The Puzzle of the Sophist

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Vlasits

Abstract The many definitions of sophistry at the beginning of Plato’s Sophist have puzzled scholars just as much as they puzzled the dialogue’s main speakers: the Visitor from Elea and Theaetetus. The aim of this paper is to give an account of that puzzlement. This puzzlement, it is argued, stems not from a logical or epistemological problem, but from the metaphysical problem that, given the multiplicity of accounts, the interlocutors do not know what the sophist essentially is. It transpires that, in order to properly account for this puzzle, one must jettison the traditional view of Plato’s method of division, on which divisions must be exclusive and mark out relations of essential predication. It is then shown on independent grounds that, although Platonic division in the Sophist must express predication relations and be transitive, it need not be dichotomous, exclusive, or express relations of essential predication. Once the requirements of exclusivity and essential predication are dropped, it is possible to make sense of the reasons that the Visitor from Elea and Theaetetus are puzzled. Moreover, with this in hand, it is possible to see Plato making an important methodological point in the dialogue: division on its own without any norms does not necessarily lead to the discovery of essences.

Author(s):  
Wesley J. Wildman

Subordinate-deity models of ultimate reality affirm that God is Highest Being within an ultimate reality that is neither conceptually tractable nor religiously relevant. Subordinate-deity models ceded their dominance to agential-being models of ultimate reality by refusing to supply a comprehensive answer to the metaphysical problem of the One and the Many in the wake of the Axial-Age interest in that problem, but they have revived in the twentieth century due to post-colonial resistance to putatively comprehensive explanations. Subordinate-deity ultimacy models resist the Intentionality Attribution and Narrative Comprehensibility dimensions of anthropomorphism to some degree but continue to employ the Rational Practicality dimension of anthropomorphism, resulting in a strategy of judicious anthropomorphism. Variations, strengths, and weaknesses of the subordinate-deity class of ultimacy models are discussed.


Sensors ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (21) ◽  
pp. 4752 ◽  
Author(s):  
Khwaja Mansoor ◽  
Anwar Ghani ◽  
Shehzad Chaudhry ◽  
Shahaboddin Shamshirband ◽  
Shahbaz Ghayyur ◽  
...  

Despite the many conveniences of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems, the underlying open architecture for communication between the RFID devices may lead to various security threats. Recently, many solutions were proposed to secure RFID systems and many such systems are based on only lightweight primitives, including symmetric encryption, hash functions, and exclusive OR operation. Many solutions based on only lightweight primitives were proved insecure, whereas, due to resource-constrained nature of RFID devices, the public key-based cryptographic solutions are unenviable for RFID systems. Very recently, Gope and Hwang proposed an authentication protocol for RFID systems based on only lightweight primitives and claimed their protocol can withstand all known attacks. However, as per the analysis in this article, their protocol is infeasible and is vulnerable to collision, denial-of-service (DoS), and stolen verifier attacks. This article then presents an improved realistic and lightweight authentication protocol to ensure protection against known attacks. The security of the proposed protocol is formally analyzed using Burrows Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic and under the attack model of automated security verification tool ProVerif. Moreover, the security features are also well analyzed, although informally. The proposed protocol outperforms the competing protocols in terms of security.


Author(s):  
Alec Hyslop

It has traditionally been thought that the problem of other minds is epistemological: how is it that we know other people have thoughts, experiences and emotions? After all, we have no direct knowledge that this is so. We observe their behaviour and their bodies, not their thoughts, experiences and emotions. The task is seen as being to uncover the justification for our belief in other minds. It has also been thought that there is a conceptual problem: how can we manage to have any conception of mental states other than our own? It is noteworthy that there is as yet no standard view on either of these problems. One answer to the traditional (epistemological) problem has been the analogical inference to other minds, appealing to the many similarities existing between ourselves and others. This answer, though it is no longer in general favour among philosophers, still has its defenders. Probably the favoured solution is to view other minds as logically on a par with the unobservable, theoretical entities of science. That other people have experiences, like us, is seen as the best explanation of their behaviour.


2001 ◽  
Vol 11 (03) ◽  
pp. 219-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
HAMID BEIGY ◽  
MOHAMMAD R. MEYBODI

Despite of the many successful applications of backpropagation for training multi–layer neural networks, it has many drawbacks. For complex problems it may require a long time to train the networks, and it may not train at all. Long training time can be the result of the non-optimal parameters. It is not easy to choose appropriate value of the parameters for a particular problem. In this paper, by interconnection of fixed structure learning automata (FSLA) to the feedforward neural networks, we apply learning automata (LA) scheme for adjusting these parameters based on the observation of random response of neural networks. The main motivation in using learning automata as an adaptation algorithm is to use its capability of global optimization when dealing with multi-modal surface. The feasibility of proposed method is shown through simulations on three learning problems: exclusive-or, encoding problem, and digit recognition. The simulation results show that the adaptation of these parameters using this method not only increases the convergence rate of learning but it increases the likelihood of escaping from the local minima.


1957 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 1027-1039
Author(s):  
Samuel Dubois Cook

The essence of Hacker's construction is the theory of the ruling class. Immediately, one thinks of Marx, Mosca, Michels, Pareto, and several Americans who have espoused, in one form or another, oligarchic doctrines. What most sharply distinguishes Hacker from most theorists of this persuasion is the absence of presuppositions of historical inevitability. Seeking only to describe sequences and relations of the past and present, he makes no claims of omniscience, of knowing what the social process must unfold. Neither is his theory normative.Yet, apart from details and variations, there is a crucial framework of meaning which discloses Hacker's close affinity with the essence of conventional oligarchic doctrines: the few rule, the many simply obey; the governors, in substance if not in form, are free from compulsion to answer to the governed. Historically, and indeed currently, Hacker asserts, genuine power has been and is the exclusive or, at least, the primary possession of a privileged few. True, the composition and foundation of the governing class have changed, but this change, he continues, did not bring in its wake a widening or deepening of the structure of power in American culture. It merely means the substitution of one set of masters or controllers for another. After all, a monopoly of power is a monopoly, whether its source be deference or manipulation. Both, he avers, “permit a few men to rule many men.” Neither system of power allows the personnel and the general policies of government to be the product of voluntary and active consent. In both contexts, the ruled, not the rulers, are the object of control. “Both deference and manipulation are similar in that they are control.” Such, then, is Hacker's relation to the essence of oligarchic thought. What can be said of the validity of his formulation?


1977 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. C. White
Keyword(s):  

In this paper I wish to argue for a view that, despite its traditional standing, has not yet in any detail been defended. The view is briefly that in the Republic, at the point where Plato is engaged in contrasting the true philosopher with the “lover of sights and sounds”, he characterises sensible particulars — referred to as “the many” — as being bearers of opposite properties in so radical a manner that they can be said neither to be nor not to be: they lie somewhere between being and utter non-being.There are two related reasons why this traditional view should now be closely scrutinised. The first is that, whatever the outcome, the passage of the Republic in question — 475a-480a — is quite crucial to our understanding of the development of Plato's thought about sensible particulars. The second’ is that it has been suggested recently, and ably argued, that Plato is not in fact talking about particulars at all; rather about types or sorts of particulars.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Ji Ma

AbstractGiven the many types of suboptimality in perception, I ask how one should test for multiple forms of suboptimality at the same time – or, more generally, how one should compare process models that can differ in any or all of the multiple components. In analogy to factorial experimental design, I advocate for factorial model comparison.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Spurrett

Abstract Comprehensive accounts of resource-rational attempts to maximise utility shouldn't ignore the demands of constructing utility representations. This can be onerous when, as in humans, there are many rewarding modalities. Another thing best not ignored is the processing demands of making functional activity out of the many degrees of freedom of a body. The target article is almost silent on both.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Tomasello

Abstract My response to the commentaries focuses on four issues: (1) the diversity both within and between cultures of the many different faces of obligation; (2) the possible evolutionary roots of the sense of obligation, including possible sources that I did not consider; (3) the possible ontogenetic roots of the sense of obligation, including especially children's understanding of groups from a third-party perspective (rather than through participation, as in my account); and (4) the relation between philosophical accounts of normative phenomena in general – which are pitched as not totally empirical – and empirical accounts such as my own. I have tried to distinguish comments that argue for extensions of the theory from those that represent genuine disagreement.


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