Mendelssohn, Kant, and Religious Pluralism

Two foremost spokesmen for the German Enlightenment, Moses Mendelssohn and Immanuel Kant, continued the defence of the separation of church and state that was at the heart of the Enlightenment in general and advocated by such great predecessors as Roger Williams and John Locke and contemporaries such as James Madison. The difference between Mendelssohn and Kant on which I focus here is that while Mendelssohn argues against his critics that Judaism is the appropriate religion for a specific people without being appropriate for all, thus implying more generally that different religions are appropriate for groups with different histories, Kant argues first that Judaism is not a genuine religion at all, second that Christianity provides the most suitable symbols or aesthetic representations of the core truths of the religion of reason, and finally that in any case all historical religion will ultimately fade away in favour of the pure religion of reason. Kant’s assumptions are tendentious and his conclusion implausible; Mendelssohn’s view that religion and differences of religion are here to stay provides a far stronger basis for genuine toleration and a strict separation of church and state.

Judaism, Christianity, and the Religion of Pure Reason

This chapter reads Kant’s Religion as a response to Part II of Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem. Mendelssohn had argued that different peoples can have different ways of practicing the common religion of reason, and that the commandments of Judaism are intended only as occasions for reflection, valid for Jews, on these truths, while other religions can get at them in different ways. In the first two parts of his Religion, Kant argued that the central ideas of Christianity are uniquely well-suited as symbols of the religion of reason, and he further argued in Part III of the book that morality requires a single church of practitioners. However, he then argued that this church must be “invisible” and ultimately transcend all scriptural religion. Mendelssohn’s insistence on the acceptance of religious diversity seems more plausible than Kant’s confidence in the ultimate transcendence of all visible churches.

Reason and Experience in Mendelssohn and Kant

This work examines the lifelong intellectual relationship between Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86). Both engaged in a common project of striking the right balance between rationalism and empiricism, they sometimes borrowed from one another, often disagreed with one another, and can usefully be compared even when they did not directly interact. Their arguments and conclusions on metaphysical issues such as proofs of the existence of God, immortality, and idealism are examined; their works in aesthetics are compared; and the path-breaking work of both on the “religion of reason” and the separation of church and state are contrasted. Both philosophers turn out to have much to offer: Kant sometimes provides deeper insight into the underlying structure of human thought, but Mendelssohn is often the deeper student of the variety of human experience.

The Place of Hermann Cohen’s Ideas in the Philosophy of Dialogue

My aim is to prove that Hermann Cohen was not only a philosopher of dialogue but has played an exceedingly important role in the history of that current of thought. His books Ethics of Pure Will (1904) and Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism (1919) offer a detailed analysis of the relationships between I and Thou, I and It, I and We. In the first book these relationships are considered from the ethical-legal point of view and in the second from the viewpoint of religious anthropology. However, Cohen considers the problem of inter-personal relationships not in isolation, but as an important component of his entire philosophical system. Deduction of the concept of personality in Ethics of Pure Will is based on Cohen’s logic of the origin expounded in the first part of his system in The Logic of Pure Cognition. Cohen explains that the origin of the self-consciousness of I as a personality is not the external world, but another person, i.e. Thou. In turn, the partnership relationships between I and Thou create the community We which forms the basis of the law-governed state. The process of artistic creation in the framework of inter-personal relationship is explored in Aesthetics of Pure Feeling. Finally, Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism formulates the conception of religion as the most complete realisation of inter-personal relationship. Thus, dialogism became an important dimension of Cohen’s entire philosophical system, a fact noted by Martin Buber. Franz Rosenzweig, in unfolding dialogical thinking, expressly appeals to all the elements of Cohen’s system. There are signs of his influence on Bakhtin’s doctrine. Thus, examining Cohen’s doctrine as part of the philosophy of dialogue gives insights into this entire trend as a coherent whole.

Las Casas’ Articulation of the Indians’ Moral Agency

This article deals with Bartolomé de Las Casas’ contribution to the notion of universal human rights. Though much study has been devoted to Las Casas’ work, what remains understudied is the Spanish philosopher’s conception of religion, which in many ways resembles what Kant called “the religion of reason.” For Las Casas, then, Christianity was conceived more as a rational system of ethics than as a compendium of Biblical and scholastic dogmas. Like the later Enlightenment philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Las Casas believed that all humans belonged to the same universal community of rational beings. By examining Las Casas together with Fichte, this article sheds further light on Las Casas’ anticipatory notions of moral agency, formal freedom, rational religion, and the rights of a free people against the use of coercion—regardless of their race, religion, or culture. They are the ideas underpinning his notion of universal human rights (Paulist and Thomist in nature), and his ethics of the Other, who “is just like me”: a rational, feeling human being, deserving of equal justice and rights.

The Concept of Virtue in Religious Philosophy of Hermann Cohen

The concept of virtue was of great interest and importance for H. Cohen. In the interpretation of this concept in his latest work “Religion of reason from the sources of Judaism” the most important concepts of this work were brought in the focus: the specificity of definition of what is the religion of reason; understanding of the uniqueness of God; correlation; messianism. For Cohen, a single system of virtues presupposes a single and unique ethics and correlates with the idea of the unity of humanity. The last concept, in his opinion, maturated in the fold of monotheism. Humanity is one, because all people are creations of the unique God. “Religion of reason” treats of the common universal virtues. In the religion of reason, the idea of God and morality are inextricably linked. Cohen rejects metaphysical speculation about the nature of God, about the attributes of God inherent in himself. The religion of the mind speaks of God only in correlation with man. God is a moral ideal and reveals himself to man by giving him moral commandments. Morality connects man and God, and this connection is revealed in detail by Cohen in the theme of virtues. Understanding God as Truth is important for the disclosure of this topic. The corresponding virtue for a person is faithfulness to truth, or truthfulness. In addition to truthfulness in the usual sense, for Cohen, faithfulness to truth requires correct worship of God. The correlation culminates in the idea of messianism, which is interpreted by Cohen as an endless movement of a whole humanity to the social justice.

Hermann Cohen w drodze ku „Religii rozumu ze źródeł judaizmu”. Przystanek Breslau

Hermann Cohen on the Way to „Religion of Reason: Out of the Sources of Judaism” Breslau Stop On the way leading Hermann Cohen from his family Coswig to Marburg and — later — to Berlin, from a Jewish province to a multicultural metropolis, Breslau is a special point. The future philosopher came here in 1857, hoping for the future of fice of the rabbi, to begin studies at the newly established Jewish Theological Seminary. Here too, four years later, he enrolled at the university, opening up the prospect of an academic career. A special point, which allowed him to create in the next years an “impressive system” which is a bold attempt to present German and Judaism as identical or connected. Jewish and religious content was a permanent and constant component of Cohen’s works, and Religion of Reason and System of Philosophy form a whole. Already before the creation of works devoted to Kant, some features of Cohen’s philosophy of religion are revealed, which originated in his studies at Breslau, one of the most important Haskalah centers in the middle of the 19th century. Cohen found there an atmosphere conduciveto the later shaping of the science of the universal religion of reason. After many years, Cohen assessed the Jewish Theological Seminary as “the most important educational institution [of his] youth.”