MOBEX Cayenne 2013: Lessons Learned & Response Enhancements Derived from the International Mobilization, Preparedness & Response Exercise in French Guiana

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-49
Author(s):  
Paul A. Schuler

ABSTRACT Oil Spill Response Limited (OSRL) and Clean Caribbean & Americas (CCA) conducted the first International Mobilization, Preparedness & Response Exercise (MOBEX) since the 2010 Gulf of Mexico “Macondo” incident and since the merger of CCA and OSRL in January 2013. The exercise was hosted by Shell Exploration & Production France SAS (Shell E&P), the operating partner of the Zaedyus joint venture drilling prospect offshore French Guiana. It was the first MOBEX to support a deep water exploratory drilling scenario. MOBEX Cayenne 2013, was conducted in French Guiana, May 15–17, 2013, and included the following five foundational exercise components found in all MOBEXs:Tabletop Exercise (Simulation)Mobilization of Tier 1 and 2 (Shell), and Tier 3 (OSRL) response equipment and personnelConference and Technical SeminarEquipment Deployment DemonstrationDelegate Exchange/Forum A number of planning activities, and MOBEX itself, contributed to enhancing the overall oil spill preparedness capability in the operating area. Planning activities included coordination visits and meetings with operators and governmental authorities, familiarization with sensitive environmental resources, logistics planning within the international, national and local infrastructure, expansion of indigenous response capability through training of local responders and vessel operators, and familiarization with governmental policies and procedures across a wide range of issues. This paper discusses oil spill preparedness and response lessons learned and enhancements derived from the planning and conduct of MOBEX Cayenne 2013.

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 427-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry A. Romberg ◽  
Dennis M. Maguire ◽  
Richard L. Ranger ◽  
Rod Hoffman

ABSTRACT This paper examines explosion hazards while recovering spilled oil utilizing oil spill recovery barges. The risk of static accumulation and discharge is well understood after thorough investigations of several incidents in the 1970s and 1980s involving explosions on tank barges and vessels during petroleum cargo loading and unloading operations. However, those lessons learned only partially apply to oil spill recovery operations due to the differences in liquid properties, crew training, and additional tasks required during an oil spill response. While regulatory standards have been enacted for petroleum tankers and barges involved in commercial transportation of oil and other hazardous materials, the utility of these standards for oil spill response vessels has not been fully considered. Inverviews were conducted with marine transporters and response organizations to understand the wide range of operational risks and mitigation proceedures currently in use. This paper outlines the four basic conditions that must be present to create a static discharge-induced explosion during liquid cargo operations. A review of explosion casualty history was completed for cargo operations and compared to operations that create similar hazards during oil spill recovery operations. Specific processes that create additional risk of static-induced explosions during response operations were studied to review mitigation actions. Finally, recommendations for continued training are provided to help guide the spill response community when preparing for and responding to oil spills.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 1055-1058
Author(s):  
Joseph Gleason

ABSTRACT Historically, many response exercises conducted by the United States Coast Guard and other oil spill response stakeholders have been conducted as functional or full-scale exercises. With the increased demands placed on many U.S. agencies as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11’ 2001, there is a greater need than ever to ensure that time spent in training and exercises produces positive and tangible results for the participants. In preparation for the joint US/Canadian response exercise, CANUSLANT 2002, the U.S. and Canadian Coast Guards decided to take a step back and look at the lessons learned from previous exercises. Based on this review, the Joint Response Team (JRT) decided to focus CANUSLANT 2002 as a training opportunity and to work on the lessons learned that were repeatedly identified in earlier CANUSLANT exercises. Perhaps the most common exercise conducted in oil spill response is the functional “command post” exercise where exercise participants are assigned to ICS (Incident Command System) staff elements. Participants then respond to an exercise scenario and prescripted injects that are provided to drive participant actions. With personnel turnover, transfers, and increased operational demands, many exercise participants struggle through the crisis phase of an incident scenario and never have the opportunity to learn what it is they are supposed to be doing. When all is said and done, many exercise participants are often simply go home happy that the exercise is over and done with. The goal for CANUSLANT 2002 was to produce an exercise where the participants accomplished something tangible; that long pending issues would be discussed and perhaps even resolved. The Exercise Design Team hoped that the participants walked away from the exercise saying that it was time well spent and not simply thankful that the exercise was over. This paper outlines the factors that led to the success of the CANUSLANT 2002 cross border response exercise. This paper also highlights some of the fundamentals for varying your approach to exercises to achieve tangible results while providing personnel the skills and training required to respond in the event of a real disaster.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-81
Author(s):  
Jenifer M. Baker ◽  
Mark Spalding ◽  
Jon Moore

ABSTRACT Prospective user groups of sensitivity maps for oil spill response have a variety of needs related to different categories of oil spill, ranging from localized tier 1 spills at fixed installations (such as oil terminals) to catastrophic tier 3 spills. The latter may affect large areas and possibly more than one country. Uses of maps range from planning practical site-specific shore cleanup to strategic planning on a regional scale for “passing ship” scenarios in remote areas. The paper discusses different map types, map scales, categories of information to be included, and symbology, bearing in mind the requirements of different users. Reference is made to international examples. A considerable degree of harmonization of approach for sensitivity maps worldwide can be achieved. However, given that resources can vary tremendously from one region to another, it seems better to promote a broad consistency with respect to symbology rather than an exhaustively detailed scheme to cover every possible resource worldwide.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 335-338
Author(s):  
Scott Read

ABSTRACT Rapid mobilization of response equipment to the scene of an incident is critical to mitigate its effects. If the scale of the response requires support from an international Tier 3 response center, it is essential to have in place a robust logistics chain to ensure that appropriate equipment is delivered rapidly and deployed effectively. With delivery time a priority, all transportation options must be explored to reduce mobilization period. This paper will refer to three recent response mobilizations of Oil Spill Response Limited (OSRL) to demonstrate the reality of transporting response equipment internationally by air. It will examine the options available including the use of the response center's permanently chartered aircraft, full or part charter available from the charter market, and the use of scheduled freighter aircraft. Transport choices are based on clearly defined procedures and the experience of the staff involved, combined with well-established and exercised contingency plans. Assessment of these various options will highlight the uniqueness of every response and demonstrate how flexibility and cooperation by all concerned parties is essential to provide the solutions to the real-time challenges that occur. A variety of systems are in place to assist rapid equipment mobilization and developments in equipment packaging and load planning are reducing further the time taken to load and discharge cargo. The case studies will show the lessons learned, pitfalls, and benefits of these systems and in particular will focus on the advantages in speed, cost, and flexibility that are obtained from the use of aircraft pallet modules as part of a specialized aircraft palletization system. The concept and development of the aircraft pallet system attracted attention as the poster presentation “Packaging of Tier 3 Oil Spill Equipment for a Faster Response” (Read, 1999) at the 1999 International Oil Spill Conference in Seattle, Washington. This paper follows up with the realities of 2-years use.


1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-5
Author(s):  
O. Khalimonov ◽  
S. Nunuparov

ABSTRACT International and domestic experience in the response to major oil spills at sea confirms the vital necessity of a national contingency plan to guarantee effective utilization of national resources and those of assisting countries and organizations. Experience in responding to recent major oil spills underlines deficiencies connected with the shortage of technical means and also with ineffective organization of the response and cooperation of all parties involved. This results in unjustifiable delays in decision making and, finally, in catastrophic damages to the environment. The main principles of the U.S.S.R. national oil spill response plan, currently under consideration for approval, are as follows:involvement of a wide range of national forces and forces of the neighboring countries under preliminary agreed-upon schemes;strengthening and development of appropriate legal instruments to stipulate obligations of the parties involved in pollution response operations;development of a mechanism to reduce impediments to financial, technical, and related agreements required prior to commencement of operations (sources of finances, preliminary approval of the response technology by competent authorities, facilitation of custom procedures);unification of the structure of the U.S.S.R national contingency plan with a view to making it compatible with corresponding plans of neighboring countries following the prototype developed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO);cooperation in the establishment of the international monitoring system, data bank, and computerized exchange of information.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-123
Author(s):  
Yvonne Najah Addassi ◽  
Julie Yamamoto ◽  
Thomas M. Cullen

ABSTRACT The Refugio Oil Spill occurred on May 19, 2015, due to the failure of an underground pipeline, owned and operated by a subsidiary of Plains All-American Pipeline near Highway 101 in Santa Barbara County. The Responsible Party initially estimated the amount of crude oil released at about 104,000 gallons, with 21,000 gallons reaching the ocean. A Unified Command (UC) was established consisting of Incident Commanders from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), Santa Barbara County, and Plains Pipeline with additional participation by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and California State Parks. Within hours, the CDFW closed fisheries and the following day Governor Brown declared a state of emergency for Santa Barbara County. The released oil caused heavy oiling of both on and offshore areas at Refugio State Beach and impacted other areas of Santa Barbara and Ventura. A number of factors created unique challenges for the management of this response. In addition to direct natural resource impacts, the closure of beaches and fisheries occurred days before the Memorial Day weekend resulting in losses for local businesses and lost opportunities for the public. The Santa Barbara community, with its history with oil spills and environmental activism, was extremely concerned and interested in involvement, including the use of volunteers on beaches. Also this area of the coast has significant tribal and archeologic resources that required sensitive handling and coordination. Finally, this area of California’s coast is a known natural seep area which created the need to distinguish spilled from ‘naturally occurring’ oil. Most emergency responses, including oil spills, follow a similar pattern of command establishment, response and cleanup phases, followed by non-response phase monitoring, cleanup and restoration. This paper will analyze the Refugio oil spill response in three primary focus areas: 1) identify the ways in which this spill response was unique and required innovative and novel solutions; 2) identify the ways in which this response benefited from the ‘lessons’ learned from both the Deepwater Horizon and Cosco Busan oil spills; and 3) provide a summary of OSPR’s response evaluation report for Refugio, with specific focus on how the lessons learned and best practices will inform future planning efforts within California.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 513-515
Author(s):  
John H. Giesen ◽  
Jon D. MacArthur

ABSTRACT Faced with training and travel dollar constraints, California's Department of Fish and Game and the 11th U.S. Coast Guard District worked to form a multiorganizational partnership designed to leverage required resources to conduct a premier operational-level oil spill response training program in the state. The partnership included no less than six major organizations from both the public and private sectors, each playing critical roles in planning and conducting the training. Major hurdles overcome were curriculum development and operational support. Both of these challenges were resolved through a unified management approach in which the ultimate objective became success of the course. The lessons learned from the program provide guidance and rationale for future such efforts.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2098-2111
Author(s):  
Kelly Lynn Schnapp ◽  
Joseph Leonard ◽  
Michael Drieu ◽  
Bryan Rogers

ABSTRACT This paper seeks to better prepare the oil spill response community for incorporating well control into a response organization, based on conditional considerations rather than long and firmly held assumptions. Techniques used to control a well, after a blowout, are more closely related to technical well drilling and control activities rather than to operations intended to address oil in the environment. When oil is released from a well in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), response organizers need to consider various factors influencing the organization that may exist at the time. These include a working knowledge of well control by response leadership; strength of responder relationships; and response complexity (to include authority, stakeholder and public expectations). This is particularly true when incorporating the well control support function in the oil spill response operational planning processes, usually facilitated by the Incident Command System (ICS). Within the last three years, complex well control operations were uniquely incorporated into response organizations during two Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GIUEs) and during the DEEPWATER HORIZON incident. Three options will be presented. Considerations for incorporating well control into a response organization will be presented using the case studies noted previously and by comparing similar lessons learned from the salvage industry in the late 1990's. Options presented help demonstrate that response organization flexibility is key to a successful response. This paper seeks to illuminate options surrounding placement of well control within an incident command structure based upon unique incident situational realities.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 457-460 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Harmer

ABSTRACT This paper provides an overview of the incident at the Tupras Oil Refinery in Izmit, Turkey following the August 1999 earthquake, including the scenarios encountered and lessons learned. Oil spill operations are not simply confined to “at-sea incidents” and can be situated within areas of complete devastation, where priority for the cleanup of leaking oil is simply an afterthought. A good example of this would be Kuwait during the Gulf War and the strategic destruction of the oil fields.


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