the response community's commitment and solicit its involvement toward this goal.

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 659-661
Author(s):  
John Arnold Witte

ABSTRACT Despite the strong emphasis on oil spill cleanup in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the United States still faces a major gap in its defenses against oil pollution: the lack of adequate professional ship salvage capability. Availability of preventive salvage capability would contribute to the most effective way of preventing a marine environmental catastrophe: keeping the oil, or chemicals, in the ship. This is especially important in view of the increasing age of the world tanker fleet.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.


Author(s):  
Helkei S. Hemminger

Abstract # —1141278 — In 2018, the Canadian government purchased the Trans Mountain pipeline, running from Alberta to British Columbia, along with the plans for expansion. The expansion could triple the transport capacity from 300,000 to 890,000 barrels of oil per day, and would increase the tanker traffic in the inland waterways of the Salish Sea, an area known for its sensitive marine habitat, and narrow, difficult to navigate passages. The anticipated increase in tanker traffic in this busy waterway continues to raise concerns about the impact of an oil spill and the financial means to address related injuries, particularly to natural resources. The transboundary nature of any spill further complicates the situation vis-à-vis the applicable liability regimes and response resources. Under the Canada-United States Joint Marine Contingency Plan (“JCP”), the United States Coast Guard and Canadian Coast Guard acknowledge each country's responsibility to fund their own response actions and pursue reimbursement of those costs within their respective jurisdictions. The availability of funding for a response, and to compensate injured parties, however, including the limits of liability of the responsible party, differs under each regime, and could impact the nature and scope of a response. For spills into or posing a substantial threat to the navigable waters of the United States, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 governs and a national fund, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (“OSLTF”), is immediately available to address an incident, including emergency restoration to natural resources. Canada's Marine Liability Act enables the Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund (“SOPF”) to pay claimants who have incurred damages as a result of oil pollution. Both countries' funds operate under the same principal—the polluter pays—but the compensation structure, and claims processes and procedures are entirely different. This paper provides an overview of these funding sources and claims procedures, comparing and contrasting the different systems. The discussion is meant to provide an overall understanding of potential funding pools available for spill responses under each scheme in order to facilitate transboundary spill planning and discussion.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 643-648 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy M. Stolls

ABSTRACT Because the federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) allows state preemption, vessel and facility owners that operate in the United States know that simply complying with federal laws and regulations is not enough. Though some states have enacted legislation similar to OPA 90 and have taken a wait-and-see approach to the promulgation of regulations, many others did not wait for federal agencies to resolve certain issues. This paper reviews new state oil spill laws and regulations in the coastal United States and compares their approaches to contingency planning, prevention, responder immunity, financial responsibility, liability, and other key issues.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 761-764 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana Stalcup ◽  
Gary Yoshioka ◽  
Brad Kaiman ◽  
Adam Hall

ABSTRACT In the years following the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), government agencies and regulated parties in the United States have begun to implement spill prevention and preparedness programs. For this analysis, 7 years of oil spill data collected in the Emergency Response Notification System were used to measure the impact that OPA 90 has had on preventing large spills. Furthermore, relationships among the types, sources, and location of spilled oil are characterized. A comparison of the number of reported 10,000-gallon oil spills for the years 1992-1995 to that number for the years 1989-1991 indicates a decline, not only for vessels but also for pipelines and fixed facilities. The decline in large oil spills to water from various sources appears to indicate that the efforts of government and industry have had a measurable impact on environmental protection.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-36
Author(s):  
Jonas Pålsson ◽  
Lawrence Hildebrand ◽  
Olof Lindén

ABSTRACT 2017-253 Few standardised frameworks are designed to assess the full range of oil spill preparedness activities, from plan development, implementation, equipment, training, exercises, and response sustainability. This paper analyses the international practice of oil spill preparedness measures and compares them to Swedish practice. Friedman’s test and Dunn’s post-test have been used to compare the RETOS™ evaluation scores of Finland, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, Denmark, and Norway to Sweden. The United States is examined as an external reference. The RETOS™ programme is an Excel tool developed for the International Oil Spill Conference 2008. It is a guide for industry and governments to assess their level of oil spill response, planning, and preparedness management in relation to established criteria, and is intended for international best management practices. Swedish oil spill preparedness is shown to be comparable to the Baltic Sea regional practice. The Swedish RETOS™ evaluation score is 69%, compared to the average 73.1% of the examined countries. A statistical difference exists between Sweden and both Norway and the United States. Swedish oil spill preparedness is comparable to the Baltic Sea Region countries despite: not having a National Contingency Plan, not using the Tiered Preparedness and Response concept, nor having adopted an Incident Management System. This suggests that these concepts are not essential for a functioning preparedness regime, although Sweden instead has a system serving the same function. However, it also questions what effect implementing these concepts would have on Swedish preparedness.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 459-461
Author(s):  
Leonard Rich

ABSTRACT The intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) is to ensure the U.S. Government is prepared to protect the environment from a catastrophic spill of the magnitude and complexity of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill. The OPA90 legislation resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the National Strike Force (NSF), and establishment of District Response Groups who are staffed and equipped with mechanical spill recovery assets and are prepared to take prompt actions to mitigate a worst case discharge scenario. During the early 1990s, over $31 million dollars worth of oil spill response equipment was acquired and placed at 23 locations throughout the United States. Since then, an additional $10 million dollars of environmental emergency response equipment has been added to the USCG'S inventory, and are now located at 16 additional sites. This paper will elaborate on the evolution of the USCG'S environmental emergency response capabilities. In terms of preparedness, it will explain how, where and why the Coast Guard has adjusted its resources and capabilities since the OPA90 legislation. The expanded mission requirements include; redistributing and adjusting the locations of the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems, expanding functional use of the pre-positioned equipment for dewatering during shipboard fires, designing and implementing an offload pumping system for viscous oil at each NSF Strike Team, revisiting the condition and continued use of OPA90 procured first response “band-aid’ equipment, modifying the basic response equipment systems for fast current spill response, and the implementation of the Spilled Oil Recovery System. These actions reflect policy and mission adjustments influenced by an ever changing environment. The Coast Guard has re-organized from the bottom up to meet increased port security measures, and the capability to respond to all-hazard incidents. We must continue to maintain a high state of readiness in the oil spill response environment and accept the need to incorporate change to the equipment and the way we conduct our support to the American public.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 801-805
Author(s):  
Jonathan K. Waldron

ABSTRACT The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) promoted a coordinated industry and government enhancement of response resources to combat oil spills effectively in the United States. However, the United States remains vulnerable to oil spills near the borders it shares with Canada, Mexico, and various nations in the Caribbean due to legal and administrative impediments associated with cross-boundary spill response activities. This paper explores cross-boundary related issues that could hinder a response and the relationship and roles of industry and government with regard to such issues, and provides recommendations to enhance improved cooperation between government and industry to facilitate response activities. The international structure that currently exists—globally, regionally, and bilaterally—provides a basic framework that promotes cooperation between nations to respond harmoniously to spills threatening the shores of neighboring countries. However, the existing agreements and understandings only provide a basic umbrella. They require planning and implementation of details and commitment to take the specific actions required to implement these agreements and understandings fully. As a result, the enhanced private response capability that now exists in the United States may not be available in a spill involving cross-boundary operations. Neighboring nations must take action to facilitate cross-boundary activities by responders by providing responder-immunity protection similar to that provided under OPA 90 and by removing potential impediments to response activities: laws and other requirements relating to matters such as customs, immigration, and safety training.


1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 689-690
Author(s):  
Måns Jacobsson

ABSTRACT The international regime on oil spill liability and compensation is based on two international conventions, the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention. The Fund Convention establishes an intergovernmental organization, the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC Fund), with the task of administering the regime of compensation set up by that convention. At present, 67 nations are party to the Civil Liability Convention, 45 to the Fund Convention. The United States is not party to either. In 1984, the conventions were revised by two protocols, which provide higher compensation limits and a wider scope of application than the original conventions. These protocols have not yet come into force. The future of the compensation regime established by these conventions is examined here, with special attention to the prospects for the entry into force of the 1984 protocols. At present, the United States will not ratify these protocols.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 261-264
Author(s):  
Daniel F. Sheehan

ABSTRACT The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) set a new course for the United States with respect to oil spill liability and compensation. For 15 years preceding the passage of OPA 90, the United States sought to become party to the international regimes. A 1984 international conference was held at the request of the United States, to modify provisions of existing conventions. Passage of OPA 90 rejected those efforts and implemented a more comprehensive and farther reaching regime. Structurally, the regimes are similar, yet they are far apart with respect to key issues of levels of liability, ease with which those limits may be broken, and scope and extent of compensable damages. The issue examined is whether they must remain so far apart and whether there is a mechanism to bring them back together.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document