Organizational and Financial Considerations of Wildlife Operations During Two Orphan Spills Off California1

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 989-992
Author(s):  
Peter Gautier ◽  
Kent Bauer ◽  
John Tarpley
Keyword(s):  
San Francisco ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Primary Source ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
California Department ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Park Service ◽  
Point Reyes ◽  
The Difference

ABSTRACT In November 1997 and again in January 1998, U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office San Francisco Bay, California Department of Fish and Game Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), the National Park Service, and the Gulf of the Farallones National Marine Sanctuary responded to “mystery” oil spill incidents in the Point Reyes National Seashore, California area. These spill responses were unique because they were primarily wildlife recovery and rehabilitation operations; very little oil was sighted despite wildlife impacts that rank the event as the fourth worst in California history. A large-scale investigation including the use of multiple laboratories to identify the source of the oil has established a connection between the two spills, but no responsible party has been identified to defray the response costs. As a result of the spills, a significant effort is underway in Northern California to better define the role of wildlife operations within the incident command system and to rethink its organization and protocols. Other lessons to apply to future responses involve the funding issues revolving around the difference between response efforts and natural resource damage assessment when the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) is the primary source of funding.

The Southern Traffic Lane Spill (T/V Command): A Case Study of Spiller Accountability1

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 445-449
Author(s):  
Kristy Plourde ◽  
CAPT Harlan
Keyword(s):  
San Francisco ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
San Francisco Bay ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Plea Bargain ◽  
California Department ◽  
Traffic Lane ◽  
Joint Investigation ◽  
Unified Command

ABSTRACT On September 24, 1998, the T/V Command had a small spill in San Francisco Bay, California while taking on bunkers in Anchorage Nine. The cause was determined to be due to a small crack in the outer hull plating of the tank. The T/V Command departed on the evening of September 26 after completing temporary repairs required by the Captain of the Port (COTP)/Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC). The next morning, a large 10-mile by 2-mile oil slick was discovered just south of the entrance to San Francisco Bay. This triggered one of the largest, most far-reaching oil spill investigations ever. Since no one took responsibility for this spill, the U.S. Coast Guard accessed the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) and established a Unified Command with the state of California Department of Fish and Game, Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) to begin immediate cleanup. The Coast Guard and OSPR also began an aggressive joint investigation to track down the spiller. Hundreds of vessels had entered or departed San Francisco Bay during the 5-day window before the spill was discovered. The investigators were able to narrow the search and sample vessels. The Coast Guard Marine Safety Lab (MSL) and OSPR's lab were able to match the spilled oil to the T/V Command,. The Coast Guard tracked down the location of the T/V Command and began the first ever request for high seas boarding of a vessel for an environmental crime. A Coast Guard team from the USCGC Boutwell boarded the T/V Command 200 miles off Guatemala to begin the investigation. A follow-on multiagency team of investigators, led by the Coast Guard again, boarded the vessel in Panama. In a plea bargain agreement, the T/V Command's operator, master, and chief engineer pled guilty in federal court to criminal charges stemming from the spill on September 27, 1998, remarkably 1 year from the date of the original spill. The operator agreed to pay over $9.4 million dollars in criminal and civil penalties. This paper and presentation discusses the complexities of this international spill response investigation and events leading up to the settlement.

scholarly journals Optimization on Emergency Materials Dispatching Considering the Characteristics of Integrated Emergency Response for Large-Scale Marine Oil Spills

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (7) ◽  
pp. 214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Song Li ◽  
Manel Grifoll ◽  
Miquel Estrada ◽  
Pengjun Zheng ◽  
Hongxiang Feng
Keyword(s):  
Emergency Response ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Marine Oil ◽  
Emergency Managers ◽  
Distribution Point ◽  
Dispatching Algorithm ◽  
Marine Oil Spills ◽  
The Difference

Many governments have been strengthening the construction of hardware facilities and equipment to prevent and control marine oil spills. However, in order to deal with large-scale marine oil spills more efficiently, emergency materials dispatching algorithm still needs further optimization. The present study presents a methodology for emergency materials dispatching optimization based on four steps, combined with the construction of Chinese oil spill response capacity. First, the present emergency response procedure for large-scale marine oil spills should be analyzed. Second, in accordance with different grade accidents, the demands of all kinds of emergency materials are replaced by an equivalent volume that can unify the units. Third, constraint conditions of the emergency materials dispatching optimization model should be presented, and the objective function of the model should be postulated with the purpose of minimizing the largest sailing time of all oil spill emergency disposal vessels, and the difference in sailing time among vessels that belong to the same emergency materials collection and distribution point. Finally, the present study applies a toolbox and optimization solver to optimize the emergency materials dispatching problem. A calculation example is presented, highlighting the sensibility of the results at different grades of oil spills. The present research would be helpful for emergency managers in tackling an efficient materials dispatching scheme, while considering the integrated emergency response procedure.

TO BOLDLY GO WHERE NO STATE HAS GONE BEFORE1

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 761-765
Author(s):  
William Boland ◽  
Pete Bontadelli
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Action Plan ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
State And Local ◽  
Marine Safety

ABSTRACT The Marine Safety Division of the 11th Coast Guard District and the California Office of Oil Spill Prevention and Response are pursuing new avenues to assure that federal, state, and local efforts in California achieve the goals of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990. Coordination of the seven California area committees, publishing detailed area contingency plans, and the implemention of a memorandum of agreement on oil spill prevention and response highlight recent cooperative successes. In 1994 a joint Coast Guard/state/industry incident command system task force drafted an ICS field operations guide and incident action plan forms that meet National Interagency Incident Management System and fire scope ICS requirements.

Integrating Trustee Issues into a Balanced Response: Working Toward a Common Goal1

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 655-661
Author(s):  
Heather A. Parker-Hall ◽  
Steve Hampton ◽  
James Haas
Keyword(s):  
San Francisco ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Pollution Source ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
California Department ◽  
Cooperative Effort ◽  
Advanced Planning ◽  
Unified Command

ABSTRACT In February 2002, a Unified Command (UC) comprised of the United States Coast Guard (USCG), the California Department of Fish and Game's Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), and other state and federal agencies tested a sample of oil taken from the water near the wreck SS Jacob Luckenbach. Oil from this fifty-year-old wreck, submerged in 176 feet of water 17 miles off San Francisco, matched oil that had impacted thousands of birds and miles of shoreline since November 2001. It also matched oil from mystery spills in this area dating back to 1992. Now that the source of this extensive pollution was found, the next step seemed simple: remove the oil from the vessel. Yet there were many issues surrounding this vessel and its location that required significant cooperation with many agencies and trustees. The Luckenbach is an historic property, protected by the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). It is submerged in the Gulf of Farallones National Marine Sanctuary - one of the most biologically productive regions off the California coast and home to many sensitive resources including several listed species. The UC realized that dialogue with and among the natural resource trustee agencies was crucial to planning balanced operations that would remove the pollution source while providing the utmost protection available to the resources at risk A task force was formed that allowed trustees to engage in discussions about the tradeoffs of initiating removal as quickly as possible while balancing the risk of harm that any incidental release during operations may cause to their resources of concern. One of the most exciting benefits of this cooperative effort was the shift in thinking beyond just responding to the incident to advanced planning of a response that would best enhance restoration and long-term recovery. In many responses, it is not always clear that everyone has the same priorities: the USCG may focus on recovering oil and mitigating damage, the responsible party wants to minimize costs, and the trustees want to protect and restore their resources. In this case, the trustees and USCG were clearly working together toward common goals: removing a source of chronic oil pollution while minimizing environmental impacts from the response.

Unannounced Drill Program: Testing Spill Management Team Capability through Vessel & Facility Oil Spill Contingency Plans

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017425
Author(s):  
Cassidee Shinn ◽  
Joe Stewart ◽  
Yvonne Addassi
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Initial Response ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Contingency Plan ◽  
Program Testing ◽  
Continued Education ◽  
Contingency Plans

California has approximately >10,000 vessels calling its ports each year, and 200–300 facilities state wide, many of which are required to have a California Oil Spill Contingency Plan (Contingency Plan) on file with Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR). Spill Management Teams (SMT), either staffed by Contingency Plan holders' employees or contracted out, and the use of the Incident Command System (ICS) structure must be described in these plans. OSPR introduced an unannounced SMT drill program (Program) in 2012 to ensure that Contingency Plan holders can successfully complete the proper initial notifications, activate their SMT, and use ICS in accordance with their approved Contingency Plan and California Code 820.01, Drills and Exercises. There are multiple goals of this Program, including the enhanced capability of SMTs, OSPR, and other partners. This Program provides continued education and training for Contingency Plan holders and SMTs in an effort to bolster the initial response phase of an actual incident. Through these drills, SMTs must demonstrate that they could make proper notifications and decisions during an actual incident and be staffed with trained personnel in ICS to fill positions before State and Federal representatives respond. Additionally, SMTs should deploy resources listed in their approved Contingency Plans and ensure those resources are up to date, available, and sufficient. Furthermore, drills provide an opportunity for OSPR and SMTs to build relationships through testing these procedures, which should make the initial response more efficient and effective. Lastly, the drills are often conducted with representatives from United States Coast Guard and Environmental Protection Agency, both of which have their own drill programs. Working in conjunction with federal partners ensures continuity and fewer required drills of SMTs. Since the beginning of the Program, SMTs continue to improve their response capabilities, validated by more successfully completed unannounced drills. OSPR has conducted 30 unannounced drills, all of which were on SMTs for marine facilities and vessels. With the expanded authority of OSPR to regulate facilities statewide in 2015, this Program will continue to grow. Ultimately, a more comprehensive Program should lead to enhanced SMT capability statewide, and therefore better protection of the State's natural resources overall. The goal of this poster will be to describe: 1) the history and purpose of this Program; 2) the lessons learned and improvements of SMTs and Contingency Plans; and 3) the expansion of the Program from marine to statewide.

Comparative study of mangrove recruitment in oil deforested areas in Guimaras, Philippines

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2369-2388
Author(s):  
Abner P. Barnuevo ◽  
Resurreccion B. Sadaba
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Long Term Effects ◽  
Natural Recovery ◽  
Recovery Processes ◽  
Recovery Potential ◽  
Dead Trees ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Persistent Disturbances ◽  
Mangrove Planting

ABSTRACT The MT Solar I oil spill that released over 2 million liters of bunker C oil in Guimaras in August 2006 affected mangrove forest in varying degrees from acute damages, sublethal stresses and long term effects. Although the incident caused only <1 ha deforestation, large scale mangrove planting has been implemented as part of response initiatives without inference to scientific assessment of the natural recovery potential of the damaged habitat. The response and intervention in the aftermath of the oil spill primarily involved planting mangroves. This study assessed the mangrove recruitment and colonization in two deforested mangrove areas in Guimaras, Philippines and evaluated whether replanting was necessary as part of intervention. Results on reconstructed age extrapolated from the internodal index showed that recruitment started to take place one and two years after the spill in Site 1 (3.33% of tagged wildings) and Site 2 (11.67%) respectively. However, the wilding establishment in the former site was impaired in the succeeding years and maintained at very low numbers (0.07–0.15 m−2) whereas wilding establishment was high in Site 2 (2.19–3.31 per m−2). The difference between sites is statistically significant (P<0.0001). The marked difference between sites is attributed to the prevailing interventions and persistent disturbances. The extraction of dead trees and downed wood in Site 1 impaired the progress of recovery and was further compounded by persistent disturbances brought by the socioeconomic activities, whereas, non-intervention in Site 2 favored the progress of natural recovery. Eight years after the incident, the colonizers in Site 2 were already reproductively mature as some already developed flowers. This study highlighted the capacity of mangroves to recover from perturbations as long as the geomorphological features of the habitats are not altered. The large-scale mangrove planting implemented in the affected areas is deemed unnecessary given that one year after the incident recruitment started to progress. Thus, future oil spill responses and interventions should carefully assess the natural recovery processes of the impacted areas first, before proceeding to large scale mangrove planting programs. Otherwise, the good intentions of implementing faster recovery of mangroves and other impacted habitats may be considered a waste of public funds and a futile effort vis-à-vis practicality.

Do Trajectories Belong in Area Plans? A New Approach in California Using the Trajectory Analysis Planner (Tap II)1

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 685-691
Author(s):  
Heather Parker Hall ◽  
Christopher Barker ◽  
Peter Gautier ◽  
Tim Holmes ◽  
James Hardwick
Keyword(s):  
San Francisco ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Trajectory Analysis ◽  
Planning Process ◽  
Deterministic Model ◽  
San Francisco Bay ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Ensemble Modeling ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
New Type

ABSTRACT The National Contingency Plan (NCP) requires that Area Contingency Plans (ACPs) be adequate to address the removal of a worst case discharge from a vessel or facility operating in or near the area. The U.S. Coast Guard took this requirement further by issuing guidance in 1992 that ACPs address response to worst case, maximum most probable, and most probable discharges. As a result, many ACPs include area-specific scenarios applying these discharge quantities. However, there remains very little guidance about including trajectories in the ACPs. For example, only three of California's six ACPs include trajectories from computer models; the remaining three contain only oil spill scenarios that incorporate committee-selected environmental conditions to help estimate where oil might go. The 2000 revision of the San Francisco Bay and Delta ACP includes a new type of trajectory using the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) Trajectory Analysis Planner (TAP II). TAP II is a statistical model rather than a single scenario-based deterministic model. It generates statistics that describe oil spill behavior using an ensemble modeling approach. These statistics are generated from an ensemble of thousands of possible trajectories resulting from hundreds of oil spill scenarios computed within a given location. This approach is designed specifically for planning purposes, and not response. A statistics-based approach facilitates the planning process by providing key information, including which shorelines have the highest probability of being impacted, the size of the area that might be affected, how quickly a response should be mounted, what quantity of oil could impact a shoreline location, which resources will be oiled, which assets will be affected, and the most threatening origin of possible oil discharge. The authors describe how the TAP II model employs ensemble modeling, detail its application in the 2000 version of the San Francisco Bay and Delta ACP, and discuss possibilities for future applications.

NOFO Oil spill response “The way we train”

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 431-446
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Performance Requirement ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Large Scale Field ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Cost Efficient ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Different Response ◽  
Norwegian Continental Shelf

ABSTRACT In a situation where oil is spilled on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) the operator is responsible for the oil spill response. To do this in a robust and efficient way Norwegian Clean Seas Association for Operating Companies (NOFO) handles the oil spill response on behalf of all member companies. Handling an oil spill response situation in all its forms from offshore incident to beach restoration involves many different resources, skills and people. Introducing Incident Command System (ICS) as the command system for this task even increases the amount of training we need to do. How can NOFO achieve the optimal training of our common and shared response resources in a time where focus is on an effective and robust response? Having an overview of the different response needs and response plans NOFO coordinates activity, training and exercises in an efficient way. This is done with the aid of NOFO’s operative plan. The plan describes every resource with a performance requirement and puts it in to a response context. This gives NOFO a foundation to build a response that is structured and cost efficient for our members. Furthermore, this enables NOFO to tailor our training and exercises from the individual responder/resource to the complex large-scale field exercise which involves typically 250–350 people from numerous different operating companies, municipalities, governmental and private responders. This paper will describe how we plan, train and exercise on the NCS in order to be prepared for response in an efficient and robust way.

ICS CONTRIBUTES TO THE NORTH CAPE OIL SPILL RESPONSE1

1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Management System ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Management Tool ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
The North ◽  
Oil Spill Response

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.

scholarly journals Evolution of Contingency Planning in California – a Federal and State Coordinated Effort

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cassidee Shinn ◽  
Anna Burkholder
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Contingency Planning ◽  
California Department ◽  
Joint Preparation ◽  
New Process ◽  
Contingency Plans ◽  
Sensitive Site

ABSTRACT U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), and California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW), Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) agreed to the joint preparation of oil spill contingency plans following the enactment of California and federal laws in 1990. With little guidance initially, six Area Committees embarked on a new process to create the first coastal Area Contingency Plans (ACPs) in 1992. In 2015, when emergency regulations to expand OSPR's jurisdiction statewide became effective, developing inland Geographic Response Plans (GRPs) became a top priority. Over the last 30 years, the ACPs have evolved into robust, nationally recognized planning documents, and response plans have expanded into inland environments. This paper will describe in detail the contributions and advancements in California oil spill contingency planning over 30 years. It will highlight OSPR's approaches for statewide consistency and coverage, interoperability between various state and federal plans, tools (including Geographic Information System (GIS) and various databases), improved sensitive site contacts and management, and lessons learned. It will also cover goals for future improvements in both marine and inland contingency plans.

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