THE STATES/BC OIL SPILL TASK FORCEAN—INTERNATIONAL MODEL FOR FORMULATING AND INFLUENCING PUBLIC POLICY

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-265
Author(s):  
Jon Neel ◽  
John Bones ◽  
Elizabeth Dimmick ◽  
Lynn J. Tomich Kent ◽  
Roger Dunstan ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force was established in 1989 to enhance spill coordination among the West Coast states and British Columbia, and to address a number of issues that became apparent during the Nestucca barge and Exxon Valdez oil spills. Task Force members are the directors of the oil spill prevention and response agencies in Alaska, British Columbia, California, Oregon, and Washington. The Task Force has become a national model for facilitating cooperation and building consensus between coastal states and provinces and their federal governments. In October of 1990, the task force issued a report containing a comprehensive set of recommendations addressing oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response. The group had achieved remarkable consensus, and many of the report's recommendations have been included in recent legislation enacted by the member states. The success of the task force's approach to regional coordination has also reduced the need for a proposed Pacific Oceans Resources Interstate Compact, which has been proposed to expand the states' role in areas of regulation that are otherwise federally preempted. The task force has become an effective mechanism for developing vigorous, productive relationships between government agencies, industry, and the public in both the United States and Canada. It has created important linkages between state/provincial and federal regulatory activities; for example, by providing input to Coast Guard and EPA rulemaking that implemented the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. It also assisted in assuring a well-coordinated international response to the July 1991 Tenyo Maru oil spill outside the Strait of Juan De Fuca between Washington and British Columbia. The task force is continuing to advance its goals of promoting public policy on oil spill prevention; cooperative management of major spills by government and industry; protection of the states/provincial rights and their natural and economic resources; and inter-governmental consistency in regulations adopted for oil spill prevention, contingency planning, and resource damage assessment.

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 684710
Author(s):  
Jim Elliott

Abstract The marine salvage industry plays a vital role in protecting the marine environment. Governments, industry and the public, worldwide, now place environmental protection as the driving objective, second only to the safety of life, during a marine casualty response operation. Recognizing over 20 years after the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that the effectiveness of mechanical on-water oil recovery remains at only about 10 to 25 percent while the international salvage industry annually prevents over a million tons of pollutants from reaching the world's oceans, ten years ago the United States began implementing a series of comprehensive salvage and marine firefighting regulations in an effort to improve the nation's environmental protection regime. These regulations specify desired response timeframes for emergency salvage services, contractual requirements, and criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a salvage and marine firefighting service provider. In addition to this effort to prevent surface oil spills, in 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard also recognized the salvage industries advancements in removing oil from sunken ships and recovering submerged pollutants, issuing Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) classification standards for companies that have the capabilities to effectively respond to non-floating oils. Ten years after the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulatory framework, this paper will review the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulations and non-floating oil detection and recovery requirements; analyze the impacts and effectiveness of these new policies; and present several case studies and recommendations to further enhance salvage and oil spill response effectiveness.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017-102
Author(s):  
Scott Knutson ◽  
Craig Dougans

Abstract number: 2017-102The Salish Sea comprises the North American inland marine waters of Washington State and British Columbia; an international border between Canada and the United States intersects it. Planning for oil spills that threaten to cross the international border is under the jurisdiction of the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) as described in the Canada-United States Joint Marine Contingency Plan. As Canadian companies gain approval to construct new pipelines to move oil-sands-derived crude oil from the landlocked province of Alberta to the tidewater province of British Columbia, governments, agencies and citizens are publicly questioning whether current levels of oil spill preparedness and response equipment will be adequate for the increased tanker traffic from Canadian ports. These stakeholders may likewise be unaware of forthcoming spill prevention and response enhancements, by the Canadian government and industry, associated with new energy infrastructure projects.This paper will expand on a 2014 IOSC paper entitled CANADA – UNITED STATES (SALISH SEA) SPILL RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARISON,1 which was a snapshot of regulations, actual inventories and philosophies that made up the 2014 response picture for the south Salish Sea shared between Canada and the United States. In order to see the entire picture, the reader is encouraged to have both documents at hand.2 The updated paper reviews changes to American Oil Spill Response Organization (OSRO) and Canadian Response organization (RO) equipment inventories, changes to the Canada Shipping Act 2001, Canada's new Oceans Protection Plan (OPP), United States newly implemented non-floating oil ORSO classification, Washington State's oil spill contingency plans and the future buildup of response equipment and personnel.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2146-2158
Author(s):  
Allen R. Thuring

ABSTRACT This paper examines the oil pollution response fund created by Section 311(k) of the 1972 CWA and then modified, culminating with the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) established by OPA. Could the CWA have been successful absent the provision for a federal fund? This Fund is now four decades old. Has it passed the “test of time”? Did it meet the goals set at its birth? Is it still relevant? Should it continue? CWA Section 311 and later OPA created a range of response tools to deal with oil and hazmat spills on the waters of the US. They established a public/private solution to spill response. Key components:An expectation that the spiller was responsible and liable to clean up the spill;The National Contingency Plan and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator/FOSC;Establishing expertise on “special teams”: the CG's National Strike Force and EPA's Emergency Response Team;An up-front trust fund available only to the FOSC that pays for removals if the responsible party (RP) does not step forward. The fund exists to:Pre-empt the RP from using delay as a response option, despite the law.Give the FOSC money to quickly hire private response companies, if the RP does not act or if the spill's origin is a mystery. Equally important, the CWA and OPA did NOT designate a government agency to “clean up” oil spills. Rather, the law envisioned private companies performing that role, paid for by the spillers/RP or the 311(k)/OSLTF Fund, under the oversight of the USCG or the EPA. It tasked the USCG with managing this Fund. The Fund achieved its results. The US has a robust private oil spill removal sector that responsible parties hire when needed. If an RP does not act, the CG and EPA FOSCs use the Fund to mobilize those same companies to remove oil spills on US waters. The US economy has grown, as has the number of oil spills reported. Cases each year requiring Fund use have not increased proportionally. Responsible parties continue to clean up their spills, as the CWA envisioned. The Fund retains its ability to respond simultaneously to major spills, even during Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon. In forty two years, the Fund has always been available for an FOSC directed removal. The opinions stated in this paper are the author's alone, and do not reflect the official policies of the United States Coast Guard.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1327-1332
Author(s):  
Pamela Bergmann ◽  
Nick Russo

ABSTRACT Neither wildlife nor oil spills acknowledge international boundaries. Both migratory birds and marine mammals move freely between Alaska in the United States and British Columbia in Canada, in the international boundary area known as Dixon Entrance in the North Pacific Ocean. An oil spill on one side of the border may be carried by winds and/or currents into the waters of the adjacent country. Recognition of these facts resulted in the development of the Canada/United States Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan, which was signed by the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) in 1974. Annexes were subsequently prepared for five transboundary areas, including Dixon Entrance. Following the promulgation of these annexes, joint exercises have been held to enhance annex implementation. In September 1999, at the request of the USCG and CCG, the U.S. Department of the Interior, Alaska Office of Environmental Policy and Compliance (DOI-OEPC) took the lead in organizing and chairing a workshop to discuss issues associated with wildlife response activities for oil spills that cross the Canada/United States border in Dixon Entrance. The workshop was held in Prince Rupert, British Columbia as part of a 4-day joint meeting. Workshop participants included representatives from key U.S. federal and Alaska State wildlife resource agencies, Canadian federal wildlife resource agencies, oil spill cooperatives for Southeast Alaska and British Columbia, and the USCG. Wildlife resource agency representatives participating in the workshop reached consensus that the goal of wildlife protection is to make decisions based on what is best for the wildlife resources and then to determine how the goal can be accomplished within the constraints of each countries regulatory process. Agreement was reached to form a Canada/United States working group to develop a joint wildlife response plan. The plan, which will focus on migratory birds and sea otters, will address issues associated with the removal of dead oiled wildlife from the environment, hazing of unoiled wildlife, preemptive capture of sea otters, and capture and treatment of oiled migratory birds and sea otters. A draft plan will be developed prior to a September 2000, Canada/U.S. Dixon Entrance (CANUSDIX) joint meeting, which will be held in Ketchikan, Alaska.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 761-765
Author(s):  
William Boland ◽  
Pete Bontadelli

ABSTRACT The Marine Safety Division of the 11th Coast Guard District and the California Office of Oil Spill Prevention and Response are pursuing new avenues to assure that federal, state, and local efforts in California achieve the goals of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990. Coordination of the seven California area committees, publishing detailed area contingency plans, and the implemention of a memorandum of agreement on oil spill prevention and response highlight recent cooperative successes. In 1994 a joint Coast Guard/state/industry incident command system task force drafted an ICS field operations guide and incident action plan forms that meet National Interagency Incident Management System and fire scope ICS requirements.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 655-661
Author(s):  
Heather A. Parker-Hall ◽  
Steve Hampton ◽  
James Haas

ABSTRACT In February 2002, a Unified Command (UC) comprised of the United States Coast Guard (USCG), the California Department of Fish and Game's Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), and other state and federal agencies tested a sample of oil taken from the water near the wreck SS Jacob Luckenbach. Oil from this fifty-year-old wreck, submerged in 176 feet of water 17 miles off San Francisco, matched oil that had impacted thousands of birds and miles of shoreline since November 2001. It also matched oil from mystery spills in this area dating back to 1992. Now that the source of this extensive pollution was found, the next step seemed simple: remove the oil from the vessel. Yet there were many issues surrounding this vessel and its location that required significant cooperation with many agencies and trustees. The Luckenbach is an historic property, protected by the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). It is submerged in the Gulf of Farallones National Marine Sanctuary - one of the most biologically productive regions off the California coast and home to many sensitive resources including several listed species. The UC realized that dialogue with and among the natural resource trustee agencies was crucial to planning balanced operations that would remove the pollution source while providing the utmost protection available to the resources at risk A task force was formed that allowed trustees to engage in discussions about the tradeoffs of initiating removal as quickly as possible while balancing the risk of harm that any incidental release during operations may cause to their resources of concern. One of the most exciting benefits of this cooperative effort was the shift in thinking beyond just responding to the incident to advanced planning of a response that would best enhance restoration and long-term recovery. In many responses, it is not always clear that everyone has the same priorities: the USCG may focus on recovering oil and mitigating damage, the responsible party wants to minimize costs, and the trustees want to protect and restore their resources. In this case, the trustees and USCG were clearly working together toward common goals: removing a source of chronic oil pollution while minimizing environmental impacts from the response.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-62
Author(s):  
Sarah Brace

ABSTRACT Two significant west coast spill incidents, the barge Nestucca spill in B.C. in 1988 and the tanker Exxon Valdez spill of 1989 catalyzed the formal creation of the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, a union of Alaska, California, Oregon, Washington and British Columbia. Hawaii joined 12 years later and for the past 25 years the Task Force member organizations have collaborated on numerous projects and policy initiatives that have significantly influenced how the west coast prevents, prepares for and responds to oil spills. This paper will: 1) Provide an overview of how the Task Force functions and how it fosters collaboration between industry, agencies, and other stakeholders in the region; 2) Highlight key projects and accomplishments from the past two decades, including Transboundary coordination, vessel traffic risk studies, mutual aid agreements, and federal regulatory oversight; and how these projects were initiated and carried out; 3) Offer examples of how the Task Force is looking at challenges ahead, such as the shifting landscape of energy transportation and emerging fuels in the region, and what this means for spill prevention and response.


Author(s):  
Donald W. Davis ◽  
Roland J. Guidry

Immediately after the Exxon Valdez incident, the United States Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was passed. This Act clarified the lines of responsibility associated with future oil spills. In addition to this Federal legislation, Louisiana lawmakers in 1991 enacted the Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act. Financial awards associated with this Act support a wide-range of research activities. Since 1993, 24 projects have been funded. The scope and nature of this research includes: • Oil Spill Awareness through Geoscience Education (OSAGE); • Used Oil Recycling in Louisiana’s Coastal Communities; • Evaluation and Characterization of Sorbents; • Landsat TM and Synthetic Aperture Radar to Facilitate Coastline Delineation; • Environmental Effects and Effectiveness of In-Situ Burning in Wetlands; • Bioremediation Protocol for Small-Scale Oil Spills; • Oil Spill Risk on Louisiana’s Largest Waterway; • River Time-of-Travel Modeling; • Composting Technology for Practical and Safe Remediation of Oil-Spill Residuals; • Predictability of Oceanic and Atmospheric Conditions off the Mississippi Delta; and • Phytoremediation for Oil Spill Cleanup and Habitat Restoration in Louisiana’s Marshes. Each of these projects, and others, are the result of the marriage of industry and university researchers in the identification and solution of applied oil-spill-related problems. The alliance is a good one. Important environmental issues are addressed because the selection process ensures each research initiative has the potential of being implemented by the response community. The work and knowledge gained from these projects is a clear indication of how industry and the university community can function in a collaborative manner to solve important issues — a significant partnership that clearly shows how both can benefit and a model for others to follow.


Author(s):  
Helkei S. Hemminger

Abstract # —1141278 — In 2018, the Canadian government purchased the Trans Mountain pipeline, running from Alberta to British Columbia, along with the plans for expansion. The expansion could triple the transport capacity from 300,000 to 890,000 barrels of oil per day, and would increase the tanker traffic in the inland waterways of the Salish Sea, an area known for its sensitive marine habitat, and narrow, difficult to navigate passages. The anticipated increase in tanker traffic in this busy waterway continues to raise concerns about the impact of an oil spill and the financial means to address related injuries, particularly to natural resources. The transboundary nature of any spill further complicates the situation vis-à-vis the applicable liability regimes and response resources. Under the Canada-United States Joint Marine Contingency Plan (“JCP”), the United States Coast Guard and Canadian Coast Guard acknowledge each country's responsibility to fund their own response actions and pursue reimbursement of those costs within their respective jurisdictions. The availability of funding for a response, and to compensate injured parties, however, including the limits of liability of the responsible party, differs under each regime, and could impact the nature and scope of a response. For spills into or posing a substantial threat to the navigable waters of the United States, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 governs and a national fund, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (“OSLTF”), is immediately available to address an incident, including emergency restoration to natural resources. Canada's Marine Liability Act enables the Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund (“SOPF”) to pay claimants who have incurred damages as a result of oil pollution. Both countries' funds operate under the same principal—the polluter pays—but the compensation structure, and claims processes and procedures are entirely different. This paper provides an overview of these funding sources and claims procedures, comparing and contrasting the different systems. The discussion is meant to provide an overall understanding of potential funding pools available for spill responses under each scheme in order to facilitate transboundary spill planning and discussion.


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