scholarly journals What Should We Believe About Belief?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-35
Author(s):  
Neil Levy
Keyword(s):  
Dual Process ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
Psychological Literature ◽  
Important Phenomenon ◽  
The Rich

This chapter aims to set the scene. First, it sets out why we should about beliefs, and about beliefs. To this end, it surveys some of the rich philosophical and psychological literature on how beliefs are acquired and updated. Second, it aims to show that the existing literature, illuminating though it is, doesn’t adequately explain how and why we come to believe what we do and act as we do. Against philosophers and cognitive scientists who argue that beliefs matter less than we might think, or that people have more accurate beliefs than they sometimes let on, the chapter argues that people’s beliefs matter for their behavior and that bad beliefs are an important phenomenon. It then goes on to review explanations of bad belief stemming from or inspired by dual process accounts of human reasoning. It argues that these accounts face difficulties significant enough to warrant developing an alternative account of belief formation.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Pat Croskerry
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Clinical Decision Making ◽  
Clinical Medicine ◽  
Medical Training ◽  
Clinical Decision ◽  
Current Medical ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Clinical Detail ◽  
The Rich

Medical error is one of the leading causes of death, and most of these errors appear to occur in the ways that practitioners’ thoughts and feelings impact their decision making. Major gains have been made in the cognitive sciences in the past few decades that have provided a model for understanding how decisions are made—dual process theory. It is an excellent platform on which to examine the different ways decisions are made. Importantly, it allows for the examination of the pervasive influence of cognitive and affective biases on clinical decision making. Current medical training appears to fall short of what is needed to produce rational decision makers, due to what has been referred to as a mindware gap. Practitioners need to move from routine expertise to a higher level of expertise that will close this gap. A clear difficulty lies in finding ways of understanding and teaching the clinical decision-making process that do not violate the ecological characteristics of real-time clinical practice. By preserving as much as possible the rich clinical detail that makes up clinical medicine, this book attempts to offer important insights into the process.

scholarly journals Individual differences in anchoring effect: Evidence for the role of insufficient adjustment

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Predrag Teovanović
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Process ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Systematic Effect ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Anchoring Effect ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories

Although the anchoring effect is one of the most reliable results of experimental psychology, researchers have only recently begun to examine the role of individual differences in susceptibility to this cognitive bias. Yet, first correlational studies yielded inconsistent results, failing to identify any predictors that have a systematic effect on anchored decisions. The present research seeks to remedy methodological shortcomings of foregoing research by employing modified within-subject anchoring procedure. Results confirmed the robustness of phenomenon in extended paradigm and replicated previous findings on anchor’s direction and distance as significant experimental factors of the anchoring effect size. Obtained measures of individual differences in susceptibility to anchoring were fairly reliable but shared only small portion of variability with intelligence, cognitive reflection, and basic personality traits. However, in a group of more reflective subjects, substantial negative correlation between intelligence and anchoring was detected. This finding indicates that, at least for some subjects, effortful cognitive process of adjustment plays role in the emergence of the anchoring effect, which is in line with expectations of dual-process theories of human reasoning.

scholarly journals Logic, Fast and Slow: Advances in Dual-Process Theorizing

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 503-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wim De Neys ◽  
Gordon Pennycook
Keyword(s):  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Thought Processes ◽  
Dual Process Models ◽  
Process Characterization ◽  
System 2 ◽  
Reasoning Tasks ◽  
System 1

Studies on human reasoning have long established that intuitions can bias inference and lead to violations of logical norms. Popular dual-process models, which characterize thinking as an interaction between intuitive (System 1) and deliberate (System 2) thought processes, have presented an appealing explanation for this observation. According to this account, logical reasoning is traditionally considered as a prototypical example of a task that requires effortful deliberate thinking. In recent years, however, a number of findings obtained with new experimental paradigms have brought into question the traditional dual-process characterization. A key observation is that people can process logical principles in classic reasoning tasks intuitively and without deliberation. We review the paradigms and sketch how this work is leading to the development of revised dual-process models.

scholarly journals The Bright Homunculus in our Head: Individual Differences in Intuitive Sensitivity to Logical Validity

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omid Ghasemi ◽  
Simon Handley ◽  
Stephanie Howarth
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Processing Time ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Logical Validity ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Deliberative Reasoning

Classic dual process theories of human reasoning attribute explicit reasoning to effortful, deliberative thinking. According to these models, intuitive processes lack any access to the formal rules of logic and probability and hence rely exclusively on superficial problem features to determine a response. However, in recent years, researchers have demonstrated that reasoners are able to solve simple logical or probabilistic problems relatively automatically, a capability which has been called ‘logical intuition’. In four experiments, we instructed participants to judge the validity (Experiment 1 and 4), likeability (Experiment 1, 2, and 3) and brightness (Experiment 2, 3, and 4) of the conclusion to several reasoning problems. Participants were also asked to complete a range of individual differences measures, drawing on cognitive ability and cognitive style, in order to evaluate the extent to which ‘logical intuitions’ were linked to measures of deliberative reasoning. The results showed that participants judged the conclusion of logically valid statements to be more valid, more likable and more physically bright. Participants with higher cognitive ability and unlimited processing time showed greater effects of logical validity in their liking judgments. However, these effects were absent in the brightness tasks, suggesting that logic effects observed under instructions to judge conclusion brightness are a purer measure of ‘logical intuition’. We discuss the implications of our findings for recent dual process theories of human reasoning.

Dual Processing in Reasoning

2006 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 428-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wim De Neys
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Working Memory Capacity ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Processing ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Reasoning Task ◽  
Reasoning System ◽  
Processing Demands ◽  
Correct Reasoning

Human reasoning has been characterized as an interplay between an automatic belief-based system and a demanding logic-based reasoning system. The present study tested a fundamental claim about the nature of individual differences in reasoning and the processing demands of both systems. Participants varying in working memory capacity performed a reasoning task while their executive resources were burdened with a secondary task. Results were consistent with the dual-process claim: The executive burden hampered correct reasoning when the believability of a conclusion conflicted with its logical validity, but not when beliefs cued the correct response. However, although participants with high working memory spans performed better than those with lower spans in cases of a conflict, all reasoners showed similar effects of load. The findings support the idea that there are two reasoning systems with differential processing demands, but constitute evidence against qualitative individual differences in the human reasoning machinery.

EXPRESS: The Bright Homunculus in our Head: Individual Differences in Intuitive Sensitivity to Logical Validity

2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110446
Author(s):  
Omid Ghasemi ◽  
Simon J Handley ◽  
Stephanie Howarth
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Processing Time ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Logical Validity ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Deliberative Reasoning

Classic dual process theories of human reasoning attribute explicit reasoning to effortful, deliberative thinking. According to these models, intuitive processes lack any access to the formal rules of logic and probability and hence rely exclusively on superficial problem features to determine a response. However, in recent years, researchers have demonstrated that reasoners are able to solve simple logical or probabilistic problems relatively automatically, a capability which has been called ‘logical intuition’. In four experiments, we instructed participants to judge the validity (Experiments 1 and 4), likeability (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and physical brightness (Experiments 2, 3, and 4) of the conclusion to several reasoning problems. Brightness judgments were made by evaluating the font shade brightness of the argument’s conclusion. Participants were also asked to complete a range of individual differences measures, drawing on cognitive ability and cognitive style, in order to evaluate the extent to which ‘logical intuitions’ were linked to measures of deliberative reasoning. The results showed that participants judged the conclusion of logically valid statements to be more valid, more likable and more physically bright. Participants with higher cognitive ability and unlimited processing time showed greater effects of logical validity in their liking judgments (varied across experiments). However, these effects were absent in the brightness tasks, suggesting that logic effects observed under instructions to judge conclusion brightness are a purer measure of ‘logical intuition’. We discuss the implications of our findings for recent dual process theories of human reasoning.

Interlude: Context and Common Ground

2021 ◽  
pp. 75-82
Author(s):  
Una Stojnić
Keyword(s):  
Common Ground ◽  
Discourse Structure ◽  
Ground Model ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
Cooperative Response ◽  
Linguistic Conventions ◽  
The Rich

An influential alternative account of context that likewise models context as a body of information that changes with an evolving discourse is Stalnakerian common ground model. On this model, however, the context is projected from a body of information mutually accepted by the interlocutors for the purposes of a conversation—a common ground. While the context constantly changes, these changes simply reflect the agents’ rational and cooperative response to manifest evidence. Might one attempt to assimilate the kinds of effects on prominence simply to such rational responses to manifest evidence? Might we then do without the rich discourse structure posited in this chapter? It is argued here that this account would be empirically inadequate, failing to capture the special status linguistic conventions have when weighed against our overall evidence.

Belief and Acceptance for the Study of Religion

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bosco B. Bae
Keyword(s):  
Implicit Bias ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Religious Behavior ◽  
Psychological Literature ◽  
Dual Process Models ◽  
The Relationship

“Belief” in the study of religion has been vexed by complexities underlying the relationship between language, cognition, and religious behavior. Drawing on anthropological, sociological, and psychological literature, this article discusses the degrees and textures of “belief” to highlight the inadequacies of language and the variety of motivations for participating in rituals. Particular emphasis is given to discrimination, implicit bias, and the issue of discrepancy. The article argues that dual-process models of cognition provide a richer account of “belief” and then goes on to map an epistemological distinction between belief and acceptance as a viable methodology for the investigation of “belief” in the study of religion.

The incommensurability of emergence and modularity in complex systems: A comment on Wastell (2014)

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 559-567 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis H. Favela ◽  
Mary Jean Amon ◽  
Marieke M. J. W. van Rooij
Keyword(s):  
Complex Systems ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
State Transitions ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Modular Systems ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Systems Framework ◽  
Interaction Problem

To answer the interaction problem, dual-process theories of reasoning must explain how seemingly disparate reasoning systems affect each other and underlie the apparent unity of subjective experience. Wastell (2014) proposes complex emergence modular theory, which asserts that complex virtual reasoning modules emerge from basic reasoning modules. We contend that Wastell’s proposal fails to address the interaction problem. First, we claim that the attempt to integrate emergence with virtual modules proliferates the interaction problem instead of solving it. Second, we argue that there is no interaction problem in human reasoning if “emergence” is employed in accordance with typical applications of complex systems theory in cognitive science and psychology. Alternatively, we suggest that in order to understand human reasoning within a complex systems framework, researchers should forego conceiving of reasoning as informationally encapsulated modular systems, and instead investigate system state transitions.

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