Brain regulatory program predates central nervous system evolution

Understanding if bilaterian centralized nervous systems (CNS) evolved once or multiple times has been debated for over a century. Recent efforts determined that the nerve chords found in bilaterian CNSs likely evolved independently, but the origin(s) of brains remains debatable. Developing brains are regionalized by stripes of gene expression along the anteroposterior axis. Gene homologs are expressed in the same relative order in disparate species, which has been interpreted as evidence for homology. However, regionalization programs resemble anteroposterior axial patterning programs, which supports an alternative model by which conserved expression in brains arose convergently through the independent co-option of deeply conserved axial patterning programs. To begin resolving these hypotheses, we sought to determine when the neurogenic role for axial programs evolved. Here we show that the nerve net in the cnidarian Nematostella vectensis and bilaterian brain are regionalized by the same molecular programs, which indicates nervous system regionalization predates the emergence of bilaterians and CNSs altogether. This argues that shared regionalization mechanisms are insufficient to support the homology of brains and supports the notion that axial programs were able to be co-opted multiple times during evolution of brains.

Systematic expression profiling of dprs and DIPs reveals cell surface codes in Drosophila larval peripheral neurons

In complex nervous systems, neurons must identify their correct partners to form synaptic connections. The prevailing model to ensure correct recognition posits that cell surface proteins (CSPs) in individual neurons act as identification tags. Thus, knowing what cells express which CSPs would provide insights into neural development, synaptic connectivity, and nervous system evolution. Here, we investigated expression of dprs and DIPs, two CSP subfamilies belonging to the immunoglobulin superfamily (IgSF), in Drosophila larval motor neurons (MNs), sensory neurons (SNs), peripheral glia and muscles using a collection of GAL4 driver lines. We found that dprs are more broadly expressed than DIPs in MNs and SNs, and each examined neuron expresses a unique combination of dprs and DIPs. Interestingly, many dprs and DIPs are not robustly expressed, but instead, are found in gradient and temporal expression patterns. Hierarchical clustering showed a similar expression pattern of dprs and DIPs in neurons from the same type and with shared synaptic partners, suggesting these CSPs may facilitate synaptic wiring. In addition, the unique expression patterns of dprs and DIPs revealed three uncharacterized MNs - MN23-Ib, MN6-Ib (A2) and MN7-Ib (A2). This study sets the stage for exploring the functions of dprs and DIPs in Drosophila MNs and SNs and provides genetic access to subsets of neurons.

Reafference and the origin of the self in early nervous system evolution

Discussions of the function of early nervous systems usually focus on a causal flow from sensors to effectors, by which an animal coordinates its actions with exogenous changes in its environment. We propose, instead, that much early sensing was reafferent ; it was responsive to the consequences of the animal's own actions. We distinguish two general categories of reafference—translocational and deformational—and use these to survey the distribution of several often-neglected forms of sensing, including gravity sensing, flow sensing and proprioception. We discuss sensing of these kinds in sponges, ctenophores, placozoans, cnidarians and bilaterians. Reafference is ubiquitous, as ongoing action, especially whole-body motility, will almost inevitably influence the senses. Corollary discharge—a pathway or circuit by which an animal tracks its own actions and their reafferent consequences—is not a necessary feature of reafferent sensing but a later-evolving mechanism. We also argue for the importance of reafferent sensing to the evolution of the body-self , a form of organization that enables an animal to sense and act as a single unit. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Basal cognition: multicellularity, neurons and the cognitive lens’.

Reafference and the origin of the self in early nervous system evolution

Discussions of the function of early nervous systems usually focus on a causal flow from sensors to effectors, by which an animal coordinates its actions with exogenous changes in its environment. We propose, instead, that much early sensing was reafferent; it was responsive to the consequences of the animal's own actions. We distinguish two general categories of reafference – translocational and deformational – and use these to survey the distribution of several often-neglected forms of sensing, including gravity sensing, flow sensing, and proprioception. We discuss sensing of these kinds in sponges, ctenophores, placozoans, cnidarians and bilaterians. Reafference is ubiquitous, as ongoing action, especially whole-body motility, will almost inevitably influence the senses. Corollary discharge – a pathway or circuit by which an animal tracks its own actions and their reafferent consequences – is not a necessary feature of reafferent sensing but a later- evolving mechanism. We also argue for the importance of reafferent sensing to the evolution of the body-self, a form of organization that enables an animal to sense and act as a single unit.

Your Brain Is Not an Onion With a Tiny Reptile Inside

A widespread misconception in much of psychology is that (a) as vertebrate animals evolved, “newer” brain structures were added over existing “older” brain structures, and (b) these newer, more complex structures endowed animals with newer and more complex psychological functions, behavioral flexibility, and language. This belief, although widely shared in introductory psychology textbooks, has long been discredited among neurobiologists and stands in contrast to the clear and unanimous agreement on these issues among those studying nervous-system evolution. We bring psychologists up to date on this issue by describing the more accurate model of neural evolution, and we provide examples of how this inaccurate view may have impeded progress in psychology. We urge psychologists to abandon this mistaken view of human brains.

Gradualism and the Evolution of Experience

In evolution, large-scale changes that involve the origin of complex new traits occur gradually, in a broad sense of the term. This principle applies to the origin of subjective or felt experience. I respond to difficulties that have been raised for a gradualist view in this area, and sketch a scenario for the gradual evolution of subjective experience, drawing on recent research into early nervous system evolution.

Your Brain Is Not an Onion with a Tiny Reptile Inside

A widespread misconception in much of psychology holds that (1) as vertebrate animals evolved, "newer" brain structures were added over existing "older" brain structures and (2) these newer, more complex structures endowed animals with newer and more complex psychological functions, behavioral flexibility, and language. This belief, though widely shared in our introductory textbooks, has long been discredited among neurobiologists and stands in contrast to the clear and unanimous agreement on these issues among those studying nervous system evolution. We bring psychologists up to date on this issue by describing the more accurate model of neural evolution, and we provide examples of how this inaccurate view may have impeded progress in psychology. We urge psychologists to abandon this mistaken view of human brains.