The Concepts of Spiel (playing) и Kampf (struggle) within the Structure of the Conceptual Sphere of Power in the German Philosophic Tradition

В статье рассматривается семантическое пространство концептов “Spiel” («игра») и “Kampf” («борьба»), которое, как показало исследование, достаточно полно и системно структурировано. Концептосфера “Spiel” («игра») и “Kampf” («борьба») выявлена по базисным пропозициям с опорой на лексическое значение слов и контексты их употребления в соответствии с репрезентациями пяти базисных фреймов: предметного, акционального, посессивного, идентификационного, компаративного. Количественное измерение концептов определяется в соответствии с лексикографическим описанием: оппозиция форм единственного и множественного числа зафиксирована в словарях и подтверждается в корпусе выбранных для анализа текстов и языковых контекстов. В квалитативном, качественном, отношении концепты оцениваются нейтрально. Локативные характеристики представлены у концепта “Spiel”. В схемах контактного действия “Spiel” («игра») и “Kampf” («борьба») выступают в нескольких ролях — объекта и медиатива. В качестве субъектов “Spiel” («игра») и “Kampf” («борьба») выступают базовые концепты “Kraft” («сила») и “Macht” («власть»). Ханна Арендт определяет борьбу в качестве родового признака политики — «борьба за власть» (ради власти). Борьба в ее представлении может выступать родовым признаком жизни (Leben). Мишель Фуко определял власть через родовой признак — как игру (Spiel), которая в непрерывных столкновениях и противостояниях (Kämpfen) соотношение сил преобразует, усиливает и извращает. Борьба (Kampf), по мнению Фуко, выступает средством игры (Spiel), в определенном смысле — ее формой. The paper examines semаntic space occupied by the concepts of “Spiel” («game») and “Kampf” («struggle»), which, as the research shows, is comprehensively and systemically structured. The conceptual sphere of “Spiel” and “Kampf” is elicited with consideration of the basic propositions, proceeding from the lexical meaning of the words and the contexts of their usage, according to the representations of the five basic frames (subject-focused, actional, possessive, identificational, comparative). The quantitative evaluation of the concepts is determined according to their lexicographic descriptions: opposition of the singular and plural forms is registered in dictionaries and confirmed by the corpus of texts and language contexts selected for analysis. From the qualitative and quantitative perspectives, the concepts are assessed neutrally. Locative characteristics are found in the concept of “Spiel”. In the patterns of contact interaction, “Spiel” and “Kampf” perform several roles — those of the object and the mediative. The role of the Subject for “Spiel” and “Kampf” is performed by the basic concepts of “Kraft” (force) and “Macht” (power). Hannah Arendt sees struggle as the generic feature of politics — “struggle for power” (for the sake of power). And power, as she sees it, might act as the generic feature of life (Leben). Michel Foucault defined power by its generic feature as a game (Spiel), which, in the course of incessant conflicts and oppositions, transforms, enhances or distorts the balance of powers. Struggle (Kampf), from Foucault’s viewpoint, is a means of playing (Spiel), and, in a certain sense, is its form.

The Philosophical Significance of Kohut's Theory of the Self

The author seeks to articulate the philosophical significance of Heinz Kohut's original theory of the self by showing (a) how it explains the basis of our ability to create and be motivated by personal ideals; (b) how it transforms our understanding of ethical life by showing why it is in one's self-interest to become an empathic, respectful person who embodies the moral virtues as articulated by Aristotle; and (c) how it reverberates with profound insights into what it means to be human by some of the most esteemed philosophers in the Western philosophic tradition, especially Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and Nietzsche. The author concludes by critically responding to the intersubjectivist critique of Stolorow and Atwood that Kohut's notion of “self” is a reified, metaphysical concept.

Collectivisation image in Soviet cinema of 1930s: philosophical analysis

The article analyses the character of the collectivization image in Soviet cinema of the 1930s. The comparison of the films of S. Eisenstein, G. Aleksandrov, A. Medvedkin, A. Dovzhenko, F. Ermler, I. Pyryev is given to describe their common images and analyse the mechanism of their impact on a viewer in its connection to a special historical moment and cinema art specifics. The collectivization, which affected lives of the population of the USSR at the turn of the 1930s as an extremely unpopular measure, “skidding” all the time and rejected by the people, demanded a constant broadcast of its presence: images of a wonderful new life, images of an enemy, images of achievements. It also demanded the presence of a special space between reality and fiction, which can be called using the modern language the “media”. The unrealism of the analyzed films, which contradicts the canons of socialist realism, shows the ability of the image to involve a viewer’s perception into the game of suspicions about the “true” reality, which can be associated with platonism philosophic tradition in its influence on art. The article materials can be used for creating studying courses and literature on philosophy, political science, art and another humanities.

Russian World. Philosophic Viewpoint

The article considers some modern approaches to understanding social-philo­sophic basis for Russian World theory. The author gives a conclusion that modern approaches to understanding this concept and this phenomenon accu­mulating mostly social-philosophic and sociological theories take their roots in western European tradition. The article presents an approach to understand metaphysical view of the Russian World as a religious idea basing on Russian philosophic tradition. It also deals with the position that the basis for the concept of the Russian World finds itself in the Orthodox ethics of interactions forming a specific reality for the bearers of such an idea in their everyday practices and determining their way of thinking notwithstanding their religious and philosophic positions. The author assumes that having accepted the Ortho­dox religious basis for the supporters of the concept of the Russian World does not necessarily mean following this religious dogmatics by all participants of such an interaction.

Innovating the Craft of Phenomenological Research Methods Through Mindfulness

To conduct qualitative social research requires not only a declarative knowledge of the research methods and methodology, but also a set of honed practical, applied skills. For beginning researchers, particularly those undertaking phenomenological research, the skills of bracketing, the phenomenological reductions and having an awareness of one’s positionality or relationship to their chosen research methods, participants and contexts is of significant importance. More generally, these skills are also required in other qualitative research disciplines under the guise of reflexivity or critical reflective practice. Regardless, these are notoriously slippery and require more than prior reading to translate from theory and philosophy into practice. There is literature which also identifies and highlights the disparity between theory, skill development and practice; however, these practicalities of how one can bracket or bridle and undertake reductions require further elaboration and guidance for how researchers can develop these applied skills of research. In this article, I propose and demonstrate that the therapeutic tradition of mindfulness as specifically practised in dialectical behaviour therapy can be used to de-mystify the practices of reflexivity and work specifically within the tradition of phenomenological reduction and bracketing. I also assert that this innovation can provide a practical tool to craft qualitative and phenomenological research and make achievable the original philosophical ideas which underpin phenomenological research. I begin by focusing on the theory of bracketing and reduction from the philosophic tradition of phenomenology as a framework for research methodology and methods, and then introduce the practical skill of mindfulness as prescribed in dialectical behaviour therapy as an innovation which can assist the researcher in developing these skills. I finish by illustrating the usefulness of mindfulness in undertaking phenomenological research drawing on examples from a current research project.

Beauty

On the subject of beauty, theorists generally agree only on rudimentary points about the term: that it commends on aesthetic grounds, has absolute and comparative forms, applies to parts, aspects and wholes, and so forth. Beyond this, dispute prevails. Realists hold that judgements of beauty ascribe to their subjects either a response-independent property inherent in things or a capacity of things to affect respondents in a way that preserves objectivity. In both cases acute problems arise in defining the property and in explaining how it can be known. Classical Platonism holds that beauty exists as an ideal supersensible ‘form’, while eighteenth-century theorists view it as a quasi-sensory property. Kant’s transcendental philosophy anchors the experience of beauty to the basic requirements of cognition, conferring on it ‘subjective universality and necessity’. Sceptics complain that the alleged property is merely a reflection of aesthetic pleasure and hence lacks objective standing. Partly due to its preoccupation with weightier matters, the philosophic tradition has not yet developed a theory of beauty as fully and deeply as it has, say, theories in the domain of morality. For most of the twentieth-century the generally subjectivistic and relativistic bent of the social sciences and humanities, as well as the scorn heaped on beauty by avant-gardism in the arts, discouraged concentration on beauty. However, the turn of the century has brought a remarkable reawakening of interest in theorizing about beauty. The burgeoning fields of cognitive science and evolutionary developmental biology have played a part.

Beauty

On the subject of beauty, theorists generally agree only on rudimentary points about the term: that it commends on aesthetic grounds, has absolute and comparative forms, and so forth. Beyond this, dispute prevails. Realists hold that judgments of beauty ascribe to their subjects either a nonrelational property inherent in things or a capacity of things to affect respondents in a way that preserves objectivity. In both cases acute problems arise in defining the property and in explaining how it can be known. Classical Platonism holds that beauty exists as an ideal supersensible Form, while eighteenth-century theorists view it as a quasi-sensory property. Kant’s transcendental philosophy anchors the experience of beauty to the basic requirements of cognition, conferring on it ‘subjective universality and necessity’. Sceptics complain that the alleged property is merely a reflection of aesthetic pleasure and hence lacks objective standing. Partly due to its preoccupation with weightier matters, the philosophic tradition has never developed any theory of beauty as fully and deeply as it has, say, theories in the domain of morality. Comparative neglect of the subject has been encouraged by the generally subjectivistic and relativistic bent of the social sciences and humanities, as well as by avant-gardism in the arts. However, several recent and ambitious studies have given new impetus to theorizing about beauty.

Brazil, philosophy in

It is possible to distinguish between European philosophy in Brazil and Brazilian philosophy. The former refers to Brazilians who participate in discussions of issues occurring in the European philosophic tradition without any reference to Brazilian reality and its problems; the latter to those Brazilian intellectuals who respond to the problems growing out of situations which have confronted the nation historically whether their philosophical orientations have originated in Europe or elsewhere. This entry focuses on the latter and generally follows a historical progression. This progression spans from the precabralian Tupi-Guarani speaking societies of eastern South America to the healthy development of Brazilian philosophy since 1950 after the founding of the Institute of Brazilian Philosophy.