Why Classic Oil Wars Do Not Pay

This chapter challenges a key assumption underpinning classic oil war claims. It argues that, although oil war believers correctly observe that petroleum is extremely valuable, they make a mistake in jumping to the conclusion that fighting for oil pays. It also describes four sets of impediments to seizing and exploiting foreign oil resources, all of which reduce the petroleum payoffs of classic oil wars: invasion, occupation, international, and investment obstacles. The chapter analyzes the intensity of each of the four obstacles that varies temporally and geographically. It discusses the petroleum payoffs of international aggression that are far lower than classic oil war believers have assumed even under favorable conditions. It also points out how states are likely to avoid fighting for petroleum resources.

Oil Campaigns

This chapter examines two prominent oil campaigns: Japan's invasion of the Dutch East Indies and northern Borneo from 1941 to 1942 and Germany's aggression against the Soviet Union in World War II from 1941 to 1942. It explains how oil ambitions drove both Japanese and German attacks as they were desperate to acquire additional petroleum resources. It also points out that Japan and Germany's willingness to fight for oil was endogenous to their ongoing conflicts, namely the Second Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945 and World War II in Europe from 1939 to 1945. The chapter analyzes how the Second Sino-Japanese and World War II in Europe were not themselves caused by petroleum ambitions. It also discusses how Japan and Germany delayed their oil campaigns for as long as possible, only resorting to international aggression after alternative means of satisfying national petroleum needs had failed.

Blood and Oil

This chapter determines whether oil causes international conflict and clarifies the meaning of oil wars. It describes militarized conflict that is linked to oil and examines oil-related civil wars along with oil-related interstate violence. The chapter identifies distinct causal pathways from petroleum to international conflict, ranging from conquest of oil resources, to fights over petroleum transportation routes, to externalization of oil-oriented civil wars, and to conflicts aimed at preventing the consolidation of control over global petroleum supplies. It argues that countries' willingness to fight for oil resources has been overstated. It also points out how oil is an exceptionally valuable commodity.

From Value to Violence

This chapter begins by tracing oil's development from a largely invisible, worthless material into a vital natural resource. It discusses oil's contemporary military and economic significance for petroleum-exporting and petroleum-importing states. It also cites existing international relations debate about the value of conquest, showing how oil's exceptional utility has led most theorists to assume that the resource is worth fighting for. The chapter talks about oil war skeptics that have questioned claims on the significance of oil and yet have failed to dislodge classic oil war beliefs. It introduces the idea of the oil wars myth as a powerful story told about countries' willingness to fight over petroleum resources.

Searching for Classic Oil Wars

This chapter examines over six hundred militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) in order to determine whether oil ambitions motivate militarized conflict. It provides evidence of classic oil wars, in which severe militarized interstate conflicts are driven largely by participants' desire to obtain petroleum resources. It also points out how MIDs in oil-endowed territories were either very minor or motivated by other issues. The chapter introduces four new categories of conflict: oil spats, red herrings, oil campaigns, and oil gambits. It explains that oil spats are minor confrontations driven by petroleum ambitions, such as China and Vietnam's 2014 confrontation over a drilling rig in the South China Sea. It also describes red herrings, which are not fought for oil, but instead, aggressors are motivated predominantly by aspirations to political independence or regional hegemony.

Oil Spats

This chapter presents a representative oil spat between Argentina and the United Kingdom. It recounts the 1976 incident, where an Argentine destroyer intercepted the RRS Shackleton, a British research ship, which the Argentines believed was unilaterally exploring for oil near the contested Falkland/Malvinas Islands. It narrates how the conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom inspired an intensely hostile rhetoric but died down when the states began to pursue oil cooperation as a means of resolving their ongoing islands dispute. The chapter demonstrates how the next major conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom, the Falklands War in 1982, was considered another red herring. It explains how the Falklands War was provoked by Argentine officials' determination to retake the islands before the sesquicentennial of British occupation.

Petro-Myths and Petro-Realities

This chapter summarizes findings that challenge the oil wars myth by revealing how states are extremely reluctant to fight for petroleum resources. It explains how oil ambitions may inspire mild international sparring and occasionally affect the trajectories of wars that are already under way. It also discusses the minimal security threat posed by current and future oil competition. The chapter addresses the reasons petroleum has not been subject to the same imperialist logic that governed states' engagement with other natural resources. It also talks about the implications for other types of oil-related contention and US foreign policy, as well as the dangers of allowing myths to drive analysis and decision making.

Red Herrings

This chapter investigates two prominent red herrings: the Chaco War from 1932 to 1935 and the Iran–Iraq War from 1980 to 1988. It explains that the two red herring conflicts were widely assumed to have been oil driven. It also mentions Bolivia and Paraguay that purportedly fought over the Chaco Boreal's prospective petroleum endowments, as well as Iraqi president Saddam Hussein who supposedly invaded Iran in order to seize its oil-rich Khuzestan Province. The chapter points out that in the Chaco War, Bolivia and Paraguay knew that the contested territory did not contain oil resources, while in the Iran–Iraq War, Saddam's territorial ambitions were limited to small areas along the states' bilateral boundary. It emphasizes how the Chaco War and Iran–Iraq War were not fought to grab petroleum resources.

Oil Gambit

This chapter evaluates the unique historical oil gambit, focusing on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. It recounts how Saddam Hussein initiated a severe conflict that aimed to seize Kuwait's petroleum resources. It justifies why labeling Iraq's invasion a classic oil war as an oversimplification. Although Saddam aspired to control Kuwait's oil, his broader goal was to resist a perceived existential threat emanating from the United States. The chapter emphasizes how Saddam believed that the US government was inciting Persian Gulf oil producers to drive down international oil prices in order to achieve its long-standing ambitions of preventing Iraq's regional rise and removing him from power.

Explaining the Oil Wars Myth

This chapter explains why people believe in classic oil wars. It argues that the credibility of the oil wars myth arises from its connection to two other hegemonic narratives about the causes of violent conflict: Mad Max and El Dorado. The Mad Max myth asserts that countries, groups, and individuals fight because of existential need, while the El Dorado myth intimates that actors fight out of greed and in order to gain extraordinary wealth. The chapter traces the dual narratives of the Mad Max and El Dorado myths across centuries of academic and popular discourse. It also shows how the Mad Max and El Dorado myths were applied to oil after it was identified as a valuable natural resource.