UK–Zimbabwean Relations: the Past and the Present

The author traces the stages of development of British–Zimbabwean relations over the past four decades. The work analyzes not only the history, but also the current state of relations between Great Britain and Zimbabwe and assesses the prospects for their development. The author set the task of showing how political cooperation between the former metropolis and its colony developed, the importance of the change of governments and the personality of the heads of state. A special attention is paid to the first president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, who ruled the country for 37 years. An attempt has been made to identify the causes of the crisis in bilateral relations and to assess the attempts to overcome and to move in a progressive development. In addition, the author considers the problem of how the context of the colonial past, economic development, the land issue and the internal policy of Zimbabwe influenced the official London’s position in relation to Harare. Zimbabwe is one of the key states in southeast Africa, traditionally viewed by the UK as a sphere of its interests. Using itsexample, certain conclusions can be drawn about London's foreign policy approach to African countries, as well as the contradictions which become obstacles to the relations’ normalization.

Reconciliation without Justice: The State and the Invalidation of Victimhood in Post-colonial Zimbabwe, 1980–2017

This article calls for the location of victimhood rather than political convenience at the centre of Zimbabwe’s peace-building matrix. From the attainment of independence in 1980 to the military assisted end of President Robert Mugabe’s rule in November 2017, Zimbabwe’s episodic cycles of violence were concluded through elite bargained amnesty ordinances, state mediated reconciliation pronouncements and clemency orders that unconditionally benefitted perpetrators at the expense of victims. The forgive-and-forget ethic central to these routine and fractional peace building measures, I argue, not only disregarded the rule of law but negated victimhood and rendered justice divisible. Victims of politically motivated violence could not secure redress through the courts of law against amnestied perpetrators as this would amount to double jeopardy. The government withheld prosecutorial justice against perpetrators and disregarded reparations for victims. Within the national legislative framework ordinary legislators could not move motions compelling the government to compensate survivors of violence because only the vice-presidents and ministers could move motions that had the consequence of either depleting state revenues or causing the imposition of additional taxes on citizens. Considering that ministers who had the prerogative to move such motions served in cabinet at the behest of their intractable president they could hardly embarrass or contradict their principal. Essentially, the Robert Mugabe led Zimbabwean government established legal firewalls for perpetrators of politically motivated violence which ipso facto invalidated the quest for justice by victims of the country’s ever recurring cycles of violence. This authoritarian legalism disregarded victimhood and emboldened human rights violators.

Mocking the just God? A theological critique of President Mnangagwa’s use of the name of God to justify his rule in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa justified his unconstitutional ascendency to power after a military coup that dethroned former President Robert Mugabe in 2017 by claiming that ‘the voice of the people is the voice of God’. He repeated the claim in 2018 when Nelson Chamisa refused to recognise him as the legitimately elected president of the country after accusing him of rigging the 2018 elections. Mnangagwa’s use of God’s name to authenticate his rule raises the question: as one of the foundational attributes of God is justice, what does it mean for political leaders openly claiming to be ordained into office by him? This leads to a further question: Has Mnangagwa’s rule satisfied the demands that come with claiming to be ordained by God to rule, and what should be the church’s response towards Mnangagwa’s rule in view of God’s justice? This article uses God’s attribute of justice to critically evaluate Mnangagwa’s claim that ‘the voice of the people is the voice of God’. The claim is described and placed within Mnangagwa’s claims and insinuations to be a Christian. His current rule, which is characterised by violent repression and corruption is examined and evaluated. God’s attribute of justice is presented and highlighted in how it challenges Mnangagwa to reform his rule to align it with God’s nature of justice.Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: The article combines insights from religion and politics, the mission of the church in a context of political oppression and systematic theology to highlight the need for the Zimbabwean churches to judge all political systems according to the adherence to God’s justice. It also provides some theological tools by which churches can protect themselves from being co-opted by unjust and oppressive regimes that violate God’s justice.

Race and Diplomacy in Zimbabwe

The 'Rhodesian crisis' of the 1960s and 1970s, and the early 1980s crisis of independent Zimbabwe, can be understood against the background of Cold War historical transformations brought on by, among other things, African decolonization in the 1960s; the failure of American power in Vietnam and the rise of Third World political power at the UN and elsewhere. In this African history of the diplomacy of decolonization in Zimbabwe, Timothy Lewis Scarnecchia examines the relationship and rivalry between Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe over many years of diplomacy, and how both leaders took advantage of Cold War racialized thinking about what Zimbabwe should be, including Anglo-American preoccupations with keeping whites from leaving after Independence. Based on a wealth of archival source materials, including materials that have recently become available through thirty-year rules in the UK and South Africa, it uncovers how foreign relations bureaucracies the US, UK, and SA created a Cold War 'race state' notion of Zimbabwe that permitted them to rationalize Mugabe's state crimes in return for Cold War loyalty to Western powers.

Nationalism and Politics in Zimbabwe

This chapter focuses on nationalism in past and present Zimbabwean politics. It first traces the history and nature of anti-colonial nationalism in Zimbabwe, after which it sets out continuities and discontinuities of anti-colonial nationalism in independent Zimbabwe. The chapter is principally interested in the post-2000 years, which witnessed the rise of a particular and influential authoritarian nationalism and its temporary decline in the period November 2017 to August 2018. The chapter maintains that after 2000, the governing Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) party propagated an exceedingly parochial and divisive authoritarian nationalism, predicated on loyalty to the ruling party. This authoritarian nationalism was prompted by the entrance of a credible opposition challenger to ZANU–PF in elections and was undergirded by a discriminatory rendition of Zimbabwe’s independence struggle history. ZANU–PF’s authoritarian nationalism was hardly brand new, since it had long roots in Zimbabwe’s anti-colonial nationalism, but its vigour and methodical promulgation by ZANU–PF constituted substantial discrepancies with past variations. Finally, the chapter argues that the removal of long-time ZANU–PF leader Robert Mugabe in a military coup in 2017 resulted in only a brief hiatus in ZANU–PF’s authoritarian nationalism, underscoring the deeply embedded nature of the ruling party’s authoritarian nationalist politics.

ZIMBABWE’S PARADOXICAL ‘NEW DISPENSATION’: POLITICAL HARM, ENDEMIC IMPUNITY AND UNENDING SILENCES, 2017-2020

O presente artigo busca discutir a capacidade e o compromisso do governo pós-Mugabe no Zimbábue com a tarefa de reconciliar os zimbabuenses e curar as feridas históricas do país, assim como seu legado assombroso de violência com motivações políticas. Após a transição de governo assistida pelos militares em novembro de 2017, a retórica do novo presidente Emmerson Mnangagwa, assinalou uma rejeição à violência e à política agressiva do seu antecessor, o presidente de longa data Robert Mugabe. Apesar de ter sido um importante facilitador do Presidente Mugabe desde a luta pela libertação nacional na década de 1970 até a era pós-colonial, o presidente Mnangagwa reapresentou a si mesmo como um político transformador, que queria desescalar as tensões políticas domésticas por meio da paz e de uma maior inclusão na gestão dos assuntos nacionais. Ele também instou seus compatriotas a esquecerem as dores da violência política do passado e seguirem em frente sob o slogan inclusivo de unidade, paz e desenvolvimento. Apesar dessa retórica conciliatória, ainda que pautada pela amnésia histórica, a qual tentou unificar os grupos políticos opositores do país, o governo comandado por Mnangagwa, popularmente conhecido como a “Nova Dispensação”, perpetuou a brutalidade da era Mugabe de violência, sequestros e desaparecimentos forçados de opositores políticos. Assim, o artigo argumenta que a mudança implícita no governo da Nova Dispensação representou um gesto populista, visto que o Zimbábue continuou a promover a impunidade diante das situações de violência instigada pelo Estado contra opositores políticos, situações marcadas pelo silenciamento e pelo negacionismo governamental.

ZIMBABWE: THE ETHNICISATION OF ZANU AND THE DOWNFALL OF NDABANINGI SITHOLE (1963-2000)

"This article is an exposition of the transformation of ZANU from being, primarily, a nationalist movement into an ethnic oriented party. Since its formation in 1963, ZANU was gripped by ethnicity, resulting in factions and contestations developing among party members. These contestations developed into open conflicts along tribal lines. The paper argues that ethnicity was so acute among ZANU party members to an extent that divisions were clearly drawn along the Shona sub-ethnic groups of Manyika (easterners), Karanga (southerners), and Zezuru (northerners). The competition for leadership positions and the fighting among members of these ethnic groups resulted in the death of some members of the party and the expulsion of others from the party. It is argued in the article that the persecution of Ndabaningi Sithole and his fallout as the ZANU president was a result of the ethnicisation of ZANU and the liberation struggle. The removal of Sithole as the party president and his replacement by Robert Mugabe exhibits these contestations among the Zezuru, Karanga and Manyika ethnic groups. We argue that the deposition of Sithole from ZANU in 1975 and his castigation as a “sell-out” and “tribalist” was a ploy by Robert Mugabe and other ZANU leaders to get rid of him and to replace him along ethnic grounds. The ethnic card was deployed to serve selfish political interests. It is these ethnic contestations and fighting which also brewed conflict and enmity between Mugabe in particular and Ndabaningi Sithole, among other factors. This hatred was clearly displayed later in the struggle for supremacy between Sithole’s new party, ZANU-Ndonga and Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF. It is stressed in the article that this enmity also culminated in the denial of a hero status to Sithole when he died in 2000. We also argue that the deposition of Sithole from ZANU is one of the reasons why the Ndau people of Chipinge always voted for him and not Robert Mugabe in elections. Keywords: Zimbabwe, Ethnicisation, Downfall, Contestations, ZANU, Hero status."