Increasing the deterrence of airport security checks by managing expectations through communication: a hypothetical scenario experiment

Selective security screenings are discussed as a potential strategy to reduce costs and waiting times at airports, while keeping security high. However, the limited literature suggests that traditional security screenings, where all passengers are screened, are perceived as more deterrent for criminal activity and more secure from passengers’ perspectives. The goal of this study was to investigate whether targeted communication on an airport’s website can counteract the detrimental effect of randomised airport security checks on deterrence. The study results confirm prior findings that people with illegal intentions prefer randomised security checks compared to traditional security checks. However, there are hints that tactical communication could be a tool to improve security at airports. All in all, the insights gathered in this study should be taken as a sign of caution, when considering switching to selective security screenings. Future directions for investigating the effect of tactical communication are discussed.

The Canada-US Border: Approaches to Managing Irregular Crossings

The Canada-US border has seen a significant spike in irregular crossings from the US into Canada since 2016. As tens of thousands of migrants have crossed into Canada outside official entry points, Canadian officials have had to grapple with how to manage these irregular asylum claims that have put enormous strain on the Canadian immigration system. In response, the Canadian government has developed an approach that sees officials conduct comprehensive security screenings to process these claims. However, the existence of the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) between Canada and the US has also created a challenge in dealing with this issue. In response, three approaches have emerged. The first involves completely eliminating the STCA. The second would see serious restriction of asylum claims and patrolling of borders, while the third would seek to maintain the status quo. However, the ideal solution is likely one that finds a middle ground, expediting the processing while also closing loopholes in the agreement.

Performing Borders: Queer and Trans Experiences at the Canadian Border

Biometric security and screening systems have revolutionized border crossings. As bodies move across the physical space of the borderland, the border moves through them, scanning and cataloguing and scrutinizing bodies for irregularity. While such technologies have been scrutinized, they have largely been so through heteronormative and cisnormative lenses that fail to recognize the vastly different experiences of nonbinary, nonconforming, transgender, and queer border crossers. This paper examines the implications of what we argue is the individualization of the border, and the effects of biometric security screenings for people whose bodies do not conform to heteronormative and cisnormative standards. We argue that border securitization increasingly equates body differences to narratives of threat and risk, which endangers nonbinary, trans, and queer border crossers, and places their safe passage at risk.

In-secure identities: On the securitization of abnormality

Highly securitized sites, such as airports, are increasingly using screening methods designed to purge racial profiling from their practices. In these contexts, not only are profiling methods seen as unlawful, but are also perceived as ineffective from a security perspective. Instead of basing security screenings on a perceived ‘dangerousness’ of social categories, these new screening methods aim to rely on automatic and objective criteria. This paper examines the shaping and effects of these security procedures, claiming that this redesigning of security technologies in accordance with practices which are presumably scientific, measurable and objective, has resulted in the creation of new categories of ‘threatening’ persons. Specifically, we show how the category of ‘normal’ has become central to security sorting and how, therefore – unintentionally yet necessarily – these procedures and technologies have become apparatuses of social normalization. People who deviate from given norms are thus singled out as potential security threats and are subjected to extended security probing, if not to outright violence. Tracing the effects of the increasing centrality of normalization processes to the management of securitized sites, this paper examines this reconfiguration of (ab)normality and explores the consequences of the securitization of social deviance.

Terahertz Frequency Continuous-Wave Spectroscopy and Imaging of Explosive Substances

Continuous-wave terahertz (THz) radiation spectroscopy was performed on high explosive materials using a tuneable optical parametric oscillator (OPO). Military grade, solid-phase, explosive substances, such as cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine (HMX), cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX), pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), and composition-4, were spectrally scanned over the 0.7–1.9 THz frequency range under experimental conditions modeling that of “real-world” security screenings. Spectral peak locations and spectral line broadening effects were quantified using a Lorentz lineshape fit algorithm. The full-width half-maximum (FWHM) parameter computed by the Lorentz fit algorithm was shown to help in the identification of samples with broad and sparse spectral characteristics. A concealed explosives identification scheme was demonstrated through raster scan THz frequency radiation imaging at specific OPO tuning frequencies.

Required security screenings for researchers: A policy analysis

After the attacks of 9/11/2001 the federal government implemented new policies intended to protect people and institutions in the United States. A surprising policy requires education researchers conducting research under contract to the U.S. Department of Education (ED) to obtain security clearances, sometimes known as security screenings. Contractor employees whose work meets any of four conditions are required to “undergo personnel security screenings.” Two of the four conditions are mandated by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, issued by President George W. Bush in 2004. This article focuses on the other two conditions triggering security screenings by ED, which are when contractor employees either “require access to unclassified sensitive information, such as Privacy Act-protected, personally identifiable, proprietary or other sensitive information and data” or “perform duties in a school or location where children are present.” Neither is a national security concern. Since 2007 the American Educational Research Association has objected to security screenings triggered by these two requirements; however, the policy was reissued by ED in July 2010. This article describes the experiences of contracting organizations and their employees. The majority have complied with the requirements, although often under duress. Two historical precedents are cited and discussed, when the government in the 1950s implemented loyalty oath provisions allegedly to protect citizens. Sociological and psychological research is explored that sheds light on people’s behavior when faced with requirements such as these screenings. A lengthy list of objections to the policy is explained and discussed.