OIL SPILLS, SEABIRDS, AND NRDA: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN U.S. WEST, EAST, AND GULF COASTS

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 1131-1139
Author(s):  
Roger C. Helm ◽  
R. Glenn Ford ◽  
Harry R. Carter

ABSTRACT Oil released into the marine environment killed millions of seabirds in the twentieth century and every year tens of thousands of sick, debilitated, moribund, and dead oiled seabirds are beached or sink at sea (Piatt et al. 1990a, Camphuysen & Heubeck 2001, Wiese & Ryan 2003). In the U.S., hundreds to thousands of birds are killed each year by oil released from pipelines, platforms, and vessels (Burger & Fry 1993, Carter 2003, USFWS 2005). Huge oil spills from tankers have killed tens to hundreds of thousands of seabirds in a single event (e.g., Exxon Valdez, Prestige) and even relatively small volumes of oil released from a vessel at sea can kill thousands of seabirds (Page et al. 1990, Piatt et al. 1990b, Burger 1993). Prior to the March 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, little attention was paid to the loss of seabirds from oil spills and damage claims for injury to natural resources, such as seabirds, were rare. Since the Exxon Valdez spill, and the subsequent passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), the pursuit of damages for injury to natural resources has become an expected element of the overall cost of an oil spill. This paper discusses: (1) how the enactment of OPA 90 appears to have affected the oil and marine transportation industries in the U.S., especially along the west coast, (2) how, following the Exxon Valdez spill, natural resource damage (NRD) claims for injury to seabirds have become commonplace, but distinctly different when comparing U.S. west coast oil spills with those on the U.S. east and Gulf of Mexico (hereafter “gulf”) coasts, and (3) predictions on the future source of vessel spills and the changing nature of NRD claim resolution nationwide. An earlier version of this manuscript was provided in Helm et al. (2006); this updated version is similar but provides more details on certain points.

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-266
Author(s):  
Jean R. Cameron

ABSTRACT An issue of increasing concern worldwide is that of oil spills from nontank vessels that carry large quantities of petroleum product as fuel or lubricants. The New Carissa incident in Oregon in 1999 is only one of several that have impacted the U.S. West Coast in the last few years. Others include the M/V Kuroshima, which grounded in Dutch Harbor, Alaska in 1997, and the M/V Kure, which spilled oil in Humbolt Bay also in 1997. The Tenyo Maru was cut in half in a collision and sank with the loss of one life and a spill of at least 100,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil and diesel in Washington State in 1991. Additional examples of both spills and threats of spills are sited, both in the United States and worldwide. This paper examines a number of actions that have been taken in response to this threat. One such model is the Canadian requirement that vessel owner/operators demonstrate a formal agreement with an approved response contractor, and list that contractor in their Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP). A more comprehensive approach would be to establish approved “umbrella” contingency plans for major port areas, supported by contracts with oil spill removal organizations (OSROs). This preferred model has been adopted by the U.S. West Coast states, and affords the opportunity for the contracted responders to drill with emergency response officials, thus improving the likelihood of an efficient, coordinated spill response. This paper also proposes spill prevention design elements for nontank vessels.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 727-731
Author(s):  
Randall B. Luthi ◽  
Linda B. Burlington ◽  
Eli Reinharz ◽  
Sharon K. Shutler

ABSTRACT The Damage Assessment Regulations Team (DART), under the Office of General Counsel of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), has centered its efforts on developing natural resource damage assessment regulations for oil pollution in navigable waters. These procedures will likely lower the costs associated with damage assessments, encourage joint cooperative assessments and simplify most assessments. The DART team of NOAA is developing new regulations for the assessment of damages due to injuries related to oil spills under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. These regulations will involve coordination, restoration, and economic valuation. Various methods are currently being developed to assess damages for injuries to natural resources. The proposed means include: compensation tables for spills under 50,000 gallons, Type A model, expedited damage assessment (EDA) procedures, and comprehensive procedures. They are being developed to provide trustees with a choice for assessing natural resource damages for each oil spill.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 684710
Author(s):  
Jim Elliott

Abstract The marine salvage industry plays a vital role in protecting the marine environment. Governments, industry and the public, worldwide, now place environmental protection as the driving objective, second only to the safety of life, during a marine casualty response operation. Recognizing over 20 years after the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that the effectiveness of mechanical on-water oil recovery remains at only about 10 to 25 percent while the international salvage industry annually prevents over a million tons of pollutants from reaching the world's oceans, ten years ago the United States began implementing a series of comprehensive salvage and marine firefighting regulations in an effort to improve the nation's environmental protection regime. These regulations specify desired response timeframes for emergency salvage services, contractual requirements, and criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a salvage and marine firefighting service provider. In addition to this effort to prevent surface oil spills, in 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard also recognized the salvage industries advancements in removing oil from sunken ships and recovering submerged pollutants, issuing Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) classification standards for companies that have the capabilities to effectively respond to non-floating oils. Ten years after the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulatory framework, this paper will review the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulations and non-floating oil detection and recovery requirements; analyze the impacts and effectiveness of these new policies; and present several case studies and recommendations to further enhance salvage and oil spill response effectiveness.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1337-1340
Author(s):  
Chao Wu ◽  
Nigel Carden

ABSTRACT Under the international convention system for oil spill liability and compensation, shipowners and oil cargo owners are sharing the costs of oil pollution (cleanup and damages). While the industries find the burden of financial liability too heavy, the compensation provided through the Conventions (Civil Liability Conventions and Fund Conventions [CLCs/FCs]) has become increasingly insufficient to satisfy the total admissible claims. What has to be done? Increase the financial liability of the responsible parties? Let the victims of pollution shoulder part of their uncompensated claims alone? Neither can be fairly accepted. This paper will discuss a solution based on the theory of risk-profit, upon which the current Conventions (CLCs/FCs) are founded. In this regard, the paper also will compare the Conventions with a domestic regime—the U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990.


2011 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 720
Author(s):  
Declan O'Driscoll

Will 2010 in the future be seen as a year that marked the transformation of the approach by the oil industry to the way it manages the preparedness and response to major oil spills similar to the effect of the Exxon Valdez in 1989? The Exxon Valdez spilled 37,000 tons of crude oil in the Prince William Sound in Alaska. The spill had a profound impact on the local environment and the livelihoods of the local communities. The scale and impact of the incident led to significant regulatory changes in the United States with the introduction of the OPA 90 Act and, internationally, with the ratification and implementation of the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (known as the OPRC Convention). The oil industry has since then undertaken many initiatives both on its own and in co-operation with governments across the world to reduce the occurrence and impact of oil spills. The positive aspect of this has been a major reduction in the number of major marine oil spills matched by increasing awareness and attention to minor oil spills. In recent years, meeting the growing demand for oil in both the developed and developing countries has led to exploration and production in ever more remote and deeper waters around the world. Has the industry adapted appropriately to the challenges of preparedness and response in these areas? The recent tragic loss of the Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico and subsequent massive and extended oil spill raises serious questions for both industry and government. This presentation will give an overview of the developments in the approach to oil spill preparedness and response since the Exxon Valdez, the challenges the industry and government face in the region and how the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico may change the way we manage preparedness and response in the future.


1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 377-383
Author(s):  
Richard W. Dunford ◽  
Sara P. Hudson ◽  
William H. Desvousges

ABSTRACT The new Oil Pollution Act of 1990 defines natural resource damages from oil spills as the sum of the cost to restore foregone natural resource services, the diminution of value of natural resource services prior to restoration, and damage assessment costs. Natural resource damages are usually determined once removal activities (containment, protection, and cleanup) are completed. Nevertheless, removal activities affect the magnitude of all three natural resource damage components. Consequently, to minimize the total cost of oil spills, decisions on removal activities should consider the linkages between removal activities and natural resource damages. Successful containment results in minimal natural resource damages, because oil generally does far less damage to natural resources in open water than on shore. If oil cannot be contained, the potential natural resource damages from oil coming ashore in certain areas can help determine priorities for protection activities. In particular, oil may harm natural resource services much more in some areas than in others. Furthermore, some natural resource services are more costly to restore and assess than others. Finally, some cleanup activities do more harm than good to natural resource services. If the effects of cleanup activities on natural resource damages are ignored, “excessive” cleanup activities are likely.


1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-112
Author(s):  
N. Okolo

ABSTRACT Following oil spills and petroleum fire incidents in Kenya, and in light of the recent increase in environmental awareness worldwide, the oil industry in Kenya and its affiliates have taken tangible steps to enhance alertness and implement emergency response plans. A National Oil Pollution Committee was formed in 1989 and charged with (1) assessing the existing capability of the industry to cope with oil spills, and (2) defining the maximum credible incident that the industry can handle, including establishing stock levels of equipment and chemicals, setting up plans, and organization and development of regular practice drills. Since the oil industry in Kenya cannot provide resources capable of responding to, and effectively controlling all emergencies which might occur, the National Oil Pollution Committee includes representatives of two government corporations, Kenya Ports Authority and Kenya Pipeline Company, and the four government ministries of Transport and Communications, Energy, Tourism and Wildlife, and Environment and Natural Resources. The Kenya Ports Authority has been appointed as the oil spill coordinator responsible for manpower, storage and maintenance of the equipment stockpile, and equipment employment in case of an oil spill.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 665-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew E. Jahn ◽  
Gordon A. Robilliard

ABSTRACT This paper evaluates the role of natural recovery in the restoration of populations, communities, and ecosystems following natural and anthropogenic disturbances, especially oil spills. Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, options for the restoration of natural resources and services injured by oil spills range from natural recovery to aggressive methods requiring human intervention. Natural recovery is defined herein as the return of natural resources to a dynamic baseline with no active human intervention. Populations, communities, and ecosystems are a product of biological responses to a wide variety of natural and anthropogenic disturbances. In an oil spill, biological communities will generally recover naturally to baseline conditions about as quickly and effectively as they will with active human interventions, and at a lower cost and lower commitment of people, equipment, and materials. Therefore, natural recovery should be considered a primary restoration alternative for each oil spill incident. Natural recovery should also be the standard or benchmark restoration alternative against which all active restoration alternatives are compared for cost-effectiveness and probable success in restoring natural resources and services. We conclude that natural recovery is a cost-effective, efficient process that, in most oil spills, restores natural resources to baseline about as quickly as would the most aggressive active restoration alternative.


Author(s):  
Emilio D’Ugo ◽  
Milena Bruno ◽  
Arghya Mukherjee ◽  
Dhrubajyoti Chattopadhyay ◽  
Roberto Giuseppetti ◽  
...  

AbstractMicrobiomes of freshwater basins intended for human use remain poorly studied, with very little known about the microbial response to in situ oil spills. Lake Pertusillo is an artificial freshwater reservoir in Basilicata, Italy, and serves as the primary source of drinking water for more than one and a half million people in the region. Notably, it is located in close proximity to one of the largest oil extraction plants in Europe. The lake suffered a major oil spill in 2017, where approximately 400 tons of crude oil spilled into the lake; importantly, the pollution event provided a rare opportunity to study how the lacustrine microbiome responds to petroleum hydrocarbon contamination. Water samples were collected from Lake Pertusillo 10 months prior to and 3 months after the accident. The presence of hydrocarbons was verified and the taxonomic and functional aspects of the lake microbiome were assessed. The analysis revealed specialized successional patterns of lake microbial communities that were potentially capable of degrading complex, recalcitrant hydrocarbons, including aromatic, chloroaromatic, nitroaromatic, and sulfur containing aromatic hydrocarbons. Our findings indicated that changes in the freshwater microbial community were associated with the oil pollution event, where microbial patterns identified in the lacustrine microbiome 3 months after the oil spill were representative of its hydrocarbonoclastic potential and may serve as effective proxies for lacustrine oil pollution.


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