scholarly journals Budget Deficits and Fiscal Adjustments under Fragmented Decision Making: New Evidence on an Old Discussion

2021 ◽  
pp. 85-97
Author(s):  
Panagiotis Palaios
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Budget Deficits ◽  
Heterogeneous Preferences ◽  
Fiscal Deficits ◽  
Institutional Effects ◽  
Fiscal Adjustment ◽  
Fiscal Adjustments ◽  
New Evidence

The purpose of this paper is to present the existing literature of political explanations for budget deficits and fiscal adjustments. The literature is distinguished initially in two broad categories, namely the effects of conflicts among agents with heterogeneous preferences and institutional effects. At the next stage the category of conflicts among agents is further distinguished in two approaches, namely political stability approach and weak government approach. The existing literature confirms that political instability leads to the strategic use of debt and therefore to higher fiscal deficits. Institutions are proved to contribute positively to the success of fiscal adjustments. However, interest groups with political power and the risk aversion character of politicians imply that fiscal adjustment is usually delayed and more costly.

Interest Groups and Political Integration: the 1972 EEC Decisions in Norway and Denmark

1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Leslie
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Political Integration ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Conflicting Evidence ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
Geographical Expansion ◽  
New Evidence ◽  
Interest Organizations

The article examines four themes of Robert J. Lieber's article in the APSR of March 1972: “Interest Groups and Political Integration: British Entry into Europe,” bringing in new evidence from the Norwegian and Danish EEC decisions of 1972. The conclusions are that:—(a) there is conflicting evidence regarding the applicability of functionalist theories of political integration to the geographical expansion of an existing union;(b) the attempt to link theories of interest group activity and theories of political integration is based on a premature if not unwise generalization about decision-making processes within interest organizations;(c) politicization (as Lieber defines it) is inherently neither favorable nor unfavorable to integration; and(d) in discussing political integration, the distinction between “high” politics (Hoffman) and welfare considerations is best abandoned, provided the observer remembers that there are more dimensions to critical decisions than the economic.The article concludes with the suggestion that there are slim prospects for developing a theory of political integration applicable to the creation or extension of a union, and that the appropriate “vocation” for such a theory is to elucidate the workings of political systems which have two or more “levels” of political authorities.

scholarly journals La complexité de valeurs dans la politique étrangère de l'administration Reagan face à l'Iran

2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 533-551
Author(s):  
André Lecours
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Middle East ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
Policy Issue ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Classic Problem ◽  
A Value ◽  
Complexity Problem

The formulation of a policy that will satisfy several values and interests more or less compatible is a classic problem of political decision making. This phenomenon by which there can be, in a foreign policy issue for example, several divergent values and interests was named value-complexity by Alexander George. When facing a value complexity problem, a decision maker must choose some values and some interests over others. The choice he makes will not necessarily be the one made by other decision makers. This can result in a serious impediment to the decision making process. The American foreign policy towards the Middle East faced, for the major part of the Cold War era, a value-complexity problem because it looked to reconcile four hard-to reconcile values and interests. The Reagan government was confronted rather acutely with this problem in the making of its Iranian policies. The administration was split in at least two factions over Iran : one who thought primarily of containing the Soviet Union in the Middle East region and the other for whom the political stability of moderate regimes threatened by revolutionnary Iran should be the most important priority. The existence of these factions, consequence of value-complexity, produced the making and the implementation of two distinct Iranian policies.

scholarly journals Member influence in cooperatives: Contributions of Scandinavian studies to the research conducted in the United States

1984 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-129
Author(s):  
Petri Ollila
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
The United States ◽  
External Factors ◽  
West Germany ◽  
Individual Factors ◽  
Internal Factors ◽  
Major Interest ◽  
Interest Organizations

This literature review summarizes research on member influence in cooperatives conducted in Scandinavia and some of the research conducted in West Germany. The review divides the contents of member influence into three components; individual factors, the cooperative organization’s internal factors and the organization’s external factors. As individual factors, participation, representation and representativeness are considered. Conflicts in cooperative organizations, the effect of the growth of the organization and the rules of decision making are discussed as organizations internal factors. The major interest groups in addition to members (the market, personnel and the society) are presented as external factors. The external factors are increasingly challenging the nature of cooperatives as member interest organizations.

scholarly journals Orçamento público, ajuste fiscal e administração consensual

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessé Torres Pereira Junior ◽  
Thaí­s Boia Marçal
Keyword(s):  
Public Administration ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Public Budget ◽  
Fiscal Responsibility ◽  
Fiscal Adjustment ◽  
Fiscal Adjustments ◽  
The Right

<p><strong>ORÇAMENTO PÚBLICO, AJUSTE FISCAL E ADMINISTRAÇÃO CONSENSUAL </strong></p><p><strong>Resumo:</strong> O estado pós-moderno compromete-se a efetivar os direitos fundamentais que a Constituição assegura aos cidadãos, sem exclusão, entre eles o direito à boa administração pública. É instrumento de conformação desta, no direito público contemporâneo brasileiro, a Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal, cuja edição completa 15 anos e em face da qual se promovem ajustes conciliadores das leis orçamentárias com a realidade socioeconômica em permanente mutação. Ajustes que devem resultar do diálogo entre as instituições representativas da sociedade, de sorte a conduzir a escolhas que serão tanto mais eficientes quanto pautadas na consensualidade.</p><p><strong>Palavras-chaves:</strong> Orçamento público. Ajuste fiscal. Administração pública dialógica. Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal.</p><p><strong>PUBLIC BUDGET, FISCAL ADJUSTMENT AND CONSENSUAL ADMINISTRATION</strong></p><p><strong>Abstract:</strong> The postmodern state is guided to achieve fundamental rights, including the right for a good public administration. In such purpose, and to enable respect for fiscal responsibility law, it is imperative to carry out fiscal adjustments that allow the adequacy of budget laws to contemporaneous not stable socioeconomic contexts. These adjustments ought to be based on dialogue among institutions, in order to improve efficient choices grounded on consensualism.</p><p><strong>Keywords:</strong> Public budget. Fiscal adjustment. Dialogic public administration. Fiscal responsibility law.</p><p><strong>Data da submissão:</strong><strong> </strong>26/03/2016<strong>                   Data da aprovação: </strong>06/04/2016<strong></strong></p>

Democracy in the Firm

2021 ◽  
pp. 38-59
Author(s):  
Hervé Crès ◽  
Mich Tvede
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Optimal Rate ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Democratic Principle ◽  
The Social ◽  
Decision Making Problem

The problem of collective decision-making arising from market failures is addressed using the democratic principle applied within the assembly of shareholders. A basic requirement is imposed (the Pareto principle): collective choices should not be at odds with the interests of all shareholders, as expressed by their preferences. This requirement puts bounds on what the collective can choose: it should remain within the set of averages of what the shareholders want. Further refining these bounds, a notion of political stability is proposed; it is defined with respect to (super) majority voting. One searches for the smallest rate of super majority for which a stable collective choice exists. This optimal rate is reviewed under classical assumptions from the social choice literature. It is shown how the dimensionality of the collective decision-making problem and the polarization of the electorate critically impact political stability, and hence the optimal rate of super majority.

Legislative Decision-Making

2021 ◽  
pp. 83-108
Author(s):  
Neilan S. Chaturvedi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Logic Model ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Interview Data ◽  
Party Leadership ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Voting Decisions ◽  
Legislative Decision

Chapter 4 examines the logic used by moderates in determining how to vote on legislation. Using interview data from six retired senators, Chapter 4 examines the pressures they face, both within the chamber with party leadership and outside the chamber with constituents and interest groups. While conventional wisdom would dictate that moderates vote only for legislation that they find palatable, and vote against all else, using data collected by Project Vote Smart capturing the issue positions of many senators, we see that all too often this is not the case—centrists get “railroaded” by leaders and vote with the majority, even when the legislation goes against their stated position. Using voting decisions on key votes and publicly stated positions by senators, the chapter then creates a logic model that illustrates how moderates decide how to vote on legislation.

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