A Disproportionality Bias in the Bureau of the Regional Assembly of Madrid

This paper analyses the voting behavior of the parliamentary groups in the Regional Assembly of Madrid to appoint the Bureau, its representative body, in all the legislatures since its inception (1983–2021). To this end, the actual result of the voting is compared with the mock result attained by following a Nash equilibrium (NE) and a d’Hondt (d’H) allocation in each vote. But the result of a d’Hondt allocation varies based on the number of stages in which the voting is performed (President, Vice-President, and Secretaries), so a bias towards disproportionality could exist as measured by the absolute index of disproportionality which calculates the number of seats non-proportionally allocated. The results show that, in view of the hypothesis on the importance of the number of seats, the NE was only followed in four of the 12 Legislatures for Vice-Presidents (it was always followed for Secretaries). Thus, parliamentary groups could gain more seats by modifying their strategies. Additionally, the absolute rate of disproportionality and the number of seats non-proportionally allocated indicate that, in general, parliamentary groups obtain voting results that are less disproportionate than they could be (due to the number of voting stages).

Reconciliation without Justice: The State and the Invalidation of Victimhood in Post-colonial Zimbabwe, 1980–2017

This article calls for the location of victimhood rather than political convenience at the centre of Zimbabwe’s peace-building matrix. From the attainment of independence in 1980 to the military assisted end of President Robert Mugabe’s rule in November 2017, Zimbabwe’s episodic cycles of violence were concluded through elite bargained amnesty ordinances, state mediated reconciliation pronouncements and clemency orders that unconditionally benefitted perpetrators at the expense of victims. The forgive-and-forget ethic central to these routine and fractional peace building measures, I argue, not only disregarded the rule of law but negated victimhood and rendered justice divisible. Victims of politically motivated violence could not secure redress through the courts of law against amnestied perpetrators as this would amount to double jeopardy. The government withheld prosecutorial justice against perpetrators and disregarded reparations for victims. Within the national legislative framework ordinary legislators could not move motions compelling the government to compensate survivors of violence because only the vice-presidents and ministers could move motions that had the consequence of either depleting state revenues or causing the imposition of additional taxes on citizens. Considering that ministers who had the prerogative to move such motions served in cabinet at the behest of their intractable president they could hardly embarrass or contradict their principal. Essentially, the Robert Mugabe led Zimbabwean government established legal firewalls for perpetrators of politically motivated violence which ipso facto invalidated the quest for justice by victims of the country’s ever recurring cycles of violence. This authoritarian legalism disregarded victimhood and emboldened human rights violators.

Too much of a good thing: the non-linear effect of vertical pay dispersion on vice presidents’ voluntary turnover rate

Purpose While the effect of vertical pay dispersion on the voluntary turnover rate of vice presidents (VPs) has received attention, the existing research conclusions are still divided. Therefore, this study aims to explore the relationship between vertical pay dispersion and voluntary turnover rate of VPs in a Chinese context using data from listed firms. Design/methodology/approach Integrating tournament theory and social comparison theory, this study examines the non-linear effect of vertical pay dispersion on VPs’ voluntary turnover rates using empirical data from Chinese A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2016. Findings The results reveal a U-shaped relationship between vertical pay dispersion and the voluntary turnover rate of VPs. After further incorporating the moderating effect of the board governance structure, the effect is found to be enhanced in firms with more efficient board governance (i.e. smaller board size, higher board turnover and higher proportion of outside directors). Further analysis indicates that the aforementioned conclusions mainly exist in non-state-owned enterprises rather than state-owned enterprises. Originality/value The findings deepen the understanding of the costs and benefits associated with vertical pay dispersion, enrich the research findings on pay dispersion and contribute to the integration of previously inconsistent findings.

WELCOME TO IMIA!

BOARD President Sabine Koch, Sweden (2019 - 2021) President elect Jack Li, Taiwan (2019 - 2021) Past President Chris Lehmann, United States (2019 - 2021) Secretary Petter Hurlen, Norway (2015 - 2021) Secretary elect Ursula Hübner, Germany (2020 - 2021) Treasurer Phil Robinson, Australia (2020 - 2023) Vice Presidents MedInfoNajeeb Al-Shorbaji, Jordon (2020 - 2023)MembershipDaniel Luna, Argentina (2018 - 2021)ServicesLina Soualmia, France (2020 - 2023)Special AffairsJennifer Bichel-Findlay, Australia (2019 - 2022)Working & Special Interest GroupsLuis Fernandez Luque (2019- 2022) CEO Elaine Huesing, Canada IMIA Web site: www.imia.org Regional Vice Presidents to IMIA APAMI: Asia Pacific Association for Medical Informatics Naoki Nakashima, Japan EFMI: European Federation for Medical Informatics Lacramioara Stoicu-Tivodar, Romania HELINA: Pan African Health Informatics Association Ghislain Kouematchoua Tchuitcheu, Germany/Cameroon IMIA-LAC: Health Informatics Association for Latin America and the Caribbean Marcelo Lucio da Silva, Brazil MENAHIA: Middle East and North African Health Informatics Association Dari Alhuwail, Kuwait North American Region James Cimino, United States IMIA Liaison Officers, ex officio WHO Liaison OfficerPatrick Weber, SwitzerlandIFIP Liaison OfficerHiroshi Takeda, JapanISO Liaison OfficerMichio Kimura, JapanIAHSI (The Academy) Liaison OfficerWilliam Hersh

Tournament Incentives and Corporate Social Responsibility Performance

Management incentives for engaging and excelling in corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance is an important theme as business sustainability gains momentum. We examine the role of tournament incentives, which are created by competition among non-CEO (chief executive officer) senior executives (vice presidents [VPs]) for promotion to the CEO position, in firms’ CSR performance. Using a sample of U.S. Standard & Poor (S&P) 1500 firms from 1993 to 2014, we find that tournament incentives proxied by pay gaps between CEOs and VPs are negatively associated with CSR performance, suggesting that competition for promotion could be detrimental for CSR performance. We further show that such association is more pronounced when the perceived probability of promotion increases prior to CEO turnover. This article provides policy, practical, and education implications and contribute to the literature on the integration of CSR into the business culture and strategic management processes.

Vice Presidents and Protest Candidates

This chapter tells the story of Joseph Smith’s search for a running mate. Smith and the Council of Fifty first determine to ask respected New York educator and recent Mormon convert James Arlington Bennet to run for vice president with Smith. When Bennet is unable to accept, Smith invites Solomon Copeland of Tennessee to join him on the ticket. When Copeland does not reply to the request and in a crunch for time, Smith invites one of his fellow Mormon leaders, Sidney Rigdon of Pennsylvania, to join him as a candidate for the vice presidency. Rigdon accepts and the ticket is set. This chapter also considers the prospects of another third party candidate, James G. Birney, who runs for the Liberty party, calling for the total and immediate abolition of slavery.