SECURITY POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR INLAND FACILITIES AND PIPELINES

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 229-232
Author(s):  
Gary Yoshioka ◽  
Ellinor Coder
Keyword(s):  
Security Policy ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Terrorist Attack ◽  
Large Fraction ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Although facilities in the United States have not been subject to major oil spills caused by intentional acts, around the world acts of war and terrorism account for a large fraction of reported major oil spills. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires response plans that address a “worst case discharge;” however, the implementing regulatory agencies did not foresee the possibility of deliberate attacks that could involve multiple storage tanks or several pipeline response zones. In addition, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 highlighted the problems with the current U.S. federal response and contingency plans. The U.S. Coast Guard published a rule that requires operators of marine-transportation-related oil facilities to implement a variety of security measures. Inland facilities and pipelines are generally exempt from the security regulations; nevertheless, those facilities and pipelines can take steps to increase their own security preparedness by emulating the Coast Guard provisions. Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-7, issued on December 17, 2003, identified critical infrastructure sectors and sector-specific agencies to facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sectors. The U.S. Department of Energy is responsible for coordinating the protection of critical infrastructures in the Energy Sector, which includes the production, refining, storage, and distribution of oil. In this paper, we discuss recent trends in Federal requirements and current provisions for oil industry security planning. We highlight types of major oil facilities that need to consider the possibility of a terrorist attack, as well as recommendations by industry groups. We conclude with suggested areas for industry planning improvement.

scholarly journals The Marine Salvage Industry: Proven in Preventing Oil Spills

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 684710
Author(s):  
Jim Elliott
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Recovery ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
New Policies ◽  
The U.S

Abstract The marine salvage industry plays a vital role in protecting the marine environment. Governments, industry and the public, worldwide, now place environmental protection as the driving objective, second only to the safety of life, during a marine casualty response operation. Recognizing over 20 years after the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that the effectiveness of mechanical on-water oil recovery remains at only about 10 to 25 percent while the international salvage industry annually prevents over a million tons of pollutants from reaching the world's oceans, ten years ago the United States began implementing a series of comprehensive salvage and marine firefighting regulations in an effort to improve the nation's environmental protection regime. These regulations specify desired response timeframes for emergency salvage services, contractual requirements, and criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a salvage and marine firefighting service provider. In addition to this effort to prevent surface oil spills, in 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard also recognized the salvage industries advancements in removing oil from sunken ships and recovering submerged pollutants, issuing Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) classification standards for companies that have the capabilities to effectively respond to non-floating oils. Ten years after the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulatory framework, this paper will review the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulations and non-floating oil detection and recovery requirements; analyze the impacts and effectiveness of these new policies; and present several case studies and recommendations to further enhance salvage and oil spill response effectiveness.

Implications of OPA 90 in General and Its Effect on the T-AO 187 Class Oilers in Particular

1994 ◽  
Vol 31 (03) ◽  
pp. 175-182
Author(s):  
Hans Hofmann ◽  
George Kapsilis ◽  
Eric Smith ◽  
Robert Wasalaski
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Structural Changes ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
International Maritime Organization ◽  
The Status ◽  
Oil Tankers ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Hull Construction

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 has mandated that by the year 2015 all oil tankers operating in waters subject to jurisdiction of the United States must have double hulls. This paper examines the Act and the status of regulatory initiatives it has generated. Guidance for new hull construction and retrofit of existing vessels is outlined, and both IMO (International Maritime Organization) and U.S. Coast Guard requirements are discussed. Finally, the structural changes necessary to convert the U.S. Navy's T-AO Class oil tankers to meet the requirements of the Act are specified and illustrated.

OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990: CURE, CATALYST, OR CATASTROPHE1

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 713-717
Author(s):  
Mary G. Holt ◽  
Lindy S. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Marine Environment ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Global Scale ◽  
International Community ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
International Liability ◽  
Double Hull ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Congress departed from the international community to unilaterally enact comprehensive oil spill legislation, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). OPA legislates in several areas not covered by the international liability scheme for oil spills, including requirements for double-hull vessels, manning standards for foreign vessels, vessel response plans, and detailed and extensive provisions for liability for natural resource damages. Thus, it clearly provides better protection for the U.S. marine environment than would the international liability scheme. While OPA has encouraged the international community to take certain steps to provide greater protection, significant differences remain between OPA and the applicable international rules and standards. Protection of the marine environment on a global scale would be increased if the United States and the international community could bridge these differences.

TANK VESSEL PETROLEUM TRANSPORTATION AS A PREDICTOR OF MARINE OIL SPILLS

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-147
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Norton
Keyword(s):  
Marine Environment ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Strong Relationship ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Army Corps ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Annual Volume ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT The annual volume of oil spilled into the marine environment by tank vessels (tank barges and tanks hips) is analyzed against the total annual volume of oil transported by tank vessels in order to determine any correlational relationship. U.S. Coast Guard data was used to provide the volume of oil (petroleum) spilled into the marine environment each year by tank vessels. Data from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Department of Transportation's (US DOT) National Transportation Statistics (NTS) were used for the annual volume of oil transported via tank vessels in the United States. This data is provided in the form of tonnage and ton-miles, respectively. Each data set has inherent benefits and weaknesses. For the analysis the volume of oil transported was used as the explanatory variable (x) and the volume of oil spilled into the marine environment as the response variable (y). Both data sets were tested for correlation. A weak relationship, r = −0.38 was found using tonnage, and no further analysis was performed. A moderately strong relationship, r = 0.79, was found using ton-miles. Further analysis using regression analysis and a plot of residuals showed the data to be satisfactory with no sign of lurking variables, but with the year 1990 being a possible outlier.

Integrated Vessel Response Plan Format

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
West Coast ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Response Planning ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.

Oil Spill Risks from Nontank Vessels1

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-266
Author(s):  
Jean R. Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
West Coast ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Fuel Oil ◽  
Emergency Plan ◽  
Heavy Fuel Oil ◽  
Design Elements ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT An issue of increasing concern worldwide is that of oil spills from nontank vessels that carry large quantities of petroleum product as fuel or lubricants. The New Carissa incident in Oregon in 1999 is only one of several that have impacted the U.S. West Coast in the last few years. Others include the M/V Kuroshima, which grounded in Dutch Harbor, Alaska in 1997, and the M/V Kure, which spilled oil in Humbolt Bay also in 1997. The Tenyo Maru was cut in half in a collision and sank with the loss of one life and a spill of at least 100,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil and diesel in Washington State in 1991. Additional examples of both spills and threats of spills are sited, both in the United States and worldwide. This paper examines a number of actions that have been taken in response to this threat. One such model is the Canadian requirement that vessel owner/operators demonstrate a formal agreement with an approved response contractor, and list that contractor in their Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP). A more comprehensive approach would be to establish approved “umbrella” contingency plans for major port areas, supported by contracts with oil spill removal organizations (OSROs). This preferred model has been adopted by the U.S. West Coast states, and affords the opportunity for the contracted responders to drill with emergency response officials, thus improving the likelihood of an efficient, coordinated spill response. This paper also proposes spill prevention design elements for nontank vessels.

JOINT MEXICO-UNITED STATES OIL SPILL RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS TRAINING ACTIVITIES

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 711-714
Author(s):  
Heather A. Parker-Hall ◽  
Timothy P. Holmes ◽  
Norma A. Hernandez Ramirez
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Hazardous Substances ◽  
Joint Training ◽  
Response Team ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Exercise and evaluation of the Pacific Annex of the Joint Contingency Plan Between the United Mexican States and the United States of America Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons or Other Hazardous Substances (MEXUSPLAN) uncovered a significant need for joint training between spill responders, planners, decision-makers and stakeholders on both sides of our border. Sponsored by U.S. Coast Guard District 11 (USCG Dll) and the Second Mexican Naval Zone (ZN2), a series of training sessions were held for Mexican officials from the Northern Baja California region and Mexico City in early 2003. The first of these well-attended sessions was held in two locations: San Diego, CA and Ensenada, Mexico in February 2003. The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Hazmat facilitated the first session, the Joint Mexico-United States Oil Spill Science Forum. It provided a scientific view of oil spills. The following joint session facilitated by USCG Dll and held in Ensenada was a tabletop exercise designed in preparation for the signing of the MEXUSPAC Annex. Through the use of a spill drill scenario, this session included instruction and dialogue about the roles and responsibilities of both U.S. and Mexican spill responders. Both sessions included presentations from several agencies of the Regional Response Team IX/Joint Response Team: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Dept. of the Interior and California's Office of Spill Prevention and Response. Industry partners also contributed topics of discussion, further complementing the U.S. response landscape. Mexican response agencies, including PEMEX, SAGARPA, SEMARNAT and PROFEPA, provided valuable input ensuring dialogue helping to identify additional joint response gaps. Upon the most significant gaps brought to light was the need for additional information regarding dispersant use by Mexican agencies, particularly in light of the approaching international SONS Exercise in April 2004. To this end, USCG Dll and NOAA HAZMAT developed and presented a modified Ecological Risk Assessment for their Mexican counterparts. Hosted by ZN2 in October 2003, this highly successful workshop brought together many key decision makers, planners and stakeholders from both sides of the border to discuss tradeoffs inherent in the use of existing spill response tools, including dispersants. Joint training and discussion sessions such as these are key to ensuring any measure of success in a joint spill response. Several additional training and discussion topics designed for the Mexican-U.S. joint response forum have been identified with many in the planning phase. Acknowledging the similarities as well as differences in response systems of our two nations' is essential to the success of these joint collaborations. Such continued efforts will help bridge existing gaps.

scholarly journals UNITED STATES COAST GUARD ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY “THEN” AND “NOW”

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 459-461
Author(s):  
Leonard Rich
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Emergency Response ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Recovery ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Security Measures ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Oil Spill Response

ABSTRACT The intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) is to ensure the U.S. Government is prepared to protect the environment from a catastrophic spill of the magnitude and complexity of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill. The OPA90 legislation resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the National Strike Force (NSF), and establishment of District Response Groups who are staffed and equipped with mechanical spill recovery assets and are prepared to take prompt actions to mitigate a worst case discharge scenario. During the early 1990s, over $31 million dollars worth of oil spill response equipment was acquired and placed at 23 locations throughout the United States. Since then, an additional $10 million dollars of environmental emergency response equipment has been added to the USCG'S inventory, and are now located at 16 additional sites. This paper will elaborate on the evolution of the USCG'S environmental emergency response capabilities. In terms of preparedness, it will explain how, where and why the Coast Guard has adjusted its resources and capabilities since the OPA90 legislation. The expanded mission requirements include; redistributing and adjusting the locations of the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems, expanding functional use of the pre-positioned equipment for dewatering during shipboard fires, designing and implementing an offload pumping system for viscous oil at each NSF Strike Team, revisiting the condition and continued use of OPA90 procured first response “band-aid’ equipment, modifying the basic response equipment systems for fast current spill response, and the implementation of the Spilled Oil Recovery System. These actions reflect policy and mission adjustments influenced by an ever changing environment. The Coast Guard has re-organized from the bottom up to meet increased port security measures, and the capability to respond to all-hazard incidents. We must continue to maintain a high state of readiness in the oil spill response environment and accept the need to incorporate change to the equipment and the way we conduct our support to the American public.

THE STATES/BC OIL SPILL TASK FORCEAN—INTERNATIONAL MODEL FOR FORMULATING AND INFLUENCING PUBLIC POLICY

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-265
Author(s):  
Jon Neel ◽  
John Bones ◽  
Elizabeth Dimmick ◽  
Lynn J. Tomich Kent ◽  
Roger Dunstan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
British Columbia ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
International Response ◽  
Regional Coordination

ABSTRACT The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force was established in 1989 to enhance spill coordination among the West Coast states and British Columbia, and to address a number of issues that became apparent during the Nestucca barge and Exxon Valdez oil spills. Task Force members are the directors of the oil spill prevention and response agencies in Alaska, British Columbia, California, Oregon, and Washington. The Task Force has become a national model for facilitating cooperation and building consensus between coastal states and provinces and their federal governments. In October of 1990, the task force issued a report containing a comprehensive set of recommendations addressing oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response. The group had achieved remarkable consensus, and many of the report's recommendations have been included in recent legislation enacted by the member states. The success of the task force's approach to regional coordination has also reduced the need for a proposed Pacific Oceans Resources Interstate Compact, which has been proposed to expand the states' role in areas of regulation that are otherwise federally preempted. The task force has become an effective mechanism for developing vigorous, productive relationships between government agencies, industry, and the public in both the United States and Canada. It has created important linkages between state/provincial and federal regulatory activities; for example, by providing input to Coast Guard and EPA rulemaking that implemented the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. It also assisted in assuring a well-coordinated international response to the July 1991 Tenyo Maru oil spill outside the Strait of Juan De Fuca between Washington and British Columbia. The task force is continuing to advance its goals of promoting public policy on oil spill prevention; cooperative management of major spills by government and industry; protection of the states/provincial rights and their natural and economic resources; and inter-governmental consistency in regulations adopted for oil spill prevention, contingency planning, and resource damage assessment.

International Offers of Assistance Guidelines – Developing an IMO Tool to "Internationalize" Oil Spill Readiness and Response

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 328-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather A. Parker ◽  
Scott R. Knutson ◽  
Andy Nicoll ◽  
Tim Wadsworth
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Guideline Development ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Global Perspective ◽  
National Response ◽  
Response Capacity ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT During the Macondo 252 incident in 2010, it became apparent that the lack of clear guidance to effectively manage the flood of response assistance offered and required from other nations and organizations. To help address these concerns, the U.S. Coast Guard hosted an international ad hoc workgroup after the 2011 International Oil Spill Conference to discuss challenges and issues associated with sharing equipment, technology and expertise among nations and organizations to support a national response authority faced with a significant oil spill exceeding the domestic response capacity. Ideas and recommendations were captured and the need for the development of a comprehensive set of guidelines for International Offers of Assistance (IOA) was formed. The U.S. Coast Guard recognized the importance of establishing these guidelines with a broad, global perspective and proposed the concept to the International Maritime Organization's Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). In July 2011, MEPC approved the proposal submitted by the United States, and added this item to the work program of the Technical Working Group of the IMO Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances (OPRC-HNS TG). The OPRC-HNS TG began this work during its 13th session in March 2012, and continues to conduct the bulk of guideline development during intersessional periods via an International Correspondence Group, comprised of a range of national response authorities, spill contractors and industry representatives from around the world. These international guidelines will be available for use by nations as a tool to assist in managing a multitude of requests for and offers of assistance from other countries, regional coordinating bodies, or other entities. This paper summarizes work already completed and still in progress on the development of the IMO International Offers of Assistance Guidelines for oil spills. The ultimate goal for these Guidelines, once completed within the OPRC-HNS TG and approved by MEPC, will be adoption and utilization by IMO Member States, particularly those that are party to OPRC Convention and to the OPRC-HNS Protocol which require States to establish procedures for international cooperation during pollution incidents.

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