scholarly journals Salvage Companies as OSROs: Benefits and Limitations

Author(s):  
Nicky Cariglia

ABSTRACT Response to oil spills in remote locations have long be limited primarily by logistical considerations. Frequently, issues associated with these cases are driven by lack of infrastructure, preparedness and regional capacity. Whilst year on year the number of significant ship-source oil spills have been on the decrease and global response preparedness has generally improved, in remote areas they still present a challenge which can prolong the response and associated impacts. Correlated with oil spills the salvage industry has also seen a steady decline in the number of major casualties. However, the need for salvage contractors to maintain adequate capacity, infrastructure, equipment and expertise to be able to respond to major casualties as and when they occur still remains. This is especially important with the construction of ever larger vessels. The backdrop of fewer casualties, whilst needing to retain capacity to deal with increasingly complex salvage operations has resulted in an attempt to diversify and expand services provided by salvage contractors. Oil spill response (OSR) has been viewed by some as a natural extension to the salvage industry's remit to prevent pollution from casualties. This is particularly so for remote cases where advanced logistics, the ability to support a large cash-flow and global contacts are key to implement a response. Such regions are less likely to have established OSR organisations able, experienced or large enough to respond to the situation. Several recent cases have demonstrated that salvage contractors could be in a unique position to fill these gaps. However, based on recent experience from several cases where salvage contractors have overseen OSR operations, there are several limitations that should be addressed by these organisations to cement their position in this role. This paper discusses the strengths and weaknesses of salvage contractors in OSR as observed by the authors over several cases and presents lessons learned with general recommendations for such organisations to sustainably complement the OSR sector.

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-123
Author(s):  
Yvonne Najah Addassi ◽  
Julie Yamamoto ◽  
Thomas M. Cullen

ABSTRACT The Refugio Oil Spill occurred on May 19, 2015, due to the failure of an underground pipeline, owned and operated by a subsidiary of Plains All-American Pipeline near Highway 101 in Santa Barbara County. The Responsible Party initially estimated the amount of crude oil released at about 104,000 gallons, with 21,000 gallons reaching the ocean. A Unified Command (UC) was established consisting of Incident Commanders from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), Santa Barbara County, and Plains Pipeline with additional participation by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and California State Parks. Within hours, the CDFW closed fisheries and the following day Governor Brown declared a state of emergency for Santa Barbara County. The released oil caused heavy oiling of both on and offshore areas at Refugio State Beach and impacted other areas of Santa Barbara and Ventura. A number of factors created unique challenges for the management of this response. In addition to direct natural resource impacts, the closure of beaches and fisheries occurred days before the Memorial Day weekend resulting in losses for local businesses and lost opportunities for the public. The Santa Barbara community, with its history with oil spills and environmental activism, was extremely concerned and interested in involvement, including the use of volunteers on beaches. Also this area of the coast has significant tribal and archeologic resources that required sensitive handling and coordination. Finally, this area of California’s coast is a known natural seep area which created the need to distinguish spilled from ‘naturally occurring’ oil. Most emergency responses, including oil spills, follow a similar pattern of command establishment, response and cleanup phases, followed by non-response phase monitoring, cleanup and restoration. This paper will analyze the Refugio oil spill response in three primary focus areas: 1) identify the ways in which this spill response was unique and required innovative and novel solutions; 2) identify the ways in which this response benefited from the ‘lessons’ learned from both the Deepwater Horizon and Cosco Busan oil spills; and 3) provide a summary of OSPR’s response evaluation report for Refugio, with specific focus on how the lessons learned and best practices will inform future planning efforts within California.


1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-91
Author(s):  
Ken Matsumoto

ABSTRACT There are many ways to evaluate the overall performance of an oil spill response operation. There is, or there should be, however, a common standpoint for looking at such operations, irrespective of the size of the spill. Lessons learned through an incident, however trivial, can provide valuable clues to the future improvement of the operation in refineries and oil terminals. But the number of incidents at one location is too few to stand the test of analysis. Evaluation by a variety of methods is now possible based on information and data available through the worldwide news and reporting networks. This paper presents a guideline, which is widely accepted by the Japanese oil industry, for evaluating responses to oil spills, and introduces a concise equation based on the rating of many response elements.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 427-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry A. Romberg ◽  
Dennis M. Maguire ◽  
Richard L. Ranger ◽  
Rod Hoffman

ABSTRACT This paper examines explosion hazards while recovering spilled oil utilizing oil spill recovery barges. The risk of static accumulation and discharge is well understood after thorough investigations of several incidents in the 1970s and 1980s involving explosions on tank barges and vessels during petroleum cargo loading and unloading operations. However, those lessons learned only partially apply to oil spill recovery operations due to the differences in liquid properties, crew training, and additional tasks required during an oil spill response. While regulatory standards have been enacted for petroleum tankers and barges involved in commercial transportation of oil and other hazardous materials, the utility of these standards for oil spill response vessels has not been fully considered. Inverviews were conducted with marine transporters and response organizations to understand the wide range of operational risks and mitigation proceedures currently in use. This paper outlines the four basic conditions that must be present to create a static discharge-induced explosion during liquid cargo operations. A review of explosion casualty history was completed for cargo operations and compared to operations that create similar hazards during oil spill recovery operations. Specific processes that create additional risk of static-induced explosions during response operations were studied to review mitigation actions. Finally, recommendations for continued training are provided to help guide the spill response community when preparing for and responding to oil spills.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 625-629
Author(s):  
Charlie Henry ◽  
Charles E. Sasser ◽  
Guerry O. Holm ◽  
Kevin Lynn ◽  
John Brolin ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT Freshwater marshes cover 4000 square kilometers of the Louisiana coastal zone and are the most abundant marsh habitat type. Many of these marshes actually float as organic mats on underlying water. Some estimates suggest as much as 70% of Louisiana's coastal freshwater marsh are of the floating variety. The slow flow of water characteristic of these environments generally transports very little sediment. As a result, the marsh substrate is composed of primarily live and dead organic matter (peat formation) rather than mineral sediments. Since floating marshes are structurally different than intertidal marsh habitats, many traditional oil spill response options are ineffective or inappropriate. Access to the marsh is often limited since there is no open water ingress and the marsh structure cannot support the weight of equipment. Oil spill response options are further complicated when the source of the oil is a pipeline leak located below the floating marsh mat; spilled oil is free to travel at the interface of the underlying water and mat. Protection booming is impossible. Oil impacts often result in the death of all the living plants that are integral to the formation and sustainability of the habitat. This paper reports on two oil spills in a floating marsh near Paradis, Louisiana that occurred eight years apart. Both spills were spatially close to each other, which provided an excellent comparison for assessing potential long-term impact from oil spills in floating marshes. During both oil spill responses, unique response techniques were developed to recover spilled oil and enhance marsh recovery. An effective technique was to rake away and remove the dead oil-contaminated surface plant debris from the site and employ sorbent recovery. Lessons learned from these responses were used to develop mitigation guidance for future responses.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 693-697
Author(s):  
Tina M. Toriello ◽  
Jan Thorman ◽  
Pamela Bergmann ◽  
Richard Waldbauer

ABSTRACT This paper focuses on industry and government roles for addressing historic properties during oil spill response. In 1997, the National Response Team (NRT) developed a Programmatic Agreement on Protection of Historic Properties during Emergency Response under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (PA) (National Response Team, 1997). At the 1999 International Oil Spill Conference (IOSC), U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) representatives discussed the development and implementation of the PA, which is intended to ensure that historic properties are appropriately taken into account during the planning for and conducting of emergency response to oil spills and hazardous substance releases. Following the 1999 IOSC, DOI and Chevron representatives began a dialog regarding industry and government roles under the PA. Chevron invited the DOI representatives to participate in an October 1999 large-scale, industry-led spill exercise; a precedent-setting drill that included historic properties protection as a key objective. This 2001 paper focuses on how industry and government have worked together to protect historic properties, government roles in PA implementation, and lessons learned. As an example of what industry can do to support the protection of historic properties during planning and response activities, this paper describes Chevron's Historic Properties Program, a program managed under its emergency spill response environmental functional team (EFT). A discussion of lessons learned focuses on the need for clear definition of industry and government roles, and the benefits of building a foundation of cooperation between industry and government to protect historic properties. Of particular importance is the inclusion of historic properties in all aspects of oil spill preparedness and response, including planning, drills, training, and response organization structure and staffing. Experience from incident response in Alaska has shown that the PA assists Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSCs) and responsible parties, while also protecting historic properties, when the FOSC is prepared to implement the PA promptly and effectively.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Rudder ◽  
Derval Barzey ◽  
Amy Ramlal ◽  
Shaleni Gopie ◽  
Ronald Alfred

Abstract The Ministry of Energy and Energy Industries assessed the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan of Trinidad and Tobago (NOSCP, 2013) for its effectiveness as a preparedness and response mechanism. Using the Readiness Evaluation Tool for Oil Spills (RETOS™), the NOSCP attained a score of 42% in the Level A Assessment. Gaps were identified in areas including National Legislation, Risk Management, Logistics, Training and Exercises, and Operational Response. Further, lessons learned from past spills were examined to highlight deficiencies in oil spill response (OSR) planning and readiness. Proposed updates to the NOSCP include: designation of appropriate Lead Agency depending on the nature of the spill scenario, mandating Oil Spill Risk Assessments, and the use of SIMA as a decision-making tool for oil spill response; development of comprehensive guidelines for Dispersant Use, Oiled Wildlife Response and Oil Spill Waste Management. The NOSCP is being re-designed to facilitate a national response management system that meets best management practice for oil spill contingency planning. This will enable the efficient and effective deployment of the appropriate resources (equipment, expertise and oversight) to mitigate impacts to human health and the environment, and minimize production down time and socio-economic costs.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dale Ferriere

ABSTRACT Lessons learned from past U.S. oil spill response histories show that prudent waste management principles have not been a primary consideration in making decisions for tactical response to major open-water oil spills. Contingency planners (government and industry) consistently choose a mechanical response strategy usually resulting in significant shoreline impact and waste generation (secondary pollution from response actions). Generally, the Environmental Protection Agency's waste minimization hierarchy is not used when managing a major open-water oil spill, subsequent cleanup of oiled shorelines, response to oiled wildlife, and final disposal of oily waste. Contingency plans do not adequately weigh the ecological ramifications from response-generated waste and response-generated pollution when deciding how to protect the environment. This paper shows how the EPA's waste minimization hierarchy should be used during all phases of an oil spill response: strategic planning, tactical planning, and response execution.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 1015-1016
Author(s):  
Bernard Bennett

ABSTRACT Achieving and maintaining preparedness for oil spill response is similar to other emergency services in that constant training is required to achieve success. Careful consideration of what training is required must be conducted through systematic task and training needs analysis. Only then can the methods and suppliers of such training be selected. Once initiated, the training must be maintained, reinforced, and updated through exercises or other schemes. This paper looks at some lessons learned from conducting oil spill training and concludes that emergency response training for oil spills can be financially justifiable.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 1388-1399
Author(s):  
Wade A. Narin van Court ◽  
Mark B. Robinson

ABSTRACT Oil terminals maintain and assess their oil spill response readiness by conducting drills and exercises in general accordance with the Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) guidelines; however, they often do not realize the full benefits of the time and effort they invest in their exercise programs. Specifically, the way many terminals conduct and evaluate their drill and exercise programs does not provide an in-depth understanding of the capabilities and competencies of their personnel and their response contractors. URS Corporation (URS) recently performed a meta-analysis of tabletop exercises (TTX), equipment deployment exercises (EDX), and unannounced spill equipment deployment drills (UDD) that we facilitated at terminals around the United States. The meta-analysis was performed as a combined review of the after action reports from the various exercises to identify common lessons learned and areas for improvement. Specifically, the objective of the meta-analysis was to develop recommendations, based on an in-depth understanding of the identified common lessons learned and insights from our exercise facilitators, to enhance or improve terminals' oil spill response performance when implemented in the design of future drills and exercises. Based on our study, URS identified and developed recommendations to address the following areas for improvement: training/exercises did not build on previous efforts; TTX were “walk through” or discussion type of exercises and not conducted in “real time”; UDD were conducted in similar ways each time and did not “stress the system”; exercises and drills did not involve upper level (e.g., regional or corporate) personnel who may have significant roles in the response; terminal personnel did not have relationships with staff of industries, contractors, and/or agencies in their area; terminal personnel were not familiar with the Geographic Response Plans or Area Contingency Plans for their area; and exercise programs and post-exercise reviews and critiques did not effectively assess all 15 response plan components. By implementing the recommendations from our meta-analysis, terminals can expect to obtain significantly greater benefits in terms of competence and confidence to respond to oil spills for a modest investment in additional time, cost, and effort.


Author(s):  
Alexander Ermolov ◽  
Alexander Ermolov

International experience of oil spill response in the sea defines the priority of coastal protection and the need to identify as most valuable in ecological terms and the most vulnerable areas. Methodological approaches to the assessing the vulnerability of Arctic coasts to oil spills based on international systems of Environmental Sensitivity Index (ESI) and geomorphological zoning are considered in the article. The comprehensive environmental and geomorphological approach allowed us to form the morphodynamic basis for the classification of seacoasts and try to adapt the international system of indexes to the shores of the Kara Sea taking into account the specific natural conditions. This work has improved the expert assessments of the vulnerability and resilience of the seacoasts.


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