Political Institutions

This chapter surveys theories and empirical evidence about the impact of state structures and political institutions on welfare state structures and outcomes. It shows that the political-institutional analysis of welfare states has shifted over time from an interest in static structures to a much more dynamic analysis of the interplay amongst preferences, structures, ideas, and institutions. It reviews different approaches to the study of political institutions, including majoritarian versus consensus democracy, veto points, and veto players. The impact of veto points on welfare state development and change, as well as the links between electoral systems and electoral dynamics on social policy outcomes, are explained and discussed. The chapter concludes with a review of the impact of past policies on welfare state politics and outcomes.

Democratic Aesthetics: Scenes of Political Violence and Anxiety in Nari Ward and Ocean Vuong

By attending to art and writing that interrogates US citizenship and state violence, this essay foregrounds the structural antagonism between democracy as an instituted form of rule, which depends on inegalitarian hierarchies, and democracy’s egalitarian drive. It argues that the realization of democracy as a form of governance (consensus democracy) occurs by substituting the rule of a part for the whole, which violently forces democracy’s constitutive figures to conform to and negotiate its organizing logics. Nari Ward’s We the People (2011) allegorizes this inherent tension in democracy as one between synecdoche and metonymy. The article then theorizes a new form of democratic politics through an engagement with Jacques Rancière before turning to Ocean Vuong’s “Notebook Fragments” (2016) and “Self-Portrait as Exit Wounds” (2016) as articulations of a democratic aesthetics constituted by figures—including metonymy, irony, and catachresis—that interrupt the substitutions of synecdoche. Vuong’s poetry foregrounds the violence enacted by state fantasies and insists on the democratic equality disavowed by consensus democracy. Together, Ward and Vuong locate the political force of aesthetics not in reassuring visions of inclusion but in operations that disturb and resist any form of hierarchy.

Preferences for consensus and majoritarian democracy: long- and short-term influences

This article analyzes individuals’ preferences for a consensus or a majoritarian type of democracy. We theorize that variation in these preferences is a function of both institutional learning (long term) and individuals’ position as a political minority or majority (short term). First, as a result of institutional learning, we expect that individuals living in democracies characterized by coalition governments will favor consensus democracy. Conversely, those living in countries characterized by single-party executives will favor majoritarian democracy. Second, we expect that individuals’ position as an electoral minority or majority will affect these beliefs. Those who vote for small parties will favor a consensus democracy, while those who vote for large parties will support a majoritarian system. However, whether institutional learning or individuals’ position as a political minority or majority prevail in influencing these preferences about the ideal model of democracy will be a function of the democratic trajectory of each country. We test these arguments drawing on data from the European Social Survey.

Consensus Democracy: The Swiss System of Power-Sharing

This chapter unpacks the notion of power-sharing and explains its centrality for political Switzerland. While direct democracy has played an important part in its evolution, law-making in Switzerland has become impossible without the participation of various interest groups at early stages of drafting already. The chapter details the functioning of Switzerland’s broad-based political pluralism, its structure of consociational democracy, the representation of the most important political parties and interest groups, and the ensuing processes of negotiation and mutual adjustment. It also discusses challenges and pitfalls of power-sharing.

Qualified objection to Ani’s qualified acceptance of Wiredu’s notion of consensus democracy in Africa

This essay offers a critical review of Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani’s article ‘On agreed action without agreed notions.’ Ani’s paper makes a critique of Kwasi Wiredu’s consensual democracy to the conclusion that though desirable, left the way it is, the model of consensus on which the idea of Wiredu’s non-party democracy was founded is itself admirable but defective and, therefore, calls for further enhancements. While not suggesting that Wiredu’s idea is perfect, this paper provides some objections to Ani’s view without necessarily aiming to make an apologetic defence of Wiredu. In the process, this paper, employing a critical conversation method, examines the most salient criticisms of Ani against Wiredu to the conclusion that Ani’s suggestion, by which he has opened up a new horizon in understanding human nature and assisting in making scholarly post-deliberation analysis, is impracticable. That is, it is still practically incapable of necessarily impacting any significant value to the process involved in attaining consensus itself. Keywords: Africa, Philosophy, Consensus, Democracy, Values

Which Government’s Policy Style is More Conducive to Prevention?

We have demonstrated that many governments face the same ‘prevention puzzle’, caused partly by universal drivers associated with multi-centric policymaking. Further, they face contradictory pressures to share power for pragmatic reasons or centralize power to seem in control. However, what if policymakers in different political systems try to solve these dilemmas in fundamentally different ways? For example, are some systems more conducive to long-term planning and more likely to facilitate central governments trying to ‘let go’ and encourage localism? This question is often central to comparative political studies involving the UK. The UK’s Westminster model often represents the archetype of a ‘majoritarian’ democracy with a top-down policymaking style and adversarial political culture. Lijphart contrasts it with ‘consensus’ democracy characterized by coalition-building between parties and political culture built on ‘inclusiveness, bargaining and compromise’. In theory, this distinction could guide our analysis of UK and Scottish preventive policymaking, since some ‘architects of devolution’ envisaged ‘new Scottish politics’ as the antidote to ‘old Westminster’, to produce a consensus democracy with greater emphasis on pragmatic policymaking. However, their reputations are inaccurate caricatures that provide a misleading way to compare UK and Scottish prevention policy.