The Philosophical Significance of Kohut's Theory of the Self

The author seeks to articulate the philosophical significance of Heinz Kohut's original theory of the self by showing (a) how it explains the basis of our ability to create and be motivated by personal ideals; (b) how it transforms our understanding of ethical life by showing why it is in one's self-interest to become an empathic, respectful person who embodies the moral virtues as articulated by Aristotle; and (c) how it reverberates with profound insights into what it means to be human by some of the most esteemed philosophers in the Western philosophic tradition, especially Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and Nietzsche. The author concludes by critically responding to the intersubjectivist critique of Stolorow and Atwood that Kohut's notion of “self” is a reified, metaphysical concept.

Why are You Proud of That?

Cognitivism about the emotions is the view that emotions involve judgments (or quasi-judgmental cognitive states) that we could, in principle, articulate without reference to the emotions themselves. D’Arms and Jacobson (2003) argue that no such articulation is available in the case of “possessive” emotions, such as pride and guilt, and, so, cognitivism (in regard to such emotions, at least) is false. This article proposes and defends a cognitivist account of our partiality to the objects of our pride. I argue that taking pride in something requires judging that your relation to that thing indicates that your life accords with some of your personal ideals. This cognitivist account eschews glossing pride in terms of one’s “possession” of what one is proud of and, so, escapes D’Arms and Jacobson’s critique. I motivate this account by critically assessing the most sophisticated possession-based account of pride in the literature, found in Gabriele Taylor (1985).

Teachers as Caretakers

Student-centered learning communities require intentionality, reflection, and an endearing commitment to care. This chapter demonstrates that despite years of experience teachers can still experience disillusionment when the ideals they hold tightly are challenged. During times of disillusionment and struggle it can become easier to let go of personal ideals of care for individual students, the collective learning community, and for teacher's self-care. However, students are competent human beings who can rise to the challenge of caring for each other in beautiful ways, reminding us all of the importance of student-centered learning.

Moral Requirements and Permissions, and the Requirements and Permissions of Reason

This chapter offers an account of personal ideals that sheds light on the relationship between the imperatives of morality and the imperatives of rationality. Many people endorse the ideal of treating others “with concern and respect” in such a way as to accommodate one’s other ideals. Living up to this accommodationist ideal closely approximates doing what one takes oneself to have sufficient reason to do, all things considered. In contrast, the requirements one must satisfy in order to live up to one’s nonaccommodationist ideals do not have a claim to be the requirements of rationality because they do not take the normative significance of other ideals into account. Accommodationist and nonaccommodationist ideals give rise to different forms of incoherence. To appreciate the ways in which our ideals fail to form a perfect unity is to appreciate the extent to which coherence is also a substantive ideal.

The Wisdom in Virtue: Pursuit of Virtue Predicts Wise Reasoning About Personal Conflicts

Most people can reason relatively wisely about others’ social conflicts, but often struggle to do so about their own (i.e., Solomon’s paradox). We suggest that true wisdom should involve the ability to reason wisely about both others’ and one’s own social conflicts, and we investigated the pursuit of virtue as a construct that predicts this broader capacity for wisdom. Results across two studies support prior findings regarding Solomon’s paradox: Participants ( N = 623) more strongly endorsed wise-reasoning strategies (e.g., intellectual humility, adopting an outsider’s perspective) for resolving other people’s social conflicts than for resolving their own. The pursuit of virtue (e.g., pursuing personal ideals and contributing to other people) moderated this effect of conflict type. In both studies, greater endorsement of the pursuit of virtue was associated with greater endorsement of wise-reasoning strategies for one’s own personal conflicts; as a result, participants who highly endorsed the pursuit of virtue endorsed wise-reasoning strategies at similar levels for resolving their own social conflicts and resolving other people’s social conflicts. Implications of these results and underlying mechanisms are explored and discussed.

The Wisdom in Virtue: Pursuit of Virtue Predicts Wise Reasoning about Personal Conflicts

Most people can reason relatively wisely about others’ social conflicts, but often struggle to do so about their own (i.e., Solomon’s Paradox; Grossmann & Kross, 2014). We suggest that true wisdom should involve the ability to reason wisely about others’ and one’s own social conflicts. The present studies investigate the pursuit of virtue as a construct that predicts this broader capacity for wisdom. Results across two studies support prior Solomon’s Paradox findings: participants (N = 623) expressed greater wisdom (e.g., intellectual humility, adopting outsider’s perspectives) about others’ social conflicts than their own. The pursuit of virtue (e.g., pursuing personal ideals and contributing to others) moderated these results. In both studies, high virtue pursuit was associated with a greater endorsement of wise reasoning strategies for one’s own personal conflicts, reducing the discrepancy in wise reasoning between one’s own and others’ social conflicts. Implications and mechanisms are explored and discussed.