Private Militaries and the Security Industry in Civil Wars

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seden Akcinaroglu ◽  
Elizabeth Radziszewski
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Conflict Zones ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Security Industry ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Conflict Termination ◽  
Military Services

Whether they train police forces in Afghanistan or provide military assistance to governments in Africa that are battling rebel groups, private military and security companies (PMSCs), or corporations that provide security and military services for profit, have been present in numerous conflicts around the globe. In 1984 only one international PMSC intervened in a civil war; in 1989 there were 15 international PMSCs present in conflict zones, while from 2003 to 2019 over 120 of such companies provided services during the Iraq war. Why do international PMSCs sometimes help with conflict termination while in other cases their intervention is associated with prolonged wars? And in what ways does market competition affect PMSCs’ military effectiveness? Relying on quantitative analysis of original data on international PMSCs’ involvement in civil wars from 1990 to 2008 and PMSCs’ human rights and fraud violations in Iraq from 2003 to 2019, the book investigates how local and global competition impacts accountability of these non-state actors and their contribution to the termination of major and minor wars.

External Interventions and Civil Wars: Why Focus on Non-State Actors?

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Seden Akcinaroglu ◽  
Elizabeth Radziszewski
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Conflict Zones ◽  
Specific Focus ◽  
State Actors ◽  
The Impact ◽  
External Interventions ◽  
Security Companies

Existing research on the impact of external interventions into civil wars focuses mostly on states and international organizations. With the expansion of private military and security companies’ (PMSCs) presence in civil wars, there is a need to better understand the impact of such non-state actors on conflict dynamics. This chapter highlights the importance of understanding conditions under which PMSCs are more militarily effective in conflict zones, describes the existing focus in the study of PMSCs, and introduces a new theoretical focus that links variation in market competition to military effectiveness. It addresses previous data in the study of PMSCs and focuses on the benefits of new data, with specific focus on international PMSCs’ presence in major and minor civil wars.

Market Factors and PMSCs’ Effectiveness in Conflict Termination

2020 ◽  
pp. 135-160
Author(s):  
Seden Akcinaroglu ◽  
Elizabeth Radziszewski
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Guerrilla Warfare ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Market Mechanisms ◽  
Conflict Zones ◽  
Market Factors ◽  
Conflict Termination ◽  
Positive Effect

This chapter presents the results of empirical analysis of local and global competition’s impact on PMSCs’ performance in civil wars from 1990 to 2008. Findings suggest that both market mechanisms contribute to conflict termination, but there is some limitation to the benefit. Mainly, local competition has a positive effect in major wars involving conventional tactics and some guerrilla warfare but is less significant in the most difficult conflict environments. Companies’ corporate structure, a factor linked to the global-competition dynamic, can affect military effectiveness in conflicts involving fewer casualties and more guerrilla warfare. The positive effect is also evident in hard-to-end conflicts but not the subset of the most complex environments, as publicly traded PMSCs may strategically avoid the most extreme conflict zones. Finally, results show that interventions by multiple PMSCs offer more benefits for conflict termination than interventions involving states or international organizations.

Private Military and Security Industry

2020 ◽  
pp. 23-78
Author(s):  
Seden Akcinaroglu ◽  
Elizabeth Radziszewski
Keyword(s):  
Positive Impact ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Global Competition ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Conflict Zones ◽  
Security Industry ◽  
Conflict Zone ◽  
The Government

This chapter describes existing international, domestic, and industry-wide approaches to improving PMSCs’ accountability in conflicts. It argues that monitoring PMSCs in the conflict zone remains a challenge for weak and strong states, though the problem is less severe for the latter, and limits PMSCs’ military effectiveness. The chapter argues that local and global competition among international PMSCs has the potential to improve military effectiveness by increasing accountability and shifting the balance of power in favor of the government, the most lucrative client of international PMSCs, with positive impact on reducing war duration. The focus is on improving military effectiveness in the area of skill and corporate professionalism, specifically PMSCs’ adherence to international humanitarian law and commitment to anti-fraud practices. The chapter shows why corporate professionalism matters for military effectiveness. It then highlights initial insights about the nature of international PMSCs’ presence in conflict zones from 1990 to 2008.

Why Factions Switch Sides in Civil Wars: Rivalry, Patronage, and Realignment in Sudan

2014 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 92-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee J.M. Seymour
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Ethnic Politics ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Weak States ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Southern Sudan ◽  
Organized Violence ◽  
Military Support ◽  
Nested Analysis

Side switching by armed groups is a prominent feature of many civil wars. Shifts in alignment have far-reaching consequences, influencing key outcomes such as civil war duration and termination, military effectiveness, levels of civilian victimization, and state-building prospects. In Sudan's wars, ideological and ethnic cleavages have not influenced factional alignments nearly as much as one might expect given the prominence of clashing political projects and ethnically organized violence in southern Sudan and Darfur. Recent explanations highlighting the role of territorial control, factional infighting, or relative power considerations also have limited value. In many wars fought in weak states characterized by low barriers to side switching, two mechanisms explain patterns of collaboration and defection: first, political rivalries that lead actors to collaborate in exchange for military support in localized struggles; and second, patronage-based incentives that induce collaboration for material gain. A nested analysis drawing on original data from wars in southern Sudan and Darfur supports this argument. The findings have implications for understanding alignments in civil wars, the role of weak states in counterinsurgency, and ethnic politics more generally, as well as policy relevance for factionalized civil wars.

Identity Change and Rebel Party Political Success

2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 454-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Ishiyama
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Identity Change ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Change Impact ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Name Changes ◽  
Political Success

Does a rebel party’s identity change impact its political success after civil wars end? Most work on political parties examines why parties change identities but does not examine the effects of such changes. In this article I examine whether identity change (indicated by party name changes and the official renunciation of violence) affects the political success of rebel parties in terms of seat shares won in the legislature, and inclusion into the executive. Using an original data set on rebel party identity change, I conduct both Prais–Winsten and logit regression analyses and find that although name changes have little impact on political success, renunciation of violence significantly increases the likelihood of both increased seat shares and inclusion in the executive. This finding has important implications regarding the impact of identity change and the transformation of rebel groups into political parties.

How leaders’ experiences and rebellion shape military recruitment during civil war

2020 ◽  
pp. 002234332095938
Author(s):  
Suparna Chaudhry ◽  
Sabrina Karim ◽  
Matt K Scroggs
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Prior Experience ◽  
Recruitment Strategies ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Combat Experience ◽  
Security Sector ◽  
Military Recruitment ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Risk Takers

The use of forced recruitment strategies during war can adversely affect military effectiveness and human rights. Given these costs, under what conditions do state leaders adopt coercive recruitment during civil wars? We find that between 1980 and 2009, states changed their recruitment practices 140 times during civil wars – half of which were towards coercive recruitment. Since structuralist explanations focus on factors that remain more or less constant over time, they cannot explain the frequency of these changes. Instead, we focus on individual-level factors and argue that leaders’ dispositions as risk-takers determine their beliefs about using force to solve collective action dilemmas during civil wars. Further, conflict context matters for leaders’ recruitment decisions – when rebel groups engage in coercive recruitment, leaders may also feel more justified in using such strategies. Using the LEAD Dataset and data on recruitment, we find that risk-tolerant leaders, including those who have had careers in the security sector, as well as those who have prior experience as a rebel or revolutionary leader, are more likely to use force to increase recruitment. While we theorize that this effect may be mitigated by combat experience, the evidence is mixed. Lastly, we find that rebels’ use of forced recruitment makes state leaders less likely to use voluntary recruitment.

Stick Then Carrot: When Do Governments Give Amnesty during Civil War?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley-Ann Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Government

Abstract Governments grant amnesties to rebel groups during civil wars and this is a puzzle. Why would the government offer an amnesty, which can be interpreted as a signal of weakness? In certain circumstances, offering amnesty is a rational policy choice. Governments should give amnesties when they are winning: the risk of misinterpreted signals is lessened, costs are low, rebel groups are weakened, and so amnesty can be used instrumentally to encourage defection or division among foot soldiers or as an incentive to leaders. Therefore, the government capitalizes on its military advantage and offers amnesty in a “stick then carrot” tactic. Using a database of amnesties during conflicts from 1990 to 2011, the article shows that governments are more likely to give amnesties following high rebel deaths. The use of amnesty during conflict is nuanced and context is important when understanding strategic choices.

A Motion of No Confidence: Leadership and Rebel Fragmentation

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 598-616 ◽  
Author(s):  
Austin C Doctor
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Proportional Hazards ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Cox Proportional Hazards ◽  
Stage I ◽  
Logistic Regression Models ◽  
Structure And Agency ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Cox Proportional Hazards Models ◽  
War Experiences

Abstract Why do rebel organizations splinter into competing factions during civil war? To explain this outcome, I leverage variation in rebel leadership. I argue that rebel leaders draw on their pre-war experiences—i.e., their military and political experiences—to manage their organizations during conflict. These experiences bear unique patterns of rebel management and, thus, corresponding risks of fragmentation. Empirical evidence comes from a two-stage research design and original data featuring over 200 rebel leaders from 1989 to 2014. In the first stage, I estimate the probability of group fragmentation with a series of logistic regression models. In the second stage, I use Cox proportional-hazards models to estimate leadership effects on the rate of group fragmentation. Results indicate that variation in rebel leadership corresponds with unique risks of fragmentation. In particular, the results suggest that leaders with real military experience are best equipped to maintain group cohesion. This study offers insight into the processes by which rebel groups splinter into armed factions. In addition, it makes an important contribution to the broader discussion on the roles of structure and agency in shaping the dynamics of civil war.

Concealing Conflict Markets: How Rebels and Firms Use State Institutions to Launder Wartime Trade

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Rachel Sweet
Keyword(s):  
State Agencies ◽  
Informal Networks ◽  
Conflict Zones ◽  
State Recognition ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Rebel Governance ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Border Trade ◽  
Trading Partners ◽  
Trade Deals

Abstract Although rebel groups are players on the international stage, little is known about their financial strategies at this scale. Existing research suggests that rebels succeed in cross-border trade by using informal networks that evade state authority. Yet rebels face a critical challenge: they operate in a normative environment that values state recognition and penalizes their illegitimate status. New evidence reveals that rebels can overcome this barrier and better connect to global economies not by evading the state but by infiltrating its institutions. Drawing on unprecedented data—the internal records of armed groups and their trading partners—I examine how rebels use state agencies in conflict zones to manufacture a legal cover for wartime trade. By using state agencies to provide false certification, rebels can place the stamp of state on their trade deals. This strategy of legal appropriation is a fundamentally different model of how conflict markets skirt sanctions and connect to global buyers. I develop a framework for how this strategy works that traces how international sovereignty norms and sanctions regimes create incentives for rebels, firms, and bureaucrats to coordinate around this legal veneer across the supply chain. The framework and evidence contribute theoretical and policy understandings for rebel governance, state building and fragmentation, and illicit global markets.

scholarly journals The Corporate War Dead: New Perspectives on the Demographics of American and British Contractors

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ori Swed ◽  
Jae Kwon ◽  
Bryan Feldscher ◽  
Thomas Crosbie
Keyword(s):  
Lived Experience ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Military Organizations ◽  
Security Industry ◽  
Legal Implications ◽  
History Of ◽  
War Dead ◽  
Military Activity

From an obscure sector synonymous with mercenaryism, the private military and security industry has grown to become a significant complementing instrument in military operations. This rise has brought with it a considerable attention. Researchers have examined the role of private military and security companies in international relations as well as the history of these companies, and, above all, the legal implications of their use in the place of military organizations. As research progresses, a significant gap has become clear. Only a handful of studies have addressed the complex of issues associated with contractors’ demographics and lived experience. This article sheds some light over this lacuna, examining contractors’ demographics using descriptive statistics from an original data set of American and British contractors who died in Iraq between the years 2003 and 2016. The article augments our understanding of an important population of post-Fordist-contracted workforce, those peripheral workers supplementing military activity in high-risk occupations with uncertain long-term outcomes.

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