La Notion de l’inceste heureux dans la littérature utopique de la fin du xviiie siècle

This article examines ways in which the existence of incestuous relationships at the heart of the utopian project at the end of the Eighteenth century poses a philosophical challenge. When a utopian community is built on the principle of a definite improvement, how is it possible to envision a positive future when incest is introduced at the foundation of a society that pretends to be better than the existing one? Furthermore, how is it possible to establish laws and rules in a society when the initial members of this society have not been able to respect a law supposedly inviolable? Lastly, how can a utopian community, which thrives to be an ideological model, adopt incest as a legitimate possibility or even a norm? This article explores how several prerevolutionary utopias try to answer all those questions. Among the texts it considers are Guillaume Grivel’s L’Isle inconnue, Giacomo Casanova’s L’Icosameron, and Jacques Henri-Bernardin de Saint-Pierre’s Paul et Virginie.

The Theology of Avatāra in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa

The idea of avatāra no doubt presents a philosophical challenge, as it appears to stand in contrast to the Vedāntic principle of non-duality; the Bhāgavata purāṇa (BhP) offers an opportunity to look into this question due to its unique structure, which combines the Vedānta and Rasa traditions. As such, this paper looks into the theology of Avatāra in the Bhāgavata purāṇa; it argues that reading the purāṇic genre in light of Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta is not as conducive to the understanding of the avatāra as reading it in light of Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, which indeed is compatible with the purāṇic genre. Moreover, uncovering the underlying assumptions of Western notions of personhood, it seems that classical ideas of “the person” have to be looked into, and offering an alternative idea of personhood may be necessary in order to better understand the theology of avatāra.

Truthmaker Trinitarianism

This paper employs recent developments in the theory of truthmakers to offer a novel solution to the most discussed philosophical challenge presented by the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. According to the view developed, the Father, Son, and Spirit each serve as the only substantial constituent of equally minimal truthmakers for claims about God. Because they do, there is a clear and robust sense in which each is a substance that “is” God as much as anything is, while the three remain distinct from each other. The view is shown to hold certain prima facie advantages over rival extant approaches.

Hypothesis Tests and Corroboration

According to Popper and other influential philosophers and scientists, scientific knowledge grows by repeatedly testing our best hypotheses. However, the interpretation of non-significant results—those that do not lead to a “rejection” of the tested hypothesis—poses a major philosophical challenge. To what extent do they corroborate the tested hypothesis or provide a reason to accept it? In this chapter, we prove two impossibility results for measures of corroboration that follow Popper’s criterion of measuring both predictive success and the testability of a hypothesis. Then we provide an axiomatic characterization of a more promising and scientifically useful concept of corroboration and discuss implications for the practice of hypothesis testing and the concept of statistical significance.

Moral challenges of going to Mars under the presence of non-intelligent life scenario

Much is discussed what would be the ideal position in terms of our ethical treatment with respect to other forms of life, particularly those that can be discovered in other worlds, in addition to our role in terms of the expansion of terrestrial life in the universe. This represents a great philosophical challenge, but what if we should make a moral decision in the face of the inevitable situation of being forced to colonize, for example, Mars? Is there a position in which we can feel safe to act legitimately? This paper tries to force us into a mental and conceptual exercise about what can really be worth beyond the concept or the positions we may have and analyse them in light of the practicality that decision making requires in this problem.

The Microstructure of Experience

I argue that experiences can have microphenomenal structures, where the macrophenomenal properties we introspect are realized by non-introspectible microphenomenal properties. After explaining what it means to ascribe a microstructure to experience, I defend the thesis against its principal philosophical challenge, discuss how the thesis interacts with other philosophical issues about experience, and consider our prospects for investigating the microphenomenal realm.