IMPROVING MARINE FIREFIGHTING AND SALVAGE RESPONSE USING A NON-REGULATORY APPROACH THROUGH KEY STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 295-299
Author(s):  
Joseph J. Leonard ◽  
Michael Drieu ◽  
Robert W. Royall

ABSTRACT While catastrophic marine fires are a rare event, minor shipboard fires do have a significant potential for damage and a potential impact on the marine transportation system. As such, it is critical that responders at the federal, state, local, industrial, and contractor levels be trained and prepared to conduct timely operations to mitigate any incidents that occur. Due to the nature of services performed in the firefighting community today (fire suppression, rescue, hazardous materials response, and emergency medical services, to name but a few), time and effort is not always dedicated towards responding to events onboard vessels. As over 70% of fire departments in the United States are volunteer departments, this has the potential to become even more of an issue. In addition, shipboard fires typically require some level of participation from a marine salvor. Depending on the damage to the vessel, this may involve significant salvage activities. The number of salvors scattered throughout the United States is somewhat limited, and their home base locations dictate their response times to specific geographic areas. Critical issues that need to be addressed by senior response managers who may find themselves involved in responding to vessel fires include: 1. Establishment of an effective Unified Command to address all stakeholder issues, 2. Enhancing knowledge of regional capabilities and resources to respond to shipboard fires and resultant salvage activities, 3. Ensuring appropriate training of response personnel that meets recognized standards (such as NFPA 1405), and 4. Developing, exercising, and validating plans to respond to shipboard fires and salvage activities. Efforts throughout the Eighth Coast Guard District over the past several years have begun to address many of these issues, with enhanced incident management training, challenging exercises to validate plans, and extensive workshops to improve responder knowledge being a few of the positive steps. Only by addressing these four critical areas can response managers be assured of an effective and efficient response that would minimize the impact to the marine transportation system.

Logistics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 23
Author(s):  
Rebecca Sheehan ◽  
Dimitrios Dalaklis ◽  
Anastasia Christodoulou ◽  
Megan Drewniak ◽  
Peter Raneri ◽  
...  

The analysis in hand provides a brief assessment of the United States’ and Canada’s marine transportation system and relevant search and rescue (SAR) support in relation to the Northwest Passage, with the purpose of examining to what extent these countries’ relevant infrastructure resources are able to meet the expected growth of shipping operations and business activities in the Arctic. Through an extensive literature review, this assessment will specifically describe the most important influences upon the maritime transportation system, with the issue of certain geographical details and the capabilities of existing ports standing out. Additionally, vessel activity trends and vessel traffic routing measure initiatives will be examined. Furthermore, the SAR infrastructure details and means to render assistance to people in distress along the Northwest Passage will be discussed. The reality remains that port characteristics are limited and vessel traffic routing measure initiatives and upgrades to SAR assets are commendable but slow-paced. It is true that both the United States and Canada are taking proper measures to build up infrastructure needs, but they both may run out of time to put adequate infrastructure in place to deal effectively with the changing environment.


2018 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
SOFIA M. SANTILLANA FARAKOS ◽  
RÉGIS POUILLOT ◽  
GORDON R. DAVIDSON ◽  
RHOMA JOHNSON ◽  
INSOOK SON ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT We assessed the risk of human salmonellosis from consumption of shelled walnuts in the United States and the impact of 0- to 5-log reduction treatments for Salmonella during processing. We established a baseline model with Salmonella contamination data from 2010 to 2013 surveys of walnuts from California operations to estimate baseline prevalence and levels of Salmonella during preshelling storage and typical walnut processing stages, considered U.S. consumption data, and applied an adapted dose-response model from the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization to evaluate risk of illness per serving and per year. Our baseline model predicted 1 case of salmonellosis per 100 million servings (95% confidence interval [CI], 1 case per 3 million to 1 case per 2 billion servings) of walnuts untreated during processing and uncooked by consumers, resulting in an estimated 6 cases of salmonellosis per year (95% CI, <1 to 278 cases) in the United States. A minimum 3-log reduction treatment for Salmonella during processing of walnuts eaten alone or as an uncooked ingredient resulted in a mean risk of <1 case per year. We modeled the impact on risk per serving of three atypical situations in which the Salmonella levels were increased by 0.5 to 1.5 log CFU per unit pretreatment during processing at the float tank or during preshelling storage or posttreatment during partitioning into consumer packages. No change in risk was associated with the small increase in levels of Salmonella at the float tank, whereas an increase in risk was estimated for each of the other two atypical events. In a fourth scenario, we estimated the risk per serving associated with consumption of walnuts with Salmonella prevalence and levels from a 2014 to 2015 U.S. retail survey. Risk per serving estimates were two orders of magnitude larger than those of the baseline model without treatment. Further research is needed to determine whether this finding reflects variability in Salmonella contamination across the supply or a rare event affecting a portion of the supply.


2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (7) ◽  
pp. 1006-1008
Author(s):  
Lauren Lizewski ◽  
Grace Flaherty ◽  
Parke Wilde ◽  
Ross Brownson ◽  
Claire Wang ◽  
...  

Objectives. To assess stakeholder perceptions of the impact and feasibility of 21 national, state, and local nutrition policies for cancer prevention across 5 domains in the United States. Methods. We conducted an online survey from October through December 2018. Participants were invited to take the survey via direct e-mail contact or an organizational e-newsletter. Results. Federal or state Medicare/Medicaid coverage of nutrition counseling and federal or state subsidies on fruits, vegetables, and whole grains for participants in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program were the policies rated as having the highest perceived impact and feasibility. Overall, the 170 respondents rated policy impact higher than policy feasibility. Polices at the federal or state level had a higher perceived impact, whereas local policies had higher perceived feasibility. Conclusions. Our findings might guide future research and advocacy that can ultimately motivate and target policy actions to reduce cancer burdens and disparities in the United States.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017027
Author(s):  
Tim Gunter

Among the variety of oil spill response countermeasures, including mechanical, chemical, in-situ burning and bioremediation, deployment of chemical dispersants has been successfully utilized in numerous oil spills. This paper will review the history of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) C-130 Air Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) capability, deployment in remote areas, and associated challenges. ADDS consists of a large tank with dispersant(e.g., 51,000 pounds), owned and operated by an industry partner, used aboard USCG C-130 aircraft designed to be ADDS capable as specified in various agreements for marine environmental protection missions. ADDS is a highly complex tool to utilize, requiring extensive training by air crews and industry equipment technicians to safely and properly deploy during an oil spill response. In 2011, the Commandant of the USCG, Admiral Papp reaffirmed the USCG's C-130 ADDS capability during a hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and the Coast Guard. The use of ADDS in remote areas creates unique challenges, such as logistical coordination between the USCG and spill response industry partners and maintaining proficiency with personnel. It is critical for federal, state, and local agencies, industry, and academia to understand the history and challenges of ADDS to ensure the successful utilization of this response tool in an actual oil spill incident.


Author(s):  
Bartley J. Eckhardt ◽  
Peter D. Squicciarini

Failures of machinery and systems aboard towing vessels can have devastating consequences to the vessel, its crew, other vessels and their crews, shoreside populations and facilities, cargoes, marine transportation systems, commerce, and the environment. This paper presents a comprehensive methodology for implementing Risk-Based Maintenance and Inspections of towing vessel machinery and systems. Utilizing incident data from the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and other relevant industry information, the authors apply the principles set forth in ANSI/API Recommended Practice 580, Risk-based Inspection [1], as a guideline. Relatively straightforward to implement, the methodology presented in this paper is expected to improve towing vessel safety, reduce potential dangers associated with towing operations, and provide favorable risk/benefit reward to vessel owners. Paper published with permission.


Author(s):  
Helkei S. Hemminger

Abstract # —1141278 — In 2018, the Canadian government purchased the Trans Mountain pipeline, running from Alberta to British Columbia, along with the plans for expansion. The expansion could triple the transport capacity from 300,000 to 890,000 barrels of oil per day, and would increase the tanker traffic in the inland waterways of the Salish Sea, an area known for its sensitive marine habitat, and narrow, difficult to navigate passages. The anticipated increase in tanker traffic in this busy waterway continues to raise concerns about the impact of an oil spill and the financial means to address related injuries, particularly to natural resources. The transboundary nature of any spill further complicates the situation vis-à-vis the applicable liability regimes and response resources. Under the Canada-United States Joint Marine Contingency Plan (“JCP”), the United States Coast Guard and Canadian Coast Guard acknowledge each country's responsibility to fund their own response actions and pursue reimbursement of those costs within their respective jurisdictions. The availability of funding for a response, and to compensate injured parties, however, including the limits of liability of the responsible party, differs under each regime, and could impact the nature and scope of a response. For spills into or posing a substantial threat to the navigable waters of the United States, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 governs and a national fund, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (“OSLTF”), is immediately available to address an incident, including emergency restoration to natural resources. Canada's Marine Liability Act enables the Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund (“SOPF”) to pay claimants who have incurred damages as a result of oil pollution. Both countries' funds operate under the same principal—the polluter pays—but the compensation structure, and claims processes and procedures are entirely different. This paper provides an overview of these funding sources and claims procedures, comparing and contrasting the different systems. The discussion is meant to provide an overall understanding of potential funding pools available for spill responses under each scheme in order to facilitate transboundary spill planning and discussion.


Author(s):  
Ilmir Nusratullin ◽  
Raul Yarullin ◽  
Tagira Ismagilova ◽  
Olga Eremeeva ◽  
Tatiana Ermoshina

As part of this study, the goal is set to assess the impact of sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union on the economy and financial sector of Russia, to identify the effectiveness of the initial goals of these countries. To achieve the goal, the legal acts concerning the imposed sanctions of the USA and the European Union against Russia were first analyzed, a chronology of events was described, and sanctions were classified. Further, based on the data of the World Bank and the Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation, the results of the sanction pressure on the Russian economy and financial sector were estimated. Then the results of this study were compared with the results obtained by other scholars. The paper concluded that the sanctions of the United States and the European Union did have an impact on the economy and financial sector of Russia, but this influence was not as significant as the leaders of these countries expected. In addition, the impact of the sanctions is gradually decreasing despite the introduction of new sanctions on various pretexts.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 943-948
Author(s):  
Joseph Gleason

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY During the summer of 2004, the First Coast Guard District in Boston, Massachusetts supported both Presidential political nominating conventions for the 2004 election. The Democratic National Convention was held in Boston, Massachusetts on July 26–29, 2004, and the Republican National Convention was held in New York City from August 30th to September 2, 2004. This was the first time both conventions have taken place within the geographic area of responsibility of a single Coast Guard District. The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security declared both of these events as National Special Security Events under Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62). PDD-62 formalized and delineated the roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in the development of security plans for major events. The 2004 Democratic and Republican Conventions were the first political conventions held in the United States since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the months before the Democratic National Convention, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice stated that there was credible intelligence from multiple sources indicating that al-Qaeda planned to attempt an attack on the United States during the period leading up to the election. (Joint Statement of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and Attorney General John Ashcroft on May 28, 2004) The terrorist attacks on the Madrid rail system were a direct attempt by AI Qaeda to influence the elections in Spain, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was going to take all appropriate steps to prevent a similar attack in the United States. (Schmidt and Priest, Washington Post May 26, 2004; Page A02) The 2004 Conventions offered a significant challenge for the Coast Guard and other federal, state, and local agencies that had dual responsibility for coordinating security operations while being prepared to respond to a disaster including oil spills and hazardous substance releases—the combination of what was previously designated as crisis and consequence management under PDD-39. This paper will examine lessons learned from planning and operations in support of the conventions. Having served as the First District Project Officer for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, this paper is written as my observations of the lessons learned and offers some insight into what went well and possible areas for improvement as I observed throughout the more than 18 months of planning for these events of national significance. The Coast Guard planning and operational support for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions demonstrated the importance of a team approach to planning, interagency coordination and partnerships, pre-event preparedness activities, and pre-deploying personnel and resources for response. It is my hope that the observations contained in this paper can benefit federal, state, and local agencies as they prepare for large significant events in the future including National Special Security Events.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 637-642
Author(s):  
Stephen Jarvela ◽  
Kevin Boyd ◽  
Robert Gadinski

ABSTRACT A team, consisting of the United States Environmental Protection Agency; Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection; Pennsylvania Department of Health; Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry; United States Coast Guard and United States Army Corps of Engineers, has completed major steps to provide a safe and healthy environment for the residents of Laurel Gardens, Hazleton, PA. What started as a simple underground gasoline leak took on more serious dimensions when gasoline vapors were found in nearby homes. The investigation and mitigation expanded to include over 400 properties. The remediation consists of a ground water treatment system and a soil vapor extraction system. This paper and its presenters look at the critical aspects of this case as the investigation went from subsurface soil and ground water contamination impacting surface water to the contamination of indoor air. It examines the impact of preferential pathways that include sanitary and storm sewers as well as a 19th century abandoned coal mine. In addition to the technical aspects, this examination looks at the public health and community issues that have surrounded this case.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 609-613
Author(s):  
Captain Jeffrey D. Stieb

ABSTRACT In the United States, the Coast Guard Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) in the role as Captain of the Port (COTP) is charged with investigating marine casualties resulting in oil spills in the coastal zone.2 The FOSC is in the challenging position of working with the responsible party as a member of the Unified Command, while simultaneously investigating the incident. Complicating the FOSC's balancing act is the likelihood that other federal, state, and local agencies will have an interest in the investigation. The parties conducting investigations (Department of Justice, National Transportation Safety Board, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Coast Guard Investigative Service, Environmental Protection Agency investigators, and state and local investigators) report to their own senior officials and are not under the direction and control of the FOSC. This article will discuss, from a Coast Guard officer's perspective, the FOSC's conflicting roles as a member of the Unified Command working closely in cooperation with the responsible party to mitigate the incident, and as a federal officer supervising at least one of the investigations. The article will describe the dynamics of significant oil spill investigations and provide recommendations on how investigative agencies should work together to conduct thorough investigations while minimizing the impact on the Unified Command's goal of working cooperatively to mitigate the effects of the spill.


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