Public Policy Failure: A Study of Home Industry Food Production Certification Policy

There is an increasing concentration of Public Administration scientists on measuring whether policy succeeds or fails. It is no longer clear how best to ensure that the policy process from formulation to policy implementation is the best and more effective way. Including in the Home Industry Food, Production Certificate Policy (SPP-IRT) is taken as a locus. Study of the Home Industry of Ground Coffee in Nagari Koto Tuo, Tanah Datar Regency. The policy on offering SPP-IRT has undergone several changes, but it will not be effective. It will fail to provide quality assurance and food safety. the increase in IRTPs who have certificates does not increase. The research method used in this study uses a qualitative approach with a case study research design. The results showed that providing Food Home Industry Certification (IRTP) with the case in the provision of IRTP Coffee Powder certificates in Nagari Koto Tuo showed that the policy failures included tolerable policy criteria. Modest loss when it happens does not fundamentally hold back the goals the proponents want to achieve, and the minor opposition and criticism that occurs is almost non-existent in this SPP-IRT-related policy.

PALM OIL INDUSTRY: CERTIFICATION DEVELOPMENT

The agricultural industry has been the backbone of Sabah's economy for decades. The industry has eradicated poverty and supported connectivity between the rural with the urban area. At the same time, it has undergone numerous shifts of cash crops to sustain the economy with the oil palm as the latest crop. The palm oil industry has both novelty and challenges to thrive with the demand for sustainability. For the mandatory certification of Malaysia Sustainable Palm Oil, growers, mainly smallholders, faced restrictions on the certification process despite incentives from the federal government. This has put a setback to the effort by the palm oil industry in their commitment to being sustainable. In this study, the researchers plan to examine the palm oil industry's certification approach on the smallholders on their way to achieving a sustainable palm oil industry based on a case study approach. Therefore, the methodology for the study was using content analysis on public-domain literature found through electronic databases encompasses publications dating from 2000 to 2020. The study found that the acceptance and trust in smallholders' certification process are in correspond with the incomprehension and the certification process approach.

Factors that affect the interest of the manufacturing industries to implement the green industry certification regulation in Indonesia

Green Industry Standards, as a regulation to achieve sustainable industrial development, currently still have little interest in its application in Indonesia, especially through certification. There are only 27 industries that have implemented Green Industry certification from a total of 33,923 industries in Indonesia until 2019. Based on this data, it is necessary to evaluate the application of current Green Industry certification regulations. The findings of this study are expected to be used as one of the information sources for government strategic consideration to increase industrial interest on Green Industry certification implementation. This study is done by analyzing the factors that drive and hinder industrial interest in implementing Green Industry certification. The method used in this study is a quantitative method conducted by a survey of 27 certified industries and 20 uncertified industries using a questionnaire with a Linkert scale and then processed statistically. The results of the research show that the driving factors of industry's interest in implementing Green Industry certification up to 100% was to improve company image, whereas 94.5% of factor inhibiting interest in certification stated by respondents was the currently limited Green Industry Standards that are only available to a certain scope of certain commodities.

Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality

We study firm's incentives to build and maintain reputation for quality, when quality is persistent and can be certified at a cost. We characterize all reputation-dependent MPEs. They vary in frequency of certification and payoffs. Low payoffs arise in equilibria because of over-certification traps. We contrast the MPEs with the highest payoff equilibria. Industry certification standards can help firms coordinate on such good equilibria. The optimal equilibria allow firms to maintain high quality forever, once it is reached for the first time. They are either lenient or harsh, endowing firms with multiple or one chance to improve and certify quality. (JEL D21, D43, D83, L13, L15)